



Annual Report to Congress

FISCAL YEAR 2023

**U.S. Department of Commerce
Bureau of Industry and Security**

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INTRODUCTION: U.S. SECRETARY OF COMMERCE GINA RAIMONDO

At the Department of Commerce, we use a range of defensive and offensive tools to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests and promote U.S. technological leadership. Fiscal Year 2023 (FY 2023) presented some of the most complex and important geopolitical challenges we've faced in over 20 years.

We are at a pivotal moment in history. Our national security and economic interests are bound together by technology in new, complex, and challenging ways. Authoritarian regimes are increasingly challenging global peace and security and the democratic, rules-based international order. In addition, technologies intended to create economic opportunity are being exploited to modernize militaries and weapons programs that destabilize international peace and security, facilitate cyber theft, and undermine democracy and human rights.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) operates at the nexus of U.S. national security, foreign policy interests, and U.S. strategic technology leadership, and it is critical to confronting these current and emerging global challenges.

The Biden-Harris Administration maintains its commitment to democratic values, working with our critical allies and partners, strengthening our national security and technological leadership, and prioritizing human rights.

As this Annual Report for FY 2023 makes clear, BIS plays a critical role in furthering our national security and foreign policy objectives, and its mission is more important than ever, especially in an era when democracy is in competition with autocratic governments for 21st century leadership.

First and foremost, BIS ensures that we play solid defense through export controls—BIS's administration and enforcement of these controls prevent the use of U.S. commodities, software, and technology, as well as certain foreign-produced items derived from or incorporating them, to support the militaries and destabilizing actions of countries and entities of concern. BIS also works to address the misuse of U.S. technologies to commit human rights abuses and implements treaty obligations to limit the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials. BIS understands that national security is a shared responsibility, which is why it works closely with counterparts throughout the Federal Government and internationally, as well as the private sector at home and abroad, to harmonize controls and detect, investigate, and prosecute export control violations and promote compliance.

Thanks to President Biden’s leadership, America has rebuilt bonds with allies and partners that share our values, which is a force multiplier for our export controls. Coordinating with allies and partners helps maximize the effectiveness of our controls, keeps a level playing field for U.S. companies, and helps maintain U.S. technological leadership and competitiveness. For example, we continue to engage with allies through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which I co-chair. The TTC’s Export Controls Working Group enables further coordination with our European partners on shared export control priorities. The TTC is just one such international coordination mechanism, along with the Japan-U.S. Commercial and Industrial Partnership (JUCIP) and others. We also continued to maintain policy and implementation alignment within the Global Export Control Coalition (GECC), which is comprised of the United States and 38 other global economies. This coalition of governments coordinates controls to hamper Russia’s ability to procure the critical inputs needed to fuel its war machine. This coordination ensures that our controls are effective and evenly impact all relevant industry across the coalition.

Furthermore, BIS’s effective administration of the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, industrial base assessments, and input into the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process collectively support our national security, competitiveness, defense industrial base, supply chain security, and critical infrastructure. Following the FY 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, BIS has focused on strengthening the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) workforce to adequately address the national emergencies related to Executive Order 13873 and Executive Order 13984.

Through these broad areas and others, BIS is instrumental to Department-wide efforts to build a stronger global security architecture that is anchored by U.S. and allied leadership and is animated by our shared commitments to democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and peaceful commerce.

TABLE OF ACRONYMS

ACE	Automated Commercial Environment
ACEP	Advisory Committee on Export Policy
AG	Australia Group
ANPRM	Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
BIS	Bureau of Industry and Security
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CBP Outbound	U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Outbound Division
CCL	Commerce Control List
CFIUS	Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
CJ	Commodity Jurisdiction
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DPAS	Defense Priorities and Allocations System
EAR	Export Administration Regulations
ECCN	Export Control Classification Number
ECP	Export Compliance Program
ECRA	Export Control Reform Act of 2018
EMCD	Export Management and Compliance Division
ERC	End-User Review Committee
ETTAC	Emerging Technology Technical Advisory Committee
FinCEN	Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
FIRRMA	Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICTS	Information and Communications Technology and Services
IEEPA	International Emergency Economic Powers Act
IIM	Intersessional Implementation Meeting

ITA	International Trade Administration
ITU	InformationTriage Unit
LD	Licensing Determination
MIC	National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NETTEM	New and Evolving Technologies Technical Experts Meeting
NOI	Notice of Inquiry
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSIP	National Security Investment Program
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
OAC	Office of Antiboycott Compliance
OC	Operating Committee
OESD	Office of Exporter Services' /Outreach and Educational Services Division
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
RPOC	Reinforced Points of Contact
SCC	Special Compliance Coordinator
TAC	Technical Advisory Committee
TEM	Technical Expert Meeting
TS	Technical Secretariat
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
USML	United States Munitions List
UVL	Unverified List
VEU	Validated End-User
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WRO	Western Regional Office

BIS MISSION STATEMENT AND OVERVIEW

MISSION: BIS advances U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by ensuring an effective export control and treaty compliance system and promoting continued U.S. strategic technology leadership.

OVERVIEW: BIS administers and enforces controls on the export of: (1) commercial and dual-use items, which have chiefly commercial uses but could be used in conventional arms and/or weapons of mass destruction, or to abuse human rights; and (2) certain less-sensitive military items that are not otherwise controlled by the Department of State under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Department of Commerce controls are implemented primarily under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), in coordination with several other federal agencies. The EAR set forth license requirements and licensing policy for exports of these items and incorporate controls on items identified on the control lists of the four major multilateral export control regimes: the Australia Group (AG) (chemical and biological nonproliferation); the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms and related commodities, software, and technologies). BIS also implements unilateral controls under ECRA authorities.

BIS participates in U.S. nonproliferation efforts related to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Additional Protocol to the U.S.-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement, and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Enforcement of the EAR is an essential aspect of the BIS mission. Enforcement efforts serve to encourage compliance, prevent and deter violators, disrupt illicit activities, and bring violators to justice. BIS investigates potential violations, supports criminal prosecutions and imposes administrative penalties, and helps evaluate the parties, end uses, and destinations of exports, re-exports, and in-country transfers of sensitive commodities, software, and technology. BIS also actively enforces prohibitions related to certain unsanctioned foreign boycotts.

BIS carries out activities to support the U.S. defense industrial base, including: investigating whether certain imports threaten to impair national security; conducting industry sector surveys and analyses; participating in the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process; administering the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS); maintaining a seat on the National Defense Stockpile Board; and providing the Department of Defense with recommendations on the proposed release of excess defense articles.

BIS consults closely with industry on the development of regulatory policy through its Technical Advisory Committees (TACs). The TACs provide valuable input on trends in technology and the likely impact of export control developments. BIS also conducts and participates in numerous outreach events throughout the United States and overseas to educate and update the public and international partners on export controls and policy.

Fiscal Year Highlights – 2023

1. **October 7 Rules:** On October 7, 2022, BIS announced the implementation of a series of targeted updates to its export controls as part of BIS's ongoing efforts to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. These updates restricted the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) ability to both purchase and manufacture certain high-end chips used in military applications. The updates built on prior policies, company-specific actions, and other regulatory, legal, and enforcement actions taken by BIS.

Following the implementation of these controls, which include item-based restrictions, entity-specific restrictions, and restrictions on services provided by U.S. persons, PRC's main semiconductor manufacturers, whose development is key to PRC's advanced chip needs, scaled back development and production plans.

2. **Russia/Belarus/Iran Controls:** In response to the Russian Federation's ongoing war against Ukraine, and Belarus's and Iran's complicity in that invasion, BIS issued 15 rules denying Russia, Belarus, and Iran access to critical technologies, equipment, and other items. These included rules expanding the scope of the Russian and Belarusian industry restrictions on oil and gas production, certain commercial and industrial items, and certain chemical and biological precursors, as well as the addition of entities to the BIS Entity List. Additionally, in response to the recovery of U.S.-branded parts and components from Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) found on the battlefield in Ukraine, BIS imposed a license requirement for low-technology items, including semiconductors, destined for Iran, amended the EAR to identify these items by Harmonized System (HS) codes, and created a new "Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) Rule" specific to Iran. These actions restricted Iran's ability to obtain items required to manufacture UAVs for use by Russia against Ukraine.
3. **Multilateral Regulatory Response:** BIS continued to work with a wide range of international partners to coordinate export control measures to degrade Russia's ability to access the items needed to sustain its war against Ukraine. This included regular coordination with the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan. As a result, the U.S., the EU, the UK, and Japan, which had all implemented similar stringent controls on Russia and Belarus through the GECC, published in July 2023 and subsequently updated in September 2023, a Common High Priority Items list to assist industry in combating Russian sanctions evasion efforts by exercising enhanced due diligence on the most critical items Russia seeks. Additionally, using this list, BIS has conducted extensive outreach to countries facing increased efforts by Russia to illicitly procure items for its defense industrial base. This outreach supports these countries' efforts to implement effective export controls to prevent Russia from circumventing GECC export controls.
4. **Disruptive Technology Strike Force:** In February 2023, the Departments of Commerce and Justice, alongside partners at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force to protect advanced technology from being unlawfully acquired by foreign adversaries. The Strike Force involves 14 different cells located throughout the United States that

are comprised of BIS, FBI, and HSI Special Agents and prosecutors from the local United States Attorney's Offices. Additionally, the Strike Force is supported by an interagency analytic cell in Washington, D.C. comprised of analysts from BIS, FBI, and HSI. During FY 2023, the Strike Force announced seven criminal actions, of which three also involved the imposition of a BIS Temporary Denial Order (TDO). The efforts of the Strike Force enabled BIS to announce the highest number of convictions, restitution, and months of imprisonment in BIS history in FY 2023.

5. **Enforcement Actions Against Russia/Belarus:** BIS applied innovative strategies to impede Russia's efforts to circumvent BIS controls, continued to work with the 39-member GECC to prevent the evasion of prioritized HS Code items to Russia, and conducted over 300 outreaches with U.S. exporters to Russia on regulation changes. In addition, BIS proactively worked with U.S. companies to identify diversion and transshipment risks, issued the first-ever "red flag" letters to U.S. companies, and publicly identified 130 commercial aircraft operating in Russia or Belarus in violation of U.S. export controls. Additionally, BIS issued its highest number ever of TDOs, most of which involved Russian and Belarusian airlines, as well as persons engaged in apparent violations of Russian controls. BIS also worked with the Department of Justice to criminally charge 16 separate individuals related to investigations involving unauthorized exports to Russia. . During FY2023, two individuals and two organizations were criminally sentenced related to investigations involving unauthorized exports to Russia. BIS further enhanced partnerships with interagency counterparts, like the Department of the Treasury to better link export controls and sanctions enforcement efforts, and with international partners, including through the Export Enforcement Five or E5 (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Group of Seven countries, to enhance information sharing and cooperation on enforcement. Finally, BIS created a Russia-Belarus Resource Page cataloguing all its actions (rules, enforcement actions, etc.) in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine.
6. **Section 1758 Technologies:** BIS remains committed to executing its statutory responsibilities under Section 1758 of ECRA to identify and implement appropriate controls on emerging and foundational technologies essential to our national security. Since the enactment of ECRA through the end of FY 2023, BIS identified 46 technologies for control pursuant to section 1758 of ECRA: 45 multilateral controls and 1 unilateral control (which expired in January 2023). In FY 2023, BIS published a rule implementing multilateral controls on four marine toxins due to their potential to be exploited for biological weapons purposes through novel synthesis methods and equipment: brevetoxins, gonyautoxins, nodularins, and palytoxin. Additionally, BIS published a proposed rule in April 2023 to control certain instruments for the automated synthesis of peptides (automated peptide synthesizers). The proposed rule follows BIS's September 2022 advanced notice of proposed rulemaking that sought public comments on the potential uses of this technology, particularly with respect to its impact on U.S. national security. In February 2023, BIS hosted a brain computer interface (BCI) conference with industry and academia to further BIS and the public's understanding of the current status and future developments in BCI technology, as well as the potential for export controls on certain related technologies. BIS has found that no new controls on BCI technologies are warranted at this time. Lastly, BIS's Section 1758 research and analysis aided in the development and implementation of controls on October 7, 2022, that restrict the PRC's ability to both purchase and manufacture certain high-end semiconductor chips that can further its military modernization.

7. **Strengthened Administrative Export Enforcement:** BIS strengthened its administrative enforcement policies by revising the voluntary self-disclosure process and speeding up issuance of post-conviction denial orders. In fact, BIS issued the highest number ever of post-conviction denial orders in FY 2023. BIS clarified that when parties deliberately decide to not disclose significant possible violations, such non-disclosure would be considered an aggravating factor under its Settlement Guidelines. BIS further incentivized the submission of disclosures concerning the conduct of others to have them come forward to report violations that others may have committed. On April 19, 2023, BIS imposed the largest standalone administrative penalty in history—a \$300 million penalty against Seagate related to their continued shipment of millions of hard disk drives to Huawei even after their two main competitors stopped shipping due to the foreign direct product rule.
8. **Strengthened Antiboycott Enforcement:** BIS strengthened antiboycott enforcement by making policy changes that apply to the resolution of administrative antiboycott enforcement matters. Specifically, BIS has: re-ordered the categories of violations set forth in the EAR’s penalty guidance to more accurately reflect the seriousness of the violations; raised penalty amounts; ended “no admit, no deny” settlements; and enhanced its focus on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. BIS also amended its boycott reporting form to require information about the party making boycott requests and added language to U.S. Government acquisition management websites to inform prospective contractors about the antiboycott rules.
9. **Additions to the Entity List:** In FY 2023, BIS added 465 entries to the Entity List (EL), actions that specifically addressed critical U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. At the conclusion of FY 2023, there were over 2,656 entries on the EL in 92 countries. BIS’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine included the addition of 296 entries in Russia, China, Iran, and other destinations in FY 2023 for contributing to or otherwise supporting Russia’s military or defense industrial base. BIS also continued implementing strong EL license requirements by applying the Russia/Belarus-Military End User foreign direct product rule to many of these entities to address the associated national security concerns. In addition to the continued attention on Russia, BIS added parties to the EL to address the efforts of nefarious actors to procure U.S.-origin items for unsafeguarded nuclear activities or missile-proliferation, or for human rights reasons.
10. **Unverified List and End-Use Check Activities:** BIS added 63 parties to the Unverified List (UVL) in FY 2023, which means BIS was unable to verify the legitimacy and reliability (bona fides) of these parties to engage in transactions involving exports under BIS jurisdiction. Additional restrictions under the EAR apply to parties added to the UVL. BIS also expanded the relationship between the UVL and the Entity List when it comes to host governments that do not timely schedule end-use checks by enabling the movement of parties from the UVL to the Entity List in such circumstances. The result of this regulatory change and related enforcement policy eliminated the backlog of end-use checks in China. Additionally, BIS completed over 1,500 end-use checks across the globe, the most ever in a single fiscal year.
11. **Academic Outreach Initiative:** BIS expanded the Academic Outreach Initiative to help academic institutions maintain an open, collaborative research environment in a way that also protects them from national

security risk. BIS partnered with an additional nine academic research institutions whose work gives them an elevated risk profile and assigned an OEE Special Agent to each institution, bringing the total number of universities under the initiative to 29.

12. **Continued Response to Russia's Use of Chemical Weapons:** BIS supported efforts to hold Russia accountable for its use of Chemical Weapons by providing input to national statements presented at meetings of the OPCW Policy-Making Organs and providing information to support the U.S. Government's goals regarding Russia's violation of the CWC. For example, in preparation for the OPCW's 104th Executive Council meeting and the annual Conference of States Parties, BIS provided chemical trade information to support the Eastern European Group's effort to oust Russia from its domination of this Group's representation at the OPCW. Russia ultimately lost its Executive Council seat for the first time since the CWC entry into force.
13. **Expansion of Nuclear Nonproliferation Controls:** On August 11, 2023, BIS expanded nuclear nonproliferation controls on the PRC and Macau to apply not only to items controlled by the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group export control regime, but also to items controlled unilaterally by BIS for nuclear nonproliferation column 2 (NP2) reasons, such as depleted uranium, graphite and deuterium for non-nuclear end use, and generators and other equipment for nuclear power plants. The purpose of these controls is to ensure such items are only used in peaceful activities such as commercial nuclear power generation, medical developments, and non-military industries. This action complements an order issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on August 8, 2023, suspending general license authority for the export of special nuclear material, source material, and deuterium for nuclear end use to the PRC.
14. **Strengthening the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Program:** Following the FY 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, BIS has focused on strengthening the ICTS workforce to adequately address the national emergencies related to Executive Order 13873, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," Executive Order 13984, "Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities," and Executive Order 14110, "Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence." The ICTS program increased its dedicated workforce from 11 full time employees at the start of FY 2023 to 32 at the end of FY 2023. Additionally, consistent with the factors enumerated in Executive Order 14034 "Protecting Americans' Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries", in June 2023, the ICTS program published a final rule, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain; Connected Software Applications." This rule amended the "Securing the Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain" regulations to clarify that connected software applications are ICTS. It also provided additional criteria that the Secretary may consider when determining whether ICTS transactions involving connected software applications present "undue" or "unacceptable" risks.
15. **Interagency and International Industry Guidance:** Multiple industry guidance documents were issued in collaboration with both interagency and international partners: Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and State alert on the impact of sanctions and export controls on Russia's military-industrial complex in October

2022; Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Justice Tri-Seal Compliance Note on cracking down on third-party intermediaries used to evade Russia-related sanctions and export controls in March 2023; Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, and Treasury guidance to industry on Iran's UAV-related activities in June 2023; FinCEN and BIS Joint Alert urging continued vigilance for potential Russian export control evasion attempts in March 2023; Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Justice Tri-Seal Compliance Note on voluntary self-disclosure of potential violations in July 2023; and E5 guidance for industry and academia on exporting commercial goods in September 2023.

REPORTING METRICS

BIS protects and promotes U.S. national security and foreign policy interests through a variety of tools that implement and enforce the EAR and support the U.S. defense industrial base. BIS also engages in a range of activities to implement and ensure compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Additional Protocol to the U.S. – IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

The following sections detail BIS's accomplishments in furtherance of these objectives.


Additions to the Entity List

BIS chairs and implements the decisions of the End-User Review Committee (ERC), the interagency group consisting of representatives from the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, State, and, where appropriate, the Treasury, that decides upon all additions to, removals from, or other modifications to the Entity List. The Entity List identifies foreign parties that are generally prohibited from being a party to a transaction involving items subject to the EAR unless the exporter, re-exporter, or transferor first receives a license. The ERC has determined that persons and entities on the Entity List have been involved, are involved, or pose a significant risk of being or becoming involved in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. Those entities present a greater risk of diversion to WMD and destabilizing military modernization programs, terrorism, enabling human rights abuses, or other activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. The Entity List is an important tool in preventing unauthorized trade in items subject to the EAR.

In FY 2023, BIS published 16 rules that added 465 entries to the Entity List.

Export License Processing

In FY 2023, BIS processed 37,943 license applications, approved 32,365 applications (85%), returned 4,998 applications without action (13%), and denied 580 applications (2%). BIS's average license application processing time in FY 2023 was 38 days, including time for review by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, as appropriate.



Through the licensing process, BIS carefully assesses each application, seeking recommendations and information from the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, the Intelligence Community, and other agencies as appropriate. BIS's Information Triage Unit (ITU) is responsible for assembling, analyzing, and disseminating information from all pertinent sources to inform agencies about the bona fides of foreign parties to a license application. During FY 2023, the ITU provided information relevant to 629 license applications. In addition, BIS end-use checks help ensure that exported and re-exported items have been, or will be, properly used as authorized and that license conditions are implemented. These activities prevent unauthorized trade and ensure entities and persons of concern are ineligible to receive items subject to the EAR.

Exports Under License

BIS obtains data from the Bureau of the Census (Census) on exports subject to BIS licensing requirements to evaluate the impact of controls on U.S. exports. In FY 2023, U.S. companies exported \$8.5 billion of items under a BIS license (0.4% of total U.S. exports). Exports made under a BIS license exception totaled \$18.2 billion, representing approximately 0.9% of overall U.S. exports.

License Applications Escalated for Interagency Resolution

Under Executive Order 12981, BIS's Operating Committee (OC)—with membership including the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State—is tasked with resolving interagency disagreement on specific license applications. In FY 2023, the OC reviewed 614 cases, and 45 cases were further escalated to the Assistant Secretary-level Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) for resolution.

Commodity Classifications

If an item is subject to the EAR, exporters need to assess if the item is described by an ECCN on the CCL. Items that are subject to the EAR but not described on the CCL are designated “EAR99.” The ECCN or EAR99 designation helps determine if a license requirement applies and, if so, the review policy that will inform the exporter of the likely outcome of a license application review. Other factors that help determine licensing requirements and review policies include the destination to which the item is being exported and the end user and intended end use of the item.


Although BIS provides web-based assistance to exporters to self-classify items, exporters often seek official classification determinations from BIS. Exporters may submit an official classification request to BIS where there is uncertainty and, in limited instances, may be required to do so because of the nature of the item. In FY 2023, BIS closed out 3,700 classification request applications, including 1,100 encryption requests, with an average response time of 201 days per classification request.

Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations

A commodity jurisdiction (CJ) request is used by exporters to determine whether an item or activity is subject to the EAR or is a defense article or defense service subject to the Department of State’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Exporters may request a CJ determination by submitting the request to the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, which has final jurisdiction determination authority. In FY 2023, BIS provided recommendations to the Department of State on 191 CJ requests.

Licensing and Export of Items Transferred from the USML to the CCL

In FY 2023, BIS’s Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security processed 12,328 export license applications for exports of “600 series” military items that were transferred from the Department of State’s United States Munitions List (USML) to the CCL. Of the “600 series” license applications, BIS approved 11,360 applications (92.1%), returned 926 applications without action (7.5%), and denied 42 applications (0.3%).



The “600 series” items with the highest number of approved license applications included military aircraft and related commodities classified under ECCN 9A610 (4,955), followed by military electronics classified under ECCN 3A611 (2,013), military aircraft technology under ECCN 9E610 (1,459), and military gas turbine engines and related commodities under ECCN 9A619 (1,146).

In FY 2023, U.S. companies exported 181,114 shipments of “600 series” items, with a value of over \$8.0 billion. The top exported “600 series” category (by value) was military aircraft and related commodities under ECCN 9A610, with 99,422 shipments valued at \$3.4 billion.

The top destinations for U.S. exports of “600 series” items (by value) included Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The license designations most often used by U.S. exporters to export “600 series” items were: BIS license (45.6%), No License Required (12.3%), and License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (12.0%).

Spacecraft systems and related items previously controlled on the USML that were transferred to the CCL are classified under “9x515” ECCNs. In FY 2023, BIS processed 670 export license applications for these spacecraft-related items. Of these, BIS approved 592 (88.4%), returned 76 applications without action (11.3%), and denied two (0.3%). During the same time period, U.S. companies exported 5,344 shipments of “9x515” items for a total value of \$1.1 billion.

Spacecraft and related commodities classified under ECCN 9A515 were both the greatest number of “9x515” items exported, with 4,166 shipments valued at \$ 1.1 billion. The license designations most frequently reported by

exporters were No License Required (48.3%), BIS license (40.6%), and License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (17.8%).

Firearms and related items previously controlled on the USML that were transferred to the CCL are classified under “0x5zz” ECCNs. In FY 2023, BIS processed 6107 export or re-export license applications for these firearms-related items. Of these, BIS approved 5211(85.3%), returned 391 applications without action (46.4%), revoked 433 applications (7.1%) and denied 72(1.2%). During the same time period, U.S. companies exported 27,360 shipments of “0x5zz” items for a total value of \$1.2 billion.

Non-automatic firearms including rifles and pistols classified under ECCN 0A501 were the greatest number of “0x5zz” items exported, with 16,759 shipments valued at \$468.8 million. The top destinations for these exports, by value, were Canada, Germany, and Australia. The license designations most frequently reported by exporters were BIS license (64.0%), License Exception Limited Value Shipment (25.3%) and No License Required (10.8%).

BIS’s Munitions Control Division conducted 79 re-series compliance reviews during FY 2023. Compliance reviews allow for the counselling of exporters on the EAR, record keeping requirements, and identification and correction of filing errors as well as identification and referral to Export Enforcement. Of the 79 completed compliance reviews, 86% were considered compliant or otherwise identified no violations of the EAR. Any reviews identifying apparent violations are referred to Export Enforcement for further action as appropriate.

Validated End-User Program

The Validated End-User (VEU) program is a program that facilitates high-technology civilian trade between the United States and VEU-eligible countries (currently China and India). Exporters’ use of Authorization VEU reduces the licensing burden on industry by allowing U.S. exporters to ship designated items to pre-approved entities under a general authorization instead of individual export licenses and allows U.S. Government review of technology roadmaps, compliance plans, and customers.

At the close of FY 2023, there were 11 VEUs in China with 47 eligible destinations and 1 VEU in India with 3 eligible destinations. Since the effective date of the VEU program in June 2007, U.S. companies have made approximately 3,300 shipments totaling \$ 686 million worth of controlled items to the VEUs, including 411 export shipments worth approximately \$7.7 million to VEUs in FY 2023.

Unverified List and Military End-User List

In addition to the requirements found elsewhere in the EAR, persons listed on the Unverified List (UVL) are ineligible to receive items subject to the EAR by means of a license exception. Such persons must also sign a UVL statement, agreeing to comply with the EAR and consent to an end-use check, before receiving any items subject to the EAR that are not subject to a license requirement. BIS added 63 persons to the UVL in FY 2023 and removed 83 persons. The UVL's requirements enhance BIS's ability to conduct end-use checks and increase U.S. Government insight into potential transactions of concern involving foreign parties whose bona fides BIS has been unable to verify.

The Military End-User (MEU) List identifies entities that have been determined by the ERC to be "military end users" pursuant to § 744.21 of the EAR. That section imposes additional license requirements on, and limits the availability of, most license exceptions for exports, re-exports, and transfers (in country) to listed entities on the MEU List, as specified in supplement no. 7 to part 744 and § 744.21 of the EAR. In November 2021, BIS added one entity in Russia to the MEU List. Subsequently, in February 2022, in response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, BIS removed all 45 Russian entities from the MEU List and made them subject to the more restrictive license requirements of the Entity List. In December 2021, BIS also added a country heading for Cambodia to the MEU List, but no entities were added under this country heading. In FY 2023, BIS removed one entity from the MEU List.

Licensing Determinations

Licensing Determinations (LDs) establish whether a license is or was required for a given transaction and are the first step in many successful enforcement actions. In making LDs, BIS licensing officers analyze the commodities, software, and technologies involved in potential violations to determine the proper classification of the item and the licensing requirements associated with them based on the facts of the case. LDs are used to support enforcement actions by BIS and other agencies in connection with potential violations of the EAR.

In FY 2023, BIS completed 1,476 LDs for BIS's Office of Export Enforcement. In addition, BIS processed 1,935 LDs for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and DHS in support of their respective investigations of potential unlawful exports.

Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Supply Chain

BIS formally took over the ICTS mission with the enactment of the 2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (March 15, 2022). This mission originated from Executive Order 13873, which grants the Secretary of Commerce the authority to review and determine whether an ICTS transaction or class of transactions involving an entity subject to the

jurisdiction, control, or direction of a foreign adversary and U.S. persons pose an “undue” or “unacceptable” risk to national security or the safety and security of U.S. persons. If such a finding is made, the Secretary is authorized, in consultation with appropriate Executive Branch agency heads, to prohibit or mitigate the transaction or class of transactions (as set forth by Executive Order 13873 and 15 CFR Part 7). The ICTS program focuses its reviews on ICTS used in critical infrastructure, as designated by Presidential Policy Directive 21; used in the digital economy; that uses, processes, or retains sensitive personal data of U.S. Persons; and that connects with and communicates via the internet. The ICTS program has issued regulations, such as the “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain” Interim Final Rule, to implement these authorities, and continues to address risks to the ICTS supply chain through its investigation authorities granted to the Secretary. The ICTS mission is further defined through the incorporation of Executive Order 13984, “Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber- Enabled Activities,” which addresses the use of United States Infrastructure as a Service products by foreign malicious cyber actors, and provisions articulated in Executive Order 14110 on “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.” The Department’s ICTS program continues to work with its interagency partners and stakeholders as it develops regulations to implement these new authorities into its mission.

As the scope and depth of the ICTS mission has grown, BIS has built up the ICTS program to help protect the U.S. ICTS supply chain, critical infrastructure, and U.S. persons. This process is ongoing, and the ICTS program increased its dedicated workforce from 11 full time employees at the start of FY 2023 to 32 at the end of FY 2023. Further, the team is supported through the execution of contract support bolstering the team with 24 contractors in FY 2023 for a combined total of 56 employees within the ICTS program.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES UPDATE

Fulfilling BIS's mission of promoting national security depends heavily upon international cooperation with our allies and partners and countries of strategic importance, such as major technology suppliers and transshipment hubs. Whether seeking to control the spread of dangerous items, including technologies, protect critical infrastructure, or ensure the existence of a strong defense industrial base, international cooperation is critical.

As ECRA recognizes, effective implementation and enforcement of export controls is greatly enhanced by both international cooperation and an effort to harmonize the substance of U.S. laws with those of our allies and partners.

The U.S. Government maintains a cutting-edge export control system, developing controls that protect national security by preventing unauthorized uses of controlled items, BIS works closely with international partners to share information and establish consistency in controls.

Australia Group

The Australia Group (AG), formally established in 1985, is a multilateral export control regime composed of 43 member countries, including the United States and European Union member states. The AG seeks to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons through the harmonization and enhancement of national export controls, sharing of information, enforcement best practices and experiences, exchanges on global proliferation activities, and outreach to non-members. The AG plenary is held annually, and one intersessional implementation meeting is often held at a separate time during the year. Additionally, AG members communicate between meetings to review and refine the list of controlled chemicals, biological agents, and related equipment and technology.

During February 22-24, 2023, the AG held an Intersessional Meeting (IM) in Rome, Italy, which included submeetings of the New and Evolving Technology Technical Experts Meeting (NETTEM), the Implementation Meeting (IM), and an export Enforcement Exchange (EE). The NETTEM reviewed emerging technologies, including developments in production equipment and technology, synthetic biology, novel delivery systems, chemical and biological convergence, artificial intelligence, and evolving biosecurity concerns. The IM featured proposals to review the process for adding or removing items from the control lists, a proposal for the addition of neosaxitoxin, and a discussion of the addition of peptide synthesizers to the AG Common Control List (AG CCL). EE presented numerous case studies of CB-related export violations and investigations. The annual Plenary was held in Paris, France from June 5-9, 2023, and also included submeetings of the NETTEM, IM, and EE. The NETTEM discussed technologies such as technology for lithium ion batteries, e and phage nanotechnologies, electrochemistry, and dual-use research of concern. The IM addressed formal proposals for the addition of peptide synthesizers, single use centrifugal

separators, and dipropylamine to the common control lists. EE also shared multiple case studies of export-related investigations.

In FY23, the AG removed cholera toxin from the AG CCL and added four marine toxins (brevetoxins, gonyautoxins, nodularins, and palytoxin). Both changes were proposed by the Department of Commerce to advance U.S. national security interests. Elimination of cholera toxin controls was driven by the toxin's low threat and potency as a weapon and its increased use in medical research for promising therapeutic uses. In contrast, addition of the marine toxins was based on findings that these toxins could be weaponized consistent with other toxins already controlled by the U.S. and our partners in the AG. The AG also amended a technical note to the Chemical Weapons Precursor Control List to clarify that the list captures stereoisomers and isotopically-labeled forms of scheduled chemicals, even if they have different CAS numbers. Additionally, the AG revised the definition of "disinfected" on the Dual-Use Biological Equipment List to more closely reflect the use of this term by the scientific and industrial communities. Finally, the AG adopted several changes to the nomenclature of certain bacterial and fungal plant pathogens to be consistent with current scientific taxonomy and nomenclature.

In FY 2023, BIS approved 4,036 license applications valued at \$3.9 billion for the export or re-export of AG CCL items, which BIS controls for chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation reasons. BIS denied 14 applications for such items valued at \$5.5 million and returned without action 113 applications valued at \$84.5 million.

Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established in 1987, is a multilateral export control regime of 35 member countries (Partners) that have agreed to coordinate their national export controls to prevent missile proliferation.

An MTCR Plenary was held October 17-21, 2022, in Montreux, Switzerland, that also included a Technical Experts Meeting (TEM), Information Exchange (IE), and a Licensing and Enforcement Experts Meeting (LEEM).

The Plenary included discussions of regional proliferation, outreach to non-Partners, and membership issues, though no new members were admitted. The LEEM consisted of presentations from many Partners on licensing and enforcement case studies and best practices.

The TEM discussed several proposals to edit the MTCR's Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex (the Annex). The U.S. has several outstanding proposals that were also the subject of further discussion, including a proposal for the modified treatment of certain less-capable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

An intersessional TEM was held from June 12-15, 2023, in Oslo, Norway. Topics of discussion were similar to those at the Montreux TEM, as proposals were further refined towards possible consensus.

In FY 2023, BIS approved 1,215 export or re-export applications that included missile technology-controlled items, valued at \$13.1 billion. In addition, BIS denied eight applications for such items valued at \$55.7 million and returned without action 48 applications valued at \$27.0 million.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multilateral export control regime that was formally established in 1992 and now includes 48 participating governments (PGs). The regime seeks to impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of guidelines for the control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue the aims of the NSG through voluntary adherence to the NSG Guidelines, which are adopted either by consensus or through exchanges of information on developments of nuclear proliferation concern.

The Annual Plenary of the NSG was held from July 10-14, 2023, in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Membership was discussed, with the United States and other PGs strongly supporting India's membership, but consensus was not reached on any pending application. Agreement was made to further outreach between the NSG and industry.

A LEEM and IE meeting were held in conjunction with the Plenary and topics discussed therein included efforts in training, new laws, further development of export control regulations, new export control procedures related to trade and their effects, catch-all controls for non-listed goods relevant to non-proliferation, intangible technology transfer (ITT), outreach to academia relevant to controlled technologies, prosecution of export control violations, and new technologies for awareness.

The Technical Experts Group (TEG) agreed on five proposals that were adopted by the Plenary related to heavy water, platinized catalysts, hydrogen-cryogenic distillation columns, and composite structures in the form of tubes. The TEG chair also reported on ongoing work related to nuclear fuel reprocessing and preparations, reactor components and systems, heavy water production, material processing and machining, nuclear-related chemical processes and switching devices.

In FY 2023, BIS approved 1,710 export or re-export applications that included items controlled for nuclear non-proliferation reasons, valued at \$6.8 billion. In addition, BIS denied 28 applications for such items valued at \$23.6 million and returned without action 160 applications valued at \$120.0 million.

Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement or Wassenaar) is a multilateral regime addressing export controls on conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. The Wassenaar Arrangement was founded in 1996 to replace the

East-West technology control program under the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls regime that ended in 1994. There are currently 42 countries participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement. As with other international export control regimes, Wassenaar Arrangement participating states are required to report approvals and denials of certain items controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement. Reporting denials helps bring to the attention of member countries attempts to obtain strategic items that may undermine the objectives of the Wassenaar Arrangement.

International security developments, technological change, and market trends continued to inform the work of the Wassenaar Arrangement. In FY 2023, Wassenaar members agreed to update the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions and Dual-Use Lists and to continue implementation of the work program and the functioning of its Secretariat. Changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement Control Lists include finalizing permanent controls on forensic and investigative cyber tools, communications monitoring tools and sub-orbital aircraft. Controls were updated on supersonic aircraft and thresholds for controls on software and technology controls related to digital computer development, and clarified for satellite navigation systems jamming equipment, optical underwater data links, and vessel propulsion systems. Controls were relaxed on low-power lasers used in automotive and industrial applications.

In FY 2023, the Wassenaar Arrangement continued its efforts to contribute to international and regional security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. During FY 2023, Wassenaar members updated several of its public documents regarding implementation of export controls, Best Practices for Very Sensitive List Items and End-User Assurances Commonly Used, Consolidated Indicative List.

In FY 2023, BIS approved 21,317 applications, valued at \$103.7 billion for the export or re-export of Wassenaar items, which BIS controlled for national security reasons. In addition, BIS denied 183 applications valued at \$3.0 billion and returned without action for 1,446 applications valued at \$6.7 billion.

TREATY COMPLIANCE

The Department of Commerce, through BIS, serves as the lead agency for ensuring U.S. industry compliance with the CWC, BWC, and the OPCW, as well as the lead agency for implementation of the Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States. BIS also participates in activities to strengthen international implementation of the BWC.

Chemical Weapons Convention

The United States ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997. The CWC provides for an extensive verification regime to ensure CWC States Parties' adherence to its terms. BIS works actively with the Department of State, other CWC States Parties, and the Technical Secretariat (TS) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization charged with implementing the CWC, to ensure that all States Parties are implementing the CWC's provisions in a rigorous, analytically sound, and equitable manner. The United States recognizes 192 States Parties to the CWC.

The CWC requires many commercial chemical facilities to submit compliance data in the form of declarations that include chemical production, processing, consumption, and import/export activities. It also requires chemical traders to submit reports on exports and imports of scheduled chemicals. BIS compiles and submits this information to the U.S. National Authority (Department of State) to transmit to the TS of the OPCW. The CWC also requires on-site facility inspections when certain quantitative threshold activity levels are triggered. BIS is the lead agency for on-site inspections conducted at U.S. facilities not owned or leased by the Department of Defense or Energy.

During FY 2023, BIS submitted 617 declarations and reports from U.S. facilities and trading companies to the OPCW. BIS's Host Teams managed 14 inspections at domestic chemical facilities in FY 2023, ensuring the protection of the facilities' confidential business information and other trade secrets, and minimizing the imposed burden.

In July 2023, BIS published a final rule to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) by reducing the concentration threshold level above which mixtures containing a Schedule 2A chemical are subject to declaration requirements for production, processing, consumption, export, or import under the CWC. These regulatory amendments bring the CWCR into further alignment with guidelines adopted by the OPCW Conference of the States Parties (CSP), which established a low concentration limit for Schedule 2A chemicals.

BIS gathered responsive data and prepared the congressionally mandated annual certification that the legitimate commercial activities and interests of the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical industry in the United States were not significantly harmed by the limitations imposed by the CWC on access to Schedule 1 chemicals.

Additionally, BIS gathered and provided responsive data to the U.S. National Authority for its annual report on the cost of inspections for both industry and the U.S. Government.

BIS supported the permanent U.S. delegation to the OPCW during meetings of the Conference of States Parties, Executive Councils, and other meetings of the policy-making and technical organs of the OPCW in The Hague, Netherlands.

Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement

The Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty between the United States and the IAEA that supplements and amends verification arrangements under the existing U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The Additional Protocol requires the United States to provide the IAEA with information on certain civil nuclear and nuclear-related items, materials, and activities not covered by the Safeguards Agreement.

The Additional Protocol entered into force for the United States on January 6, 2009. Under Executive Order 13458, BIS is the lead agency for all subject commercial activities and locations not licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or an NRC Agreement State and not located at certain other government sites. BIS administers the compliance program involving private sector nuclear fuel cycle activities that are not subject to the jurisdiction of the NRC. BIS receives declarations from industry, academia, the NRC, and the Department of Energy to assemble the U.S. national declaration and other reports for submission to the IAEA. All declared activities and locations are vetted by the Departments of Defense and Energy for national security concerns and reviewed by Congress. In FY 2023, BIS submitted to the IAEA the annual Additional Protocol declarations containing 298 changes and new activities, and quarterly reports to the IAEA covering a total of 261 exports of nuclear-related equipment and materials.

Biological Weapons Convention

The BWC prohibits developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining biological agents or toxins for non-peaceful purposes. The BWC entered into force in 1975. In 2001, international efforts to develop a verification protocol for the BWC failed because the draft protocol would not have strengthened confidence in compliance with the BWC and would have restricted the potential scope of its prohibitions, removed effective barriers to proliferation, and put national security and confidential business information at risk. As written, the BWC establishes the international norm prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons.

In FY 2023, BIS actively supported U.S. Government efforts, in accordance with the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, to improve confidence in and compliance with the BWC, through a two-pronged initiative. The first was to seek agreement to adopt and implement widely supported measures to strengthen the Convention. The second was to support a new working group (WG) to examine options to enhance confidence and promote compliance informed by developments in science and technology and the evolution of the biological weapons threat over the last two decades.

In December 2022, these efforts were realized when the 9th Review Conference established a working group (WG) to strengthen the BWC with a mandate to “identify, examine and develop specific and effective measures, including possible legally-binding measures, and to make recommendations to strengthen the Convention in all its aspects.”

BIS advocated for the new WG process to prevent undermining of export controls, sanctions regimes, or related national prerogatives, and promote a shared vision of practical, cooperative action to strengthen national implementation of the BWC. BIS continues to bring the U.S. industry's perspective into discussions on the full range of issues pertinent to the BWC through consultations with the U.S. private sector through its Materials Technical Advisory Committee and various trade and professional associations.

INDUSTRY OUTREACH AND COMPLIANCE

BIS continues to inform the regulated community about changes to regulations. Outreach activities in FY 2023 included BIS seminars, industry group meetings, small and medium sized business conferences, webinars, meetings with foreign governments, and outreach to foreign business communities. These events predominantly online during the fiscal year. BIS also deployed web-based decision tools to assist exporters.

Seminars and Conferences

BIS conducted its 36th annual Update Conference on Export Controls and Policy from March 27-29, 2023. The in-person conference was attended by 1,045 paying registrants, with 1,312 attendees in all, including attendees from 24 foreign countries. The theme of the two-and-a-half-day conference was “Partnerships in Global and National Security,” and international partner speakers were featured in the keynote address by Oksana Markarova, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United States, and a session on international cooperation and export controls. Other sessions covered a wide range of topics, including information and communications technology and services (ICTS), the foreign direct product and *de minimis* rules, emerging technology, human rights due diligence, semiconductor tools, advanced computing and supercomputers, a Russia brief, a China brief, and perspectives from BIS export control officers abroad on protecting U.S. national security through global engagement. The U.S. Bureau of the Census at the Department of Commerce and the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of the U.S. Department of State also presented sessions. The conference also featured keynote addresses from Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, Deputy Secretary of Commerce Don Graves, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Alan F. Estevez, and Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod.

BIS’s export outreach and educational offerings constitute the first line in BIS’s contact with exporters and provide guidance and transparency to new, as well as experienced, exporters regarding the EAR. BIS counseling operations have been instrumental in assisting the exporting community in understanding and complying with critical national security and foreign policy-based regulations. Each year, counselors in the BIS Office of Exporter Services’ Outreach and Educational Services Division (OESD) and Western Regional Office (WRO) provide regulatory, policy and process guidance to tens of thousands of exporters, freight forwarders, universities, and individuals assisting them in meeting their obligations under the EAR.

Counseling

BIS received 32,151 phone and email inquiries through its counseling programs at OESD in Washington, D.C., and 7,153 through the Western Regional Office in California. Through these programs, BIS offers guidance on regulations, policies, and practices and helps to increase compliance with U.S. export controls.

BIS provides one-on-one counseling assistance on both coasts for extended periods of operation each day. Counselors also conduct numerous highly regarded seminars for the high-technology communities most affected by export control regulations. BIS restructured the seminar organization and content to offer this training online, dramatically expanding the potential audience for these programs. These online events have proven to be particularly beneficial for small- and medium-sized businesses that operate with limited time and financial resources for compliance training.

BIS conducted two live online export control seminars, and seven in-person seminars in FY 2023. These seminars attracted a total of 1,237 participants and provided guidance to new and experienced exporters regarding the EAR, including an overview of changes in export policy and licensing procedures, the requirements for developing Export Management Control Programs, re-export controls, and encryption compliance, as well as technical data issues. Of the attendees who participated in post-event surveys, 95% rated the seminars either “very good” or “excellent.”

BIS continued to offer online training videos in FY 2023, introducing key regulatory and process concepts to the business community. The agency has produced a total of 16 videos that had over 46,381 views in FY 2023 alone. The intent behind the initiative was to enable small and new-to-export firms access to clear and concise guidance, delivered in a viewer-friendly format, via the agency’s website and YouTube channel.

Technical Advisory Committees (TAC)

BIS’s Technical Advisory Committees (TACs) advise the Department of Commerce on the technical parameters and administration of export controls applicable to commodities, software, and technology subject to BIS jurisdiction. The TACs are composed of representatives from industry, academia, and Government representing diverse points of view on the concerns of the exporting community. Industry representatives are selected from firms producing a broad range of goods, technologies, and software presently controlled for national security, foreign policy, nonproliferation, and short supply reasons or that are proposed for such controls, balanced to the extent possible among large and small firms.

TAC members are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce and serve terms of not more than four consecutive years. The membership reflects the Department's commitment to attaining balance and diversity. TAC members must obtain secret-level clearances prior to appointment. These clearances are necessary so that members can be permitted access to relevant classified information needed in formulating recommendations to the Department of Commerce. Each TAC meets approximately four times per year. Members of the TACs are not compensated for their services.

BIS has seven TACs. While the President's Export Council Subcommittee on Export Administration was not staffed in FY 2023, the other six are:

- 1.) **Emerging Technology Technical Advisory Committee (ETTAC)** - consists of members with specific technical or export control expertise to identify emerging technologies with potential dual-use applications as early as possible in their developmental stages both within the United States and abroad. In its work the committee focuses on both the current state of such technologies and projecting their likely effects five to ten years in the future on national security, the U.S. defense industrial base, and the overall health and competitiveness of the U.S. economy.
- 2.) **Materials and Equipment Technical Advisory Committee (METAC)** - consists of members with specific technical or export control expertise in materials, chemicals, microorganisms, toxins, chemical and biological weapons, metals, nuclear power and associated materials, and specific technical or export control expertise in machine tools and robotics.
- 3.) **Transportation Technical Advisory Committee (TRANSTAC)** - consists of members with specific technical or export control expertise in transportation and related equipment, including gas turbine engines, airframes and overall aircraft integration, avionics, accelerometers, gyroscopes, and inertial navigation.
- 4.) **Information Systems Technical Advisory Committee (ISTAC)** - consists of members with specific technical or export control expertise in information systems and related software and technology, including encryption and information security, semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, high performance computers and microprocessors, telecommunications technology, and instrumentation.
- 5.) **Sensors and Imaging Technical Advisory Committee (SITAC)** - consists of members with specific technical or export control expertise in sensor and laser systems, including video cameras, radars, uncooled and cooled infrared imagers, shortwave imagers, low light-level imagers, magnetic sensors, infrared thermometry equipment, firefighting cameras, diode pumped lasers, optical fibers, wireless sensors, and hydrophones.
- 6.) **Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory Committee (RPTAC)** - consists of not more than 50 members from a multi-discipline group of exporters, consultants, freight forwarders, and attorneys whose focus is on review of regulations prior to their issuance.

Each TAC meeting is led by a chairperson nominated by the committee. In addition, a Designated Federal Officer from BIS is also assigned to each TAC to ensure that the mission of the TAC is fulfilled, and the process of the TAC is consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act. In FY 2023, BIS TACs convened 23 hybrid meetings.

Export Compliance Program

During FY 2023, the BIS Office of Exporter Services' Export Management and Compliance Division (EMCD) conducted 27 Export Compliance Program (ECP) reviews of corporate or university export compliance programs. In March 2023, EMCD held its first in-person Complying with U.S. Export Controls seminar since 2019 in Los Angeles, CA. It also participated in in-person and virtual training opportunities for a wide range of audiences, including the Society for International Affairs' (SIA) virtual Back to Basics Conference and virtual Spring Advanced Conference; the Association for University Export Control Officers annual conference; the California State University Export Control Officers Forum; a Department of State-sponsored Technology Transfer Workshop between representatives of the U.S. government and Argentina; and an Enforcement conference with Malaysian government representatives.

EMCD also conducted seven remote compliance reviews to identify and counsel exporters with anomalies in filing in the Automated Export System (AES). Four reviews resulted in referrals to Export Enforcement for further action. EMCD initiated these reviews, involving 40 transactions, to identify the specific reasons these errors occurred, provide guidance to exporters on correcting them, offer export counseling assistance to enhance their compliance with the EAR, and where necessary, refer to Export Enforcement for further action. The majority of these parties were small- to medium-sized exporters who had never previously received any formal export control training.

Enforcement Outreach

BIS also maintains a constructive and cooperative relationship with the business community through outreach programs sponsored by BIS's Office of Export Enforcement. In FY 2023, OEE conducted 1,813 outreaches to industry, including 324 to parties with a history of exporting to Russia. BIS also for the first-time issued "red flag" letters to U.S. companies identifying third parties supplying Russia with U.S. items to prevent diversions. Similarly, BIS's Project Guardian focuses on specific items that illicit proliferation networks actively seek to acquire. BIS contacts U.S. manufacturers and exporters of these items to apprise them of these acquisition threats and to solicit cooperation in identifying and responding to suspicious purchase requests. BIS initiated 37 Project Guardian leads (i.e., alerts to Special Agents about a suspicious transaction) in FY 2023.

Export Enforcement also expanded its Academic Outreach Initiative to help academic institutions maintain an open, collaborative research environment in a way that also protects them from national security risk. The domains of national security and academia are increasingly interconnected, and U.S. technological leadership and economic dynamism stem from the strength of U.S. academic institutions. BIS partnered with an additional nine academic research institutions whose work gives them an elevated risk profile and assigned an OEE Special Agent to each institution, bringing the total number of universities under the initiative to 29.

Published Guidance

BIS issued multiple industry guidance documents in collaboration with both interagency and international partners during FY23. BIS, with the Departments of Treasury and State, published an alert on the impact of sanctions and export controls on Russia's military-industrial complex in October 2022. In March 2023, BIS and Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) also published the first-ever Joint Alert urging continued vigilance for potential Russian export control evasion attempts and providing a reporting mechanism for financial institutions. Additionally, BIS published tri-seal guidance advisories with the Departments of the Treasury and Justice on cracking down on third-party intermediaries used to evade Russia-related sanctions and export controls (also March 2023) and on voluntary self-disclosures (in July 2023). In June, BIS, with the Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury, published guidance to industry on Iran's UAV-related activities, and in September, published guidance for industry and academia on exporting commercial goods with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (under the auspices of the Export Enforcement Five or E5), the first-ever guidance to be issued by multiple countries.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In addition to participation in the multilateral regimes, BIS staff participated in virtual and in-person discussions related to export control policy, licensing, or enforcement issues with dozens of countries across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, the African continent, and the Americas. This included participation in capacity building workshops for the development of stronger export control laws, such as those in Armenia and Azerbaijan; industry outreach events focused on circumvention in countries including Türkiye, Italy, and Central Asia; numerous senior level dialogues to discuss U.S. anti-circumvention priorities related to U.S. controls on Russia, including in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, the United Arab Emirates, and Armenia; conferences on export controls where BIS gave keynote addresses, moderated panels, or discussed data circumvention trends, including in Japan, Belgium, Germany, and Singapore. In addition, BIS had dozens of meetings with officials visiting Washington, D.C. to discuss U.S. export controls on Russia and other export control policy priorities, held bilateral engagements on the sidelines of global conferences to provide targeted data on circumvention trends; and engaged with government officials in dozens of countries to provide information on BIS listed entities, Temporary Denial Orders, and enforcement cases. BIS's regular meetings with trade counterparts in the European Commission, UK, and Japan served as the backbone of its international coordination on Russia-related export controls, and was supplemented regularly with virtual outreach to other members of the Global Export Control Coalition (GECC). BIS Export Control Officers stationed in seven countries around the globe also routinely liaised with governments and industry in their host country as well as regional countries to assist with export control administration and enforcement.

BIS planned, organized, and implemented several international outreach engagements on strategic trade controls under the auspices of the Department of State's Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program. These

engagements were conducted with government and/or industry counterparts and addressed a range of strategic trade control issues ranging from strategic trade controls fundamentals, to how controls are evolving in order to address the national and international security challenges posed by emerging technology. BIS's outreach included a series of in-person and virtual engagements with governments and industry from countries including India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Republic of Korea, and the economy of Taiwan. Additionally, BIS supported strategic trade control outreach led by the Departments of State and Energy in countries including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates.

In FY 2023, BIS and enforcement counterparts from the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom established the Export Enforcement Five or E5 to coordinate on Russian export control enforcement issues. In September 2023, the E5 issued joint guidance to industry and academia identifying high priority items critical to Russian weapons systems and urging specific actions to prevent diversion of these items to Russia through third countries. In FY 2023, a G7 Enforcement Coordination Mechanism also was initiated to bolster the enforcement of multilateral sanctions and export controls aimed at denying Russia the inputs it needs to equip its military and the revenue necessary to fund its illegal war. BIS subsequently participated in an export enforcement sub-working group to coordinate on enforcement of Russia export controls across the G7, to include exchanging information and enhancing cooperation on investigations.

OVERVIEW: REGULATORY CHANGES

BIS published 36 regulatory notices and rules pertaining to the EAR in the Federal Register during FY 2023, including the following:

October 7 Controls

On October 7, 2022, BIS announced the implementation of the first of a series of targeted updates in two rules to its export controls as part of BIS's ongoing efforts to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The first rule imposed restrictions on the PRC's ability to obtain advanced computing chips, develop and maintain supercomputers, and manufacture advanced semiconductors. These items and capabilities are used by the PRC to produce advanced military systems including weapons of mass destruction; improve the speed and accuracy of its military decision making, planning, and logistics, as well as of its autonomous military systems; and commit human rights abuses. These updates restrict the PRC's ability to both purchase and manufacture certain high-end chips used in military applications. BIS engaged and consulted with close allies and partners on these controls, and worked closely with industry to ensure effective and seamless implementation.

The first rule (87 FR 62186) on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing imposes restrictive export controls on certain advanced computing semiconductor chips, transactions for supercomputer end-uses, and transactions involving certain entities on the Entity List. The rule also imposed new controls on certain semiconductor manufacturing items and on transactions for certain integrated circuit (IC) end uses.

Specifically, the rule added select advanced and high performance chips and items that contain such chips, as well as select semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to the Commerce Control List; added licensing requirements for certain items when destined for supercomputer or semiconductor development, production, or manufacturing end uses, or to certain semiconductor fabrication facilities, in the PRC; and expanded the scope of the EAR and related licensing requirements to certain PRC entities on the Entity List to cover some foreign-produced advanced computing items or items for supercomputer end uses. The rule also restricted the activities of U.S. persons to support the development or production of ICs at certain semiconductor fabrication facilities in the PRC without a license.

In the second rule (87 FR 61971), BIS updated its regulations related to the Entity List to clarify that a sustained lack of cooperation by the host government that effectively prevents BIS from determining compliance with the EAR may lead to the addition of an entity to the Entity List.

Following the implementation of these controls, China's main semiconductor manufacturers, whose development is key to China's advanced chip needs, scaled back development and production plans.

Russia, Belarus, and Iran Controls

In response to the Russian Federation's ongoing war against Ukraine, and Belarus and Iran's complicity in that invasion, BIS issued fifteen rules in FY23 denying Russia, Belarus, and Iran access to critical technologies, equipment, and other items needed to support Russia's invasion.

In February 2023, BIS released four rules, developed in conjunction with key allies and partners, to further respond to Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine. The first rule (88 FR 12175) revised the EAR by expanding the scope of Russian and Belarusian industry sector sanctions on oil and gas production, commercial and industrial items, and chemical and biological precursors. The rule also expanded controls on 'luxury goods' to better align with allies and partners' controls on similar items.

The second rule (88 FR 12150) updated export control measures against Iran in response to Russia's use of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the battlefield in Ukraine. In particular, the rule imposed licensing requirements for certain EAR99 items, including some semiconductors, destined to any end-user in Iran, and established a new list (Supplement No. 7 to part 746) of these items by HTS-6 code to enable tracking and analysis of exports. The rule also created a new "Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) Rule" for items in certain categories of the CCL and other items identified in supplement no. 7 to part 746, thereby imposing controls on the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of additional foreign-produced items to Iran. This rule similarly revised the EAR's existing Russia/Belarus FDP rule to reference the items identified in the supplement so that they are restricted for export to Russia.

The third and fourth rules released in February 2023 (88 FR 12155 and 88 FR 12170) added 86 entities to the Entity List for activities supporting Russia's defense industrial base and war efforts. Seventy-six of these entities were designated as "Russian/Belarusian Military End Users," a designation that imposes some of the most stringent review policies and serves to effectively cut them off from receiving items subject to the EAR.

In May 2023, BIS followed up these actions with the release of two more rules imposing further coordinated restrictions on Russia. The first rule (88 FR 33422) revised the EAR to better align with controls implemented by U.S. allies and partners by expanding the scope of items listed on Supplement no. 4 (commercial and industrial items), supplement no. 6 (chemical and biological precursors), and supplement no. 7 (foreign-produced items destined to Russia, Belarus, or Iran) to the EAR. The rule also expanded the scope of the Russia/Belarus Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) Rule to the temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine in order to further hamper Russia's ability to procure items for use in the region. The second rule released in May 2023 (88 FR 32640) added 71 entities to the Entity List, including 69 entities for support to Russia's military and defense sector. These 69 entities were also designated as Russian/Belarusian Military End Users, making them subject to the most stringent restrictions under the EAR.

BIS published an additional nine rules throughout FY23 targeting Russia, Belarus, or Iranian entities supporting Russia's war efforts in Ukraine. These rules added dozens of entities to the Entity List for acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

Section 1758 Technologies

Section 1758 of ECRA requires the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, to identify and control emerging and foundational technologies and to submit a report to Congress on actions taken to implement this requirement.

As of the end of FY 2023, BIS implemented controls on 4 technologies pursuant to Section 1758 of ECRA. In FY 2023 specifically, BIS published 1 rule and 1 proposed rule on Section 1758 technologies:

- On January 17, 2023, (88 FR 2507), BIS implemented controls on 4 naturally occurring, dual-use marine toxins (specifically, brevetoxins, gonyautoxins, nodularins and palytoxin) in a final rule which implemented a decision of the Australia Group to adopt these controls.
- On April 20, 2023 (88 FR 24341), BIS proposed controlling the automatic chemical synthesis of peptides (peptide synthesizers) in a proposed rule.
- Additionally, BIS's Section 1758 research and analysis aided in the Bureau's development and implementation of controls on October 7, 2022, that restrict the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) ability to both purchase and manufacture certain high-end semiconductor chips that can further its military modernization. Though the October 7 controls are not explicitly "Section 1758" controls, those controls

nevertheless further the Bureau's mission related to Section 1758 by addressing the national security threat of PRC development of and access to advanced semiconductor and artificial intelligence capabilities.

Human Rights

As part of the Biden Administration's commitment to put human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy, BIS plays an important role in coordinating with foreign governments, particularly within the Export Controls Human Rights Initiative (ECHRI) forum. In September 2023, BIS participated in the inaugural ECHRI plenary session with 24 other subscriber nations, as well as U.S. and foreign non-governmental organizations focused on human rights. BIS also participated in several engagements throughout the year with members of the core group of countries that have endorsed the voluntary ECHRI Code of Conduct, including Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. While there continues to be considerable focus on the People's Republic of China's ongoing repression of religious and ethnic minorities, the focus of ECHRI is how to utilize (and enhance, as appropriate) export controls to prevent misuse by any authoritarian regime. In particular, the U.S. and its ECRI partners examine which items may be used by such a regime in surveillance activities, even if the items are not specifically designed for surveillance.

To ensure that the EAR's item-based controls to protect human rights reflect technological advances, BIS continues to conduct a comprehensive, in-depth review of advanced surveillance tools, including facial recognition systems, machine learning, and biometric and artificial intelligence technologies, for possible inclusion on the Commerce Control List (CCL), and proactively engages with non-government organizations to ensure these inclusions will not inadvertently limit freedom of expression and dissent, both core elements of a democratic society, or the provision of humanitarian aid.

In addition to undertaking this review to assess whether additional controls might be warranted to address state actors' deployment of sophisticated technology in the suppression of human rights, including civil dissent and journalistic activities, BIS plans to implement the expanded authority provided in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to restrict U.S. persons' support of foreign security services whose activities may raise human rights concerns.

Finally, BIS continues to include human rights as a standard for determinations to include additions to the Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the EAR). Effective March 28, 2023, BIS added this criterion into Section 744.11 of the EAR, and subsequently added eleven entities in Burma, China, Nicaragua, and Russia for either directly engaging in, or enabling, human rights abuses in those destinations. These abuses range from surveillance of minority groups to the aerial bombardment of civilians.

EXPORT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


Across the United States and in seven embassies and consulates around the world, BIS Special Agents and intelligence analysts enforce U.S. export rules. By leveraging BIS's authorities, as well as collaborating with other U.S. Government law enforcement, intelligence agency, and international partners, Export Enforcement identifies, disrupts, and deters violations of the EAR.

Criminal Penalties

In FY 2023, BIS investigations resulted in the criminal conviction of 67 individuals and companies for export violations. This represents the highest number of convictions since tracking began in FY 2010. Penalties for FY 2023 amounted to: \$1,710,019 in criminal fines; \$3,383,410 in forfeitures; \$9,020,618 in restitution;* and 1,779 months of imprisonment.*

*Represents the highest number since tracking began in FY 2010.

Convictions of Individuals and Companies	
Total convictions	67 convictions
Criminal Fines	\$1,710,019
Forfeitures	\$3,383,410
Restitution	\$9,020,618
Prison Time	1,779 months



Disruptive Technology Strike Force

On February 16, 2023, the Departments of Commerce and Justice, alongside partners at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations, launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force to protect advanced technology from being unlawfully acquired by foreign adversaries. Together, the agencies that comprise the Strike Force have taken an all-tools approach to aggressively pursue enforcement actions against illegal procurement networks and prevent nation-state actors from illicitly acquiring our most sensitive technology.

The Strike Force involves 14 different cells located throughout the United States that are comprised of BIS, FBI, and HSI Special Agents and prosecutors from the local United States Attorney's Offices. Additionally, the Strike Force is supported by an interagency analytic cell in Washington, D.C. comprised of analysts from BIS, FBI, and HSI.

- During FY 2023, the Strike Force successfully charged seven (7) cases involving sanctions and export control violations, smuggling conspiracies, and other offenses related to the unlawful transfer of sensitive information, goods, and military-grade technology to Russia, China, or Iran. Four cases charged defendants with sending or attempting to send semiconductors, microelectronics, or other technologies to Russia in violation of U.S. law.
- Two cases charged former employees of U.S. companies with stealing confidential and proprietary information related to sensitive technology and attempting to take such information to China.
- One case charged an individual with seeking to procure sensitive U.S. technology on behalf of the government of Iran or Iranian end users.

Three of these cases also involved the imposition of a BIS TDO to prevent imminent violations of the EAR.

Administrative Penalties

BIS strengthened its administrative enforcement policies to keep the most critical U.S. technology out of the most dangerous hands by revising the voluntary self-disclosure process. This included:

- Encouraging the submission of disclosures to provide concrete benefits to the Respondent who files the disclosure;
- Clarifying that when parties deliberately decide to not disclose significant possible violations, such non-disclosure would be considered an aggravating factor under the Settlement Guidelines; and
- Incentivizing the submission of disclosures concerning the conduct of others by having companies come forward to report violations that others may have committed, and considering such reported tips that result in an enforcement action to be a mitigating factor if a future enforcement action, even for unrelated conduct, is ever brought against the disclosing party.

BIS investigations resulted in the completion of 147 administrative enforcement actions, the highest number ever, and the imposition of a total of \$303,401,583 in civil penalties in FY 2023. This included imposing the largest standalone administrative penalty in history – a \$300 million penalty against Seagate and Seagate Singapore International Headquarters Pte. Ltd. of Singapore related to their continued shipment of millions of hard disk drives to Huawei even after their two main competitors stopped shipping due to the foreign direct product rule. Additionally, BIS issued five new TDOs and renewed 30 TDOs, including renewing TDOs against 10 Russian and Belarusian airlines, and renewing the TDO against Mahan Airlines of Iran that violated both export controls on Iran and Russia. These actions represent the highest number of TDO actions in BIS history. BIS also publicly identified an additional 130 aircraft from Russia, Belarus, and Iran operating in likely violation of the EAR, bringing the total number of aircraft notified to the public to 310, and that as such, BIS considers activities including refueling, maintenance, and repair of these aircraft as violations of the EAR.


Prevention and Compliance

BIS continued to emphasize enforcement activities that focus on prevention and compliance. Export Enforcement officials participate in the export licensing process by providing all-source Bona Fides Information Reports (BFIRs) to licensing officers on foreign transaction parties, making recommendations on license applications, detaining shipments that may have been undertaken in violation of the EAR, and in some significant cases, seeking the issuance of TDOs to prevent imminent export violations.

End-use checks involving the verification of parties to an export transaction continue to serve as a valuable safeguard and preventive enforcement tool for verifying the bona fides of foreign end users. In addition, end-use checks seek to ensure the recipients of the exported items are or will be using the items as authorized and that they are adhering to license conditions.

BIS end-use checks have been effective in uncovering unauthorized end uses, including improper or unauthorized diversion of items subject to BIS jurisdiction.

End-Use Checks by Region



In FY 2023, BIS completed 1,509 end-use checks in 62 countries, the highest number in BIS history. Of these, 54 were Pre-License Checks, which BIS conducts prior to issuance of export licenses to prevent the export of sensitive items to unreliable parties, and 1,455 were Post-Shipment Verifications, which assist the U.S. Government in monitoring export transactions to conclusion.

Approximately 79% of the checks were conducted by BIS Export Control Officers stationed at U.S. Embassies and Consulates in Beijing, Dubai, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Istanbul, New Delhi, and Singapore. These Export Control Officers also have regional responsibilities. The remaining checks were conducted by Office of Export Enforcement Special Agents and analysts deployed from the United States, or Foreign Commercial Service Officers

at various U.S. Embassies. BIS uses the results of negative checks to prevent future exports to unsuitable end users and to take enforcement action where appropriate.

Pursuant to the reporting requirement under Section 1213 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998, BIS reports no Post-Shipment Verifications conducted on high performance computers in “Computer Tier 3” eligible countries during FY 2023, as there were no licenses issued for the specified items. Tier 3 destinations, as listed in Section 740.7(d) of the EAR, are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, China (People’s Republic of), Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Macau, Macedonia (The Former Yugoslav Republic of), Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the UAE, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, and Yemen.

In situations where an end-use check indicates a diversion of U.S.-origin goods has or may have occurred, or the U.S. Government was unable to conduct the check or was otherwise unable to verify the existence or authenticity of the end user, BIS will take action to mitigate such concerns, including license denials, Entity List or UVL designations, or investigative referrals. Twenty-five percent of BIS end-use checks resulted in such follow-up actions.

In an effort to address delays by foreign governments in scheduling end-use checks, BIS amended the EAR and announced a new two-step policy in October 2022 that moves parties onto the UVL, and then from the UVL to the Entity List, when a host government’s sustained non-cooperation prevents the timely scheduling of end-use checks. These changes directly resulted in eliminating a backlog of end-use checks in China.

BIS completed a significant number of additional preventive enforcement actions in FY 2023, including the issuance of 515 warning letters, 634 detentions, and 185 seizures. BIS issued 102 Denial Orders against parties convicted under certain federal statutes following their criminal convictions, which represents the highest number of denial orders since 2010 when tracking began.

Prevention Actions	
Warning Letters	515
Detentions	634
Seizures	185
Outreach Contacts	1,813

Antiboycott Activities

The United States Government continues to oppose actions by U.S. persons in support of foreign boycotts of countries friendly to the United States (unsanctioned foreign boycotts). The Anti-Boycott Act of 2018, a subpart of ECRA, encourages, and in specified cases requires, U.S. persons to refuse to participate in certain unsanctioned foreign boycotts. BIS, through its Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), takes enforcement action against U.S. persons who violate the antiboycott provisions set forth in part 760 of the EAR. During FY 2023, four companies agreed to pay civil penalties totaling \$425,500 to settle allegations that they violated the antiboycott provisions of the EAR.

BIS strengthened antiboycott enforcement to ensure that U.S. firms do not support unsanctioned foreign boycotts, most notably the Arab League Boycott of Israel, by instituting measures to enhance compliance and incentivize deterrence. These included:

- Increasing penalties for all violations;
- Reprioritizing categories of violations to reflect the seriousness of the violation;
- Eliminating “no admit, no deny” settlements; and
- Enhancing focus on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies.

BIS further strengthened its antiboycott enforcement efforts by:

- Amending the boycott reporting form to require the identity of the party making the request in addition to the country from which the request originated to hold accountable those who make boycott-related requests of U.S. persons; and
- Including an antiboycott policy statement on U.S. government acquisition management websites (i.e., SAM.gov and the Department of Commerce’s Office of Acquisition Management website) to ensure contractors are aware and abide by the antiboycott regulations as part of their contractual responsibilities.

Programmatically, OAC responded to 336 requests from U.S. companies for guidance on compliance with the antiboycott provisions of the EAR. Through its Advice Line, OAC provided extensive same-day counseling to individual companies, both large and small, with boycott-specific concerns, including the removal of boycott-related language from letters of credit, tenders, and contracts originating in boycotting countries. In addition, through presentations at banking and international trade conferences, OAC reached out to exporters, manufacturers, freight forwarders, bankers, and attorneys involved in international trade.

For additional information related to significant BIS enforcement activities, see Appendices A and B.



SUMMARY OF APPROVED LICENSE APPLICATIONS TO PROSCRIBED PERSONS

In FY 2023, BIS approved 32,740 license applications. Of those approved licenses, 353 applications were flagged for potential matches to entities on the Consolidated Screening List, which includes restricted persons on a variety of lists maintained by the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury.

For FY 2023, approximately 1 percent of all approved licenses contained parties verified as matches to persons listed on the Consolidated Screening List. Because license review policies for entities listed on the Entity List are clearly articulated, applications submitted to BIS for proposed exports to such parties may be for transactions that exporters expect to have a higher likelihood of approval, such as transactions subject to case-by-case review rather than transactions that are subject to a presumption of denial.



DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE ACTIVITIES

BIS's mission includes supporting continued U.S. technology leadership in industries that are essential to U.S. national security. BIS engaged in the following activities related to the defense industrial base.

Section 232 Investigations

In FY 2023, the Department did not initiate any investigations under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.

BIS continued to administer the steel and aluminum exclusion process authorized by the President under Section 232. In FY 2023, the Administration's objective was to ensure that the United States retains a robust domestic production capability necessary to meet national security requirements.

A fair, transparent, and effective Section 232 Exclusion Process is an important goal of the Department. In FY 2023, BIS processed approximately 72,000 Exclusion Requests submitted by domestic importers of steel and aluminum products subject to duties under Section 232. The Department reviewed all Exclusion Requests and associated Objections, Rebuttals, and Surrebuttals on a case-by-case basis, considering only information that was submitted on the public record by the parties to the Section 232 Exclusions Portal. BIS worked closely with industry specialists within the International Trade Administration (ITA), as well as product specialists from the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

In FY 2023, Exclusion Requests with no Objections received a final decision within approximately 49 calendar days on average, while Exclusion Requests with Objections received a final decision within 86 calendar days on average. Commerce has met its internal timeliness guidelines for over 97 percent of Exclusion Requests submitted in the Section 232 Exclusions Portal.

In FY 2023, BIS continued to take steps to further increase the efficiency, ease of use, and transparency of the Section 232 Exclusions Process. On August 28, 2023, the Department published a Proposed Rule on the Section 232 Exclusion Process that proposes additions to existing certifications for Requestors and Objectors, modifies criteria for General Approved Exclusions (GAEs) and solicits feedback on the existing GAE List, and proposes a concept of General Denied Exclusions (GDEs) under which certain products would not be eligible for a Section 232 Exclusion.

Commerce continued to accept comments from the industry and other interested parties through October 12, 2023, and plans to issue one or more final rules implementing changes to the Section 232 Exclusions Process in FY 2024.

In FY 2023, BIS continued to implement recommendations from prior audits into the Section 232 Exclusions Process by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department's Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The GAO's most recent audit on the administration of tariffs and exclusions under Section 232 was published on July 20, 2023, recommending that Commerce fully assess the effectiveness of volume certifications for Exclusion Requests and explore the development of an improved data transfer process with Customs. BIS accepted these recommendations and is implementing them in conjunction with its action plans issued in response to previous reports by the GAO on the Section 232 Exclusions Process in September 2020 and December 2021.

Finally, in FY 2023, BIS continued to coordinate with CBP and ITA to implement alternative arrangements to the Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs that preserve the national security objectives of Section 232. In February 2023, BIS increased the Section 232 Aluminum Tariff to 200 percent for imports of certain aluminum articles originating from Russia through Presidential Proclamation 10522. In May 2023, BIS also extended an existing suspension of the Section 232 Steel Tariff for Ukraine for an additional year through May 31, 2024, by Presidential Proclamation 10588. Meanwhile, BIS continued to execute the Section 232 Tariff-Rate Quotas with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom that went into effect in FY 2022.

Administering the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS)

BIS's administration of the DPAS plays an important role in supporting the deployment of U.S. and Allied forces abroad, meeting critical national defense and homeland security requirements, and facilitating recovery from natural disasters. The U.S. Government places DPAS priority ratings on approximately 300,000 contracts and orders annually to support these requirements. BIS participates in interagency discussions with the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Transportation on standards and procedures for prioritizing contracts and orders.

In FY 2023, BIS undertook 40 official actions under the DPAS regulation for the placement of DPAS priority ratings on contracts and orders to expedite the delivery of industrial resources needed in support of national defense programs. BIS undertook these official actions in response to Special Priorities Assistance (SPA) requests and based on determinations that the requests for assistance were in support of programs that were "necessary or appropriate" to promote the national defense by DoD, DOE, and DHS in accordance with Executive Order 13603.

DOC/BIS issued six DPAS rating authorizations in support of U.S. Government agencies; nine in support of allied and foreign defense partners; two in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); one in support of an allied partner to provide critical infrastructure assistance; two in support of state/local authorities; one in support of a U.S. company; and three in support of a DOE national laboratory. BIS issued two denials in FY 2023, as the DPAS was found to be an ineffective solution to the requestors' needs and issued two directives to reprioritize rated orders.

Of the rating authorizations DOC/BIS issued, 12 were issued in response to SPA requests where semiconductor supply chain issues were directly or indirectly identified. This number could be higher as DOC/BIS does not always have full visibility into all problems in requesters' supply chains. Six of those were issued in support of allied and foreign defense partners or NATO; four were issued to U.S. Government agencies and a state/local authority, one was issued to a U.S. company; and one was issued to a foreign company supporting a U.S. Government agency.

Lastly, of the 40 official actions, BIS issued 12 DPAS rating authorizations to Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) to support Canadian military programs, in accordance with the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding on Priorities and Allocations Support between Commerce and PWGSC.

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA)

CFIUS is an interagency committee that conducts national security reviews of certain transactions involving foreign investments in the United States. The International Trade Administration (ITA) and BIS play complementary roles in the Department of Commerce's reviews for CFIUS. Among other things, FIRRMA expanded the scope of CFIUS authorities, including by authorizing CFIUS to review certain transactions involving critical technologies.

BIS plays an important role under FIRRMA, particularly in transactions involving non-controlling, non-passive investments in U.S. companies involved in critical technologies that require mandatory declarations. Under this program, which began as a pilot program in November 2018 and was incorporated into the final FIRRMA regulations in February 2020, BIS determines whether the underlying investment includes a U.S. business involved in a critical technology, which is defined to include, among other things, multilaterally-controlled items on the Commerce Control List (including for reasons relating to national security), regional stability or surreptitious listening reasons, or items identified as emerging or foundational technologies.

In addition, in FY 2023 BIS reviewed 388 CFIUS actions which includes both filings and declarations. BIS also worked closely with the CFIUS agencies to implement Executive Order 14083 that was issued by the President in FY 2023 to provide additional guidance to CFIUS. The Executive Order added areas such as supply chain and technological leadership in industry sectors such as microelectronics and artificial intelligence as major areas of consideration to be undertaken during review of CFIUS filings and declarations. In addition, BIS worked closely with other CFIUS agencies on implementing Executive Order 14105 regarding outbound investment. The Order directs the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a program to prohibit or require notification of certain types of outbound investments by United States persons into certain entities located in or subject to the jurisdiction of a country of concern, and certain other entities owned by persons of a country of concern, involved in specific categories of advanced technologies and products. The Order identifies three categories of national security technologies and products for the program: semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum computing quantum information technologies, and artificial intelligence. BIS worked throughout FY 2023 with other CFIUS agencies on the development of regulations for this new program. Because of this enhanced role, which includes both filings and declarations, BIS's CFIUS-related activities continued at a very high rate in FY 2023.

MONITORING THE STRENGTH OF THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL BASE



BIS conducted the following industrial base survey and assessment activities:

Public Health Industrial Base Assessment

BIS has partnered with the Department of Health and Human Services, including the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), to conduct a series of public health industrial base surveys. The assessments will be conducted in three phases, focusing on (1) influenza vaccine products starting in FY 2023, followed by (2) active pharmaceutical ingredients, and (3) High Consequence Biological Countermeasures. In FY 2023, BIS deployed a survey to over 100 U.S. manufacturers and distributors of influenza vaccines and influenza vaccine-related products designed to capture existing supply chain vulnerabilities, production capacities, emergency response capabilities, and other data that will inform recommendations to improve the resiliency of the influenza vaccine supply chain in the face of future public health emergencies. The survey data collected will be the basis of a comprehensive report on the health and competitiveness of the U.S. influenza vaccine industrial base and include recommendations to improve the resiliency of the influenza vaccine supply chain in the face of future public health emergencies.

Civil Space Supply Chain Network Assessment

BIS has partnered with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to survey and assess the United States civil space supply chain network. This multi-year collaboration builds upon a substantial record of space sector analysis conducted among BIS, NASA, NOAA, and the broader U.S. Government and serve primarily to evaluate the current health and competitiveness of the civil segment of the U.S. space industrial base. In FY 2023, BIS deployed a comprehensive survey to over 1,500 respondents that both directly and indirectly support the U.S. civil space industrial base. The data collected will inform and help identify the structure and interdependencies of organizations that participate in the U.S. civil space industrial base, especially related to NASA and NOAA systems and subsystems.

Microelectronics Industry Assessment

In FY 2023, BIS surveyed approximately 200 companies that supply semiconductor devices in the United States, including designers, manufacturers, and distributors of semiconductors as part of a comprehensive assessment of

the U.S. microelectronics industrial base. The survey was developed pursuant to the requirement in section 9904 of Title XCIX of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 2021 and designed to gather data to help inform the U.S. Government on the capabilities and challenges of the U.S. microelectronics supply chain. Using the survey data collected from over 200 companies, BIS produced a comprehensive report and assessment of the U.S. microelectronics industrial base.

Multiple U.S. Government agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security, as well as NASA and the Intelligence Community, continue to request BIS industrial base surveys and analyses to support informed national defense and technology policy decisions.

Offsets in Defense Trade

BIS completed its 27th congressionally mandated report on the impact of offsets in defense trade and transmitted it to Congress in May 2023. In addition, the implementation plan of the 2018 Conventional Arms Transfer Policy established an Interagency Working Group on Offsets, which is co-chaired by BIS and the Department of State. The Working Group was established to coordinate U.S. Government policy discussions on offset-related issues and is the primary liaison with industry. During FY 2023, the Working Group met several times, including with industry, to identify the most pressing offset issues facing U.S. companies.

Review of Security Cooperation Proposals

BIS reviewed 60 proposed transfers of excess defense equipment to foreign governments through the Department of Defense's (DoD) Excess Defense Articles program and provided DoD with determinations whether these transfers would interfere with the ongoing sales or marketing activities of U.S. industry. As part of its review, BIS contacted original equipment manufacturers and suppliers of similar products to assess whether proposed transfers would have an adverse impact on their operations. BIS reviewed 28 proposed international armaments and defense technology cooperation agreements and provided DoD with comments on these agreements' commercial implications and potential effects on the international competitive position of the U.S. defense industrial and technological bases.

National Defense Stockpile

In FY2023, BIS continued to co-chair the interagency National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee (MIC) with the Department of State's Bureau of Energy Resources. The MIC advises the Defense Logistics Agency regarding proposed plans to sell portions of the material in the stockpile and proposed plans to acquire new material. The advice relates to avoiding undue market disruptions during the sale or acquisition of such materials. The activities of the MIC will be integrated by the new National Defense Board of Directors, where the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration will serve as the Commerce representative.

Supporting the U.S. Defense Industry's International Competitiveness

BIS also continued to approve and assist U.S. companies that were interested in providing goods and services to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agencies, commands, and, through the NATO Security Investment Program, other member governments. BIS performed 499 actions in support of U.S. firms seeking to participate in NATO procurement competitions. In addition, BIS reviewed 72 U.S. industry applications for defense trade advocacy in support of the International Trade Administration's Advocacy Center. These reviews directly assisted the competitiveness of U.S. companies in international arms sales.

APPENDIX A: SUMMARIES AND TABLES OF CLOSED EXPORT ENFORCEMENT CASES

Table 1: Criminal Convictions during FY 2023 [1]

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
10/05/22	Natasha France	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; three counts of false statements to a federally licensed firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922; two counts of failure to file export information in violation of 13 U.S.C. § 305	60 months in prison; three years of supervised release; and a \$600 special assessment	Export of firearms through the U.S. Virgin Islands to various Caribbean countries
10/27/22	Intertech Trading Corp.	14 counts of failure to file export information in violation of 13 U.S.C. § 305	Two years of probation; \$140,000 criminal fine; and a \$5,600 special assessment	Failure to file Electronic Export Information related to exports of testing equipment to Russia
10/31/22	Lybier Carolina Aguilar Parra	One count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine by a person on board an aircraft in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 959, and 960	60 months in prison; three years of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of aircraft used in connection with conspiracy to distribute and possess a controlled substance

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
11/03/22	Giuseppe Galatioto	One count of attempt to violate the Export Control Reform Act in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 4819	Five years of probation; and a \$100 special assessment	Attempted export to Italy of handguns and ammunition concealed inside a portable air tank included in checked luggage on a commercial flight
11/03/22	Yan Orjoux	One count of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705	24 months in prison; \$100,000 criminal fine; three years of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of mechanical equipment and parts to Iran via the UAE
11/04/22	Star Trade International	One count of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705	One year of probation; \$150,000 criminal fine; and a \$400 special assessment	Export of mechanical equipment and parts to Iran via the UAE
12/14/22	Jorge Chica-Giler	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of smuggling goods from the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554; one count each of dealing in firearms without a license, delivery of a firearm to a common carrier without written notification, and	262 months in prison; one year of supervised release; and a \$500 special assessment	Smuggling of firearms to Ecuador in compressed air tanks

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
		possession of a firearm by an unlawful alien, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922		
11/08/22	Gary Stambaugh	One count of theft of military property in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 and 2; one count of falsifying official certificates in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1018	18 months of probation; \$1,000 criminal fine; and a \$50 special assessment	Theft of military equipment and other property from the U.S. Department of Defense
11/09/22	William Cole	One count of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of unlawful dealing in firearms without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922	18 months in prison; three years of supervised release; and a \$200 special assessment	Export of firearms to the British Virgin Islands via the U.S. Virgin Islands
11/17/22	Rolando Alexi Pupo-Abrahantes	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of dealing in firearms without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922; and one count of smuggling goods from the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554	30 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$300 special assessment	Smuggling of firearms and bullet proof vests to Ecuador in compressed air tanks

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
11/17/22	Nicolas Ayala	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of dealing in firearms without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922; and one count of smuggling goods from the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554; and one count of failure to notify common carrier of shipped firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922	36 months in prison; three years of supervised release; and a \$400 special assessment	Smuggling of firearms and bullet proof vests to Ecuador
11/30/22	Jody “Joe” Stambaugh	One count of theft of military property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641	18 months of probation; \$250 criminal fine; and a \$25 special assessment	Theft of military equipment and other property from the U.S. Department of Defense
12/09/22	Fredy Herrera-Vargas	One count of interstate transportation of stolen goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314	Three years of probation; \$125,000 forfeiture; and a \$100 special assessment	Interstate transportation of stolen optical sights and night vision devices

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
12/14/22	Arif Ugur	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; two counts of violating the Arms Export Control Act in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2278; two counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343	33 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$500 special assessment	Export of defense technical data to foreign nationals in Turkey
12/21/22	Leatrice DeBruhl-Daniels	Three counts of tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512; seven counts of false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; one count of bribery of public officials and witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201; and one count of destruction, alteration or falsification of records in federal investigations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519	108 months in prison; one year of supervised release; \$5,000 criminal fine; and a \$1,200 special assessment	Interference in a U.S. Government investigation involving the export of oilfield equipment to Iran; illegal passport procurement scheme; bribery of U.S. Government officials
12/21/22	Troy Barbour	One count of money laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956	Six months of home confinement; three years of probation; \$28,600 in restitution; and a \$100 special assessment	Fraudulently obtained sensitive, export-controlled communications equipment

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
01/19/23	Hendel Laurent	One count of attempting to violate the Export Control Reform Act in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 4819	46 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of firearms to Haiti concealed in a vehicle
01/24/23	Jeremiah Coomer	One count of theft or misuse of public money, property, or records in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641	Five years of probation; and a \$100 special assessment	Sale of property of a U.S. government agency
02/09/23	Marc Chavez	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and 15 counts of receipt of stolen government property, aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641	Time served; three years of supervised release; \$132,280 in (shared) restitution; and a \$1,700 special assessment	Sale of technical drawings and manuals stolen from the U.S. Air Force
02/23/23	Ya Wen Chen aka Tina Chen	One count of conspiracy to unlawfully export goods to Iran in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705	13 months in prison; three years of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of electronic components and drone equipment to Iran via Hong Kong

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
02/28/23	Lyle Schirm	One count of smuggling goods from the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554	30 months in prison; five years of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Smuggling of firearms to the United Kingdom
03/09/23	Stefan Gillier	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; one count of interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314; and four counts of engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957	84 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$3,509,916 in restitution; and a \$800 special assessment	Fraud; export of aviation technology to Iran via Canada
03/14/23	Leon Madorsky	One count of unlawful export information activities in violation of 13 U.S.C. § 305	One year of probation; \$500 criminal fine; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of handgun slides to Ukraine via Poland
03/20/23	Murat Bukey	One count of conspiracy to unlawfully export U.S. goods to Iran and to defraud the United States and the U.S. Department of Treasury	28 months in prison; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of a fuel test kit and bio-detection kit to Iran

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
		in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 50 U.S.C. 1705, and 22 U.S.C. § 2778		
03/22/23	Eric Fru Nji	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of transportation of a firearm with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922; and one count of smuggling in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554	63 months in prison; two years of supervised release; \$25,000 criminal fine; and a \$300 special assessment	Export of firearms, ammunition, and rifle scopes to Cameroon via Nigeria
04/05/23	Wilson Tita	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of transportation of a firearm with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922; and one count of smuggling in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554	60 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$300 special assessment	Export of firearms and ammunition to Nigeria, intended to assist separatists fighting against the government of Cameroon
04/10/23	BY Trade OU	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956	\$826,696 civil forfeiture; and a \$800 special assessment	Export of a jig grinder to Russia via Latvia and Estonia

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
04/18/23	Patrick John Lee	One count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846; and one count of smuggling goods from the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554	Time served; three years of supervised release; 150 hours of community service; and a \$200 special assessment	Export of firearms components to the United Kingdom
04/18/23	Tse Bangarie	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778	46 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$200 special assessment	Export of firearms and ammunition to Nigeria
04/19/23	Daniel Johnson	One count of transfer of a firearm to a non-resident in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924; one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; and one count of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A)	90 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$581,628 in restitution; and a \$300 special assessment	Export of firearms to the United Kingdom; COVID-related fraud

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
04/20/23	Edith Ngang	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778	46 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$200 special assessment	Export of firearms and ammunition to Nigeria, intended to assist separatists fighting against the government of Cameroon
04/26/23	DES International	One count of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371	Five years of probation; \$83,769 criminal fine; and a \$400 special assessment	Export of electronic components to Iran
04/27/23	Broad Tech Systems, Inc.	One count of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of violation of the Export Control Reform Act in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 4819; and one count of money laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956	One year of probation; \$120,000 criminal fine; and a \$1,200 special assessment	Export of photoresist chemicals to a Chinese party on the Entity List
04/27/23	Tao “Jason” Jiang	One count of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of violation of the Export Control Reform Act in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 4819; and one count of money laundering	One year of probation; 100 hours of community service; \$5,500 criminal fine; and a \$300 special assessment	Export of photoresist chemicals to a Chinese party on the Entity List

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
		conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956		
4/28/2023	Phoenix Fisheries	One count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342, and 1349, 3561 and 2; and one count of money laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 3561, and 2	One year of probation; and a \$800 special assessment	International wildlife trafficking, wire fraud, money laundering
04/28/23	Jonathan Yet Wing Soong	One count of violation of International Emergency Economic Powers Act in violation of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702 and 1705	20 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$168,885 in restitution; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of flight control software to a Chinese party on the Entity List
05/02/23	Godlove Mancho	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778	46 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$200 special assessment	Export of firearms to Nigeria, intended to assist separatists fighting against the government of Cameroon
05/02/23	Suhaib Allababidi	One count of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371	48 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$1.15 million in (shared) restitution with 2M	Filing of false Electronic Export Information in furtherance of export

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
			Solutions, Inc.; and a \$100 special assessment	of products to foreign customers
05/03/23	2M Solutions, Inc.	One count of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and one count of failure to submit export information in violation of 13 U.S.C. § 305	Five years of probation; \$1 million criminal fine; \$1.15 million in (shared) restitution with Suhaib Allababidi; and a \$100 special assessment	Filing of false Electronic Export Information in furtherance of export of products to foreign customers
05/22/23	Roger Akem	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778	24 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$200 special assessment	Export of firearms and ammunition to Nigeria, intended to assist separatists fighting against the government of Cameroon
06/01/23	Haoyang Yu	One count of possession and attempted possession of stolen trade secrets in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1832	Six months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$55,000 criminal fine; and a \$100 special assessment	Possessing stolen trade secrets from Analog Devices, Inc., a semiconductor company
06/16/23	Tamufor St. Michael	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act in	30 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$200 special assessment	Export of firearms and ammunition to Nigeria, intended to assist separatists fighting against the

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
		violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778		government of Cameroon
06/30/23	Rafael Magallon Castillo	One count of conspiracy to violate the Export Administration Regulations in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 4819	Six months in prison; three years of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of ammunition, firearms parts, and accessories to a Mexican cartel
07/07/23	Carl Williams	One count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922	31 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$4,500 criminal fine; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of firearms optics to China
07/11/23	Terrance France	One count of conspiracy to make a false statement to a federally licensed firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371	One year of probation; 80 hours of community service; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of firearms through the U.S. Virgin Islands to various Caribbean countries
07/20/23	Spares, Inc.	One count of aircraft parts fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 38	Five years of probation; \$8,500 criminal fine; \$945,166 forfeiture; and a \$400 special assessment	Aircraft parts fraud
07/21/23	Cleophus Lesure II	One count of engaging in a business of dealing in firearms without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 and 924; two counts of illegal	One year in prison; three years of supervised release; and a \$400 special assessment	Dealing in firearms without a license; illegal possession of machine guns; and making a firearm

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
		possession of a machine gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924; and one count of making a firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5822, 5861 and 5871		
08/10/23	Lydia Adutwumwaa	One count of knowing delivery of a firearm to a common or contract carrier without notice in violation of 22 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924	Five years of probation, including six months of home confinement; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of firearms to Ghana
08/15/23	Monique Jones	One count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; one count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956; and 25 counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343	48 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$578,130 in restitution; and a \$2,700 special assessment	Inheritance scams and related illegal financial activities
08/15/23	Mekayda Jones	One count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; one count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956; and 14 counts of	36 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$387,160 in restitution; and a \$1,600 special assessment	Inheritance scams and related illegal financial activities

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
		wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343		
08/15/23	Sally Cruz Roberto	One count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; and 32 counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343	33 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$1,030,990 in restitution; and a \$3,900 special assessment	Inheritance scams and related illegal financial activities
08/17/23	Okechukwu Iwuji	One count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349	45 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$475,710 in restitution; and a \$100 special assessment	Inheritance scams and related illegal financial activities
08/30/23	Muhammad Mohsin Raja	One count of conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1960	24 months in prison; one year of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Blade antennas used in satellite communications to a party in Pakistan on the Entity List; missile servo, hydraulic pump, assault rifles to Pakistan
08/31/23	Brandon Schulte	One count of making a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001	12 months of probation; \$1,000 criminal fine; and a \$100 special assessment	Theft of military equipment and other property from U.S. Department of Defense

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
09/05/23	Luis De Arco	One count of conspiracy to violate the Export Administration Regulations in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 4819	One year of supervised release; six months of home confinement; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of ammunition, weapons parts, and accessories to a Mexican cartel
09/11/23	Eric Ampong-Coker	One count of attempt to violate the Export Control Reform Act in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 4819	30 months in prison; two years of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of firearms and accessories to Ghana
09/14/23	Rafael Richiez	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554	20 months in prison; two years of supervised release; 200 hours of community service; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of firearms to the Dominican Republic
09/25/23	Eusebio Cortes	One count of false statements in acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924; and one count of false statements in a federal firearms licensee's record in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924	Time served; three years of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of firearms and ammunition to Mexico
09/27/23	Zac DeMyers	One count of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371	57 months in prison; three years of supervised release; and a \$100 special assessment	Export of firearms to St. Lucia

Sentencing Date	Defendant	Criminal Charges	Criminal Sanctions	Case Details
09/29/23	Sarfraz Yousuf	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and 16 counts of aiding and abetting the receipt of stolen government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641	Eight months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$383,590 in (shared) restitution; and a \$1,700 special assessment	Stolen U.S. government technical manuals to various countries
09/29/23	Mark Fitting	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and three counts of aiding and abetting the receipt of stolen government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641	41 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$589,095 in restitution; and a \$200 special assessment	Stolen U.S. government technical manuals to various countries
09/29/23	Melony Erice	One count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and three counts of aiding and abetting the receipt of stolen government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641	18 months in prison; three years of supervised release; \$589,095 in restitution; and a \$400 special assessment	Stolen U.S. government technical manuals to various countries

Table 2: Administrative Cases during FY 2023

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
10/03/22	UTair Aviation JSC	Temporary Denial Order (TDO) in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization.		TDO renewed for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
10/03/22	PJSC Aeroflot	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
10/03/22	Azur Air	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
10/13/22	URAL Airlines JSC	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization		Initial TDO issued for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
10/17/22	Aviastar-TU	TDO in matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
10/20/22	Claudia Delgadillo	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by knowingly and willfully combining, conspiring, confederating, and agreeing with others to knowingly and unlawfully conceal, buy, and facilitate the transportation and concealment of various rifles and handguns, knowing they were to be exported from the United States to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until October 9, 2029 under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA). (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
10/28/22	Jose Martin Gallegos-Luevanos	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by fraudulently and knowingly attempting to export from the United States to Mexico one Barret .50 caliber bolt rifle; three FA Cugir Romanian AK-47 rifles; seven Century Arms VSKA AK-47 rifles; one Century Arms WASR AK-47 rifle; and 85 assorted magazines.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until January 6, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
11/08/22	Mahan Airways; Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, a/k/a Kosarian Fard; Mahmoud Amini; Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation; Sirjanco Trading LLC; Mahan Air General	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by a previously issued BIS TDO against Iranian airline Mahan Air, by acquiring custody or control of a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 aircraft from Mahan Air of Iran in violation of U.S. export controls and for engaging in further violations by operating that aircraft on flights between Venezuela, Iran, and Russia.		TDO renewed for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
	Trading LLC; Mehdi Bahrami; Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a Al-Naser Airlines, a/k/a Alnaser Airlines and Air Freight Ltd.; Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay; Bahar Safwa General Trading; Sky Blue Bird Group, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Aviation, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Ltd., a/k/a Sky Blue Bird			

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
	FZC; and Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam Muhammad Anwar Nur Shammout, a/k/a Issam Anwar			
11/15/22	Rossiia Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
12/01/22	Jose Miguel Lazarin-Zurita	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) by willfully and knowingly attempting to export from the United States to Mexico a Kel-Tec PLR-16 rifle; a 60-round capacity drum magazine for 5.56mm ammunition; and two	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until July 15, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		empty 30-round 5.56mm magazines.		
12/01/22	Mauricio Martell	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by fraudulently and knowingly exporting and sending or attempting to export and send from the United States to Mexico a Bushmaster, Model XM15-E2S, multi caliber rifle and a Barrett, Model 82A1, .50 caliber rifle.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until January 14, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
12/01/22	Tian Min Wu	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA of knowingly and willfully soliciting the export of, attempting to export, and causing others to export from the United States a Decoder, a defense article as defined in Category XI of the United States Munition List (USML), without first obtaining from the U.S. Department of State a license for such export or written approval.	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until June 9, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
12/01/22	Mark Komoroski	Underlying criminal conviction for violating International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by unlawfully and willfully attempting to export and attempting to cause and to be exported from the United States to Russia one Leupold VX-6, 1-6x24mm CDS Matte FireDot Circle 112319 riflescope, an item designated ECCN 0A987 on the Commerce Control List at the time of export, and which required a license for export to Russia. Komoroski failed to first obtain the required authorization and license for such export from the U.S. Department of Commerce.	Section 1705 of IEEPA	Export privileges denied until February 14, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
12/01/22	Gene Shilman	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by knowingly and intentionally conspiring to export from the United States to Russia and Ukraine arms, ammunition, articles of war, and certain Commerce-controlled goods and technology, without first having obtained a license.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until May 27, 2028 under ECRA. (7 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
12/01/22	Rene Sarmiento	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by fraudulently and knowingly exporting and sending or attempting to export and send from the United States to Mexico two DPMS Panther Arms AR-15 5.56mm caliber rifles; a Colt, Model Government, 9mm caliber pistol; and a Colt, Model Government, 45 caliber pistol.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until November 19, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
12/01/22	Jacqueline Castro-Aguilera	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by fraudulently and knowingly attempting to export and send to Mexico approximately 1,000 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until February 25, 2026 under ECRA. (7 years)
12/05/22	Quicksilver Manufacturing, Inc., Rapid Cut LLC and US Prototype, Inc.	TDO in a matter that involved unlicensed exports of controlled technology to China for 3D printing.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
12/13/22	Boris Livshits, Svetlana Skvortsova, Aleksey Ippolitov,	TDO in a matter that involved conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws in connection with the unlicensed export of an electronic signal generator and measurement equipment,		Initial TDO issued for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
	Advanced Web Services, and Strandway, LCC	among other items, to parties on the Entity List in Russia.		
12/13/22	Belavia Belarusian Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization.		Initial TDO issued for 180 days.
12/20/22	Priscilla Bustos Martinez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by fraudulently and knowingly exporting and sending or attempting to export and send from the United States to Mexico four .22 caliber pistols without obtaining a license or written authorization for such export.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until November 24, 2028 under (ECRA). (8 years)
12/20/22	Jesse Cortez-Arguelles	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by attempting to smuggle one 9 mm pistol; two 5.56 caliber rifles; two 9 mm firearm magazines; two 30-round 5.56 caliber firearm magazines; 1,030 rounds of 9 mm ammunition;	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until November 5, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		and 1,000 rounds of 10 mm ammunition.		
12/20/22	Siberian Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
12/20/22	Pobeda Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
12/20/22	Nordwind Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on		TDO renewed for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization.		
01/05/23	Nathan Christopher Ball	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by conspiring to smuggle from the United States to Mexico firearms and ammunition without the required license or written authorization.	18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until November 6, 2024 under ECRA. (5 years)
01/05/23	Hany Veletanlic	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA by willfully exporting from the United States to Sweden defense articles designated on the USML, namely a Glock lower 23 receiver, without having obtained from the U.S. Department of State a license or written approval for the export of the defense article.	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until January 27, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
01/05/23	Mauricio Robles	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico 1,680 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition; 1,000 rounds of 10mm ammunition; 3,200 rounds of 7.62x39mm	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until December 1, 2028 under ECRA. (7 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		ammunition; and 50 rounds of 7.62x25mm ammunition.		
01/10/23	Brett McGinnis	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by knowingly and willfully exporting and smuggling from the United States to Mexico a Beretta Model 84, .380 caliber pistol; a Beretta, Model 92FS, .22LR caliber pistol; 2,451 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition; 1,500 rounds of Fiocchi .38 Super Caliber Ammunition; 500 rounds of Magtech .44 Caliber Ammunition; 440 rounds of TulAmmo 7.62 caliber Ammunition; 300 rounds of G2 Research .380 Caliber Ammunition; 200 rounds of G2 Research Ammunition; 200 rounds of Hornady .270 Caliber Ammunition; 150 rounds of Remington .45 Caliber Colt Ammunition; 120 rounds of Remington .308 Caliber Ammunition; and various other firearms, firearms parts, and ammunition.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until September 16, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
01/10/23	Ge Song Tao	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by conspiring to submit false export information through the federal government's Automated Export System and to export maritime raiding craft and engines to China fraudulently, and attempting to export that equipment fraudulently.	18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until July 14, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
01/10/23	Jose Daniel Medina	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by knowingly smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico one a Barrett model 50 BMG, and a .50 caliber rifle.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until February 22, 2026 under ECRA. (7 years)
01/18/23	Jermaine Craig Rhoomes	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA by knowingly and willfully exporting and causing to be exported from United States to Jamaica two 7.62-caliber AK47-style rifles; five 5.56-caliber AR15-style rifles; four 9mm-caliber pistols; two .40-caliber pistols; two .45-caliber pistols; 3,315 rounds of ammunition; and 38 firearm magazines, all of which were designated as	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until February 5, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		defense articles on the USML at the time of export, without first obtaining the required license or written authorization from the U.S. Department of State.		
01/18/23	Eli Rodriguez-Jasso	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by knowingly and unlawfully exporting or attempting to export from the United States to Mexico ammunition and two firearms magazines.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until October 28, 2026 under ECRA. (6 years)
01/26/23	Empresa de Transporte Aéreo cargo del Sur, S.A., a/k/a Aerocargo del Sur Transportati on Company, a/k/a EMTRASUR	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by a previously issued BIS TDO against Iranian airline Mahan Air, by acquiring custody or control of a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 aircraft from Mahan Air of Iran in violation of U.S. export controls and for engaging in further violations by operating that aircraft on flights between Venezuela, Iran, and Russia.		TDO renewed for 180 days

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
01/31/23	Maria Guadalupe Pina	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by fraudulently and knowingly exporting and sending, and attempting to export and send, from the United States to Mexico twenty fully automatic lower parts kits for M-16 rifle and twenty pistol grips for M-16 and AR-type rifles.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until February 2, 2029 under ECRA. (8 years)
01/31/23	Michael Cox	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to export defense articles, specifically night sighting equipment, to Ukraine without the required licenses.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until May 18, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
01/31/23	Shirley Trinity Inzunza	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA by knowingly and willfully attempting to export and causing to be exported from the United States to Mexico 10,000 23 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition, which was designated as a defense article on the USML, without having first obtained from the U.S. Department of State a license for	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until January 18, 2026 under ECRA. (8 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		such export or written authorization for such export.		
01/31/23	Victor Anthony Bocanegra	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling from the United States to Mexico one Barrett .50 caliber, semiautomatic rifle, bearing the serial number #AA007434.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until March 3, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
01/31/23	Amin Yousefi Jam	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to export goods from the United States to Iran through the United Arab Emirates (UAE) without having first obtained the required licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until November 17, 2028 under ECRA. (7 years)
01/31/23	Josef Koyshman	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA by willfully exporting, attempting to export, and attempting to cause the export, from the United States to Hong Kong one High Power Advanced Laser-Aiming System; one AN/PRC-152 Handheld Radio;	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until February 6, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		and one AN/PVS-31A Binocular Night Vision Goggles, all of which were designated as defense articles on the USML, without first obtaining from the U.S. Department of State a license for such export or written approval.		
01/31/23	Obaidullah Syed	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to export computers; computer systems; and associated equipment from the United States to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission without a license from the U.S. Department of Commerce.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until May 17, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)
02/02/23	Dotphins LLC	Exported two red dot sights to Austria and Switzerland without the required licenses, controlled on crime control grounds, and valued in total at approximately \$199.26.	Section 764.2(a) [2] of the EAR	Settlement Agreement - Complete export compliance training on the Regulations within twelve months and a two-year suspended denial of export privileges.
02/08/23	Arash Yousefi Jam	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to export goods from the United States to Iran through the UAE without having first obtained the required licenses from OFAC.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until October 14, 2028 under ECRA. (7 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
02/08/23	Luc Edmond	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by knowingly and willfully attempting to smuggle from the United States to Canada a Sig Sauer P228 pistol kit and an AR-15 300 AAC 7.5" pistol kit, which were designated as defense articles on the USML, without first obtaining the required license or written authorization from the U.S. Department of State.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until February 19, 2025 under ECRA. (5 years)
02/14/23	Shuren Qin	Underlying criminal conviction for violating International Emergency Economic Powers (IEEPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by conspiring to unlawfully export items from the United States to Northwestern Polytechnical University, an entity on the U.S. Department of Commerce's Entity List, without first obtaining the required export licenses; two counts of making false statements to law enforcement agents regarding his customers and the types of parts he caused to be exported from the United States to China; and two counts of smuggling	Section 1705 of IEEPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until September 8, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		hydrophones from the United States to China.		
02/14/23	Carlos Francisco-Rodriguez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by knowingly and willfully attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico approximately 15,923 rounds of ammunition of assorted calibers.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until November 3, 2028 under ECRA. (7 years)
02/14/23	Rafael Palomares, Jr.	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA by knowingly and willfully agreeing to conspire with others to export firearms from the United States to Mexico without the required licenses.	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until May 13, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
02/14/23	Jorge Martin Dorame, Jr.	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico, weapons, weapons components, and weapons parts; specifically: four Matrix Arms AR-15 80% lower receivers; two Tapco AR T6 collapsible stocks; twenty Browning 1919 A4 .308 WIN caliber ammunition links; five Apex SAW/M249 M27	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until January 26, 2026 under ECRA. (5 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		5.56x45 caliber ammunition links; two AR-15 compensators; three Brownells AR-15 H3 carbine buffers; five DPMS AR-15 hammer springs; five Magpul MOE AR-15 trigger guards; five DPMS AR-15 trigger springs; one DPMS AR-15 buffer tube; one Brownells M 16 bolt carrier group; two Brownells AR-15 receiver end plates; two Brownells AR-15 charging Handles; three DPMS AR-15 receiver extension castle nuts; five Luth-AR M-16 auto sears with springs; and six Luth-AR M-16 disconnectors.		
02/22/23	Qingshan Li	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA and willfully attempting to export from the United States to China a Harris Falcon III AN/PRC 152A Radio, which is designated as a defense article on the USML, without the required licenses or written authorization from the State Department.	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until June 12, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
02/22/23	Javier Campos	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until February 22, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		to Mexico 6,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition.		
02/22/23	Marco Rodriguez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by conspiring and unlawfully smuggling from the United States to Mexico 5,000 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition and 5,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm caliber ammunition.	18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until March 12, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
02/24/23	Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO, a/k/a Radiotester LLC	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by unlawfully procuring and exporting from the United States electronic devices subject to the EAR to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (“FSB”), a Russian party on the Entity List, and to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) without the required U.S. government authorization.		Initial TDO issued for 180 days.
02/27/23	3D Systems Corporation	Exported technical drawings, controlled for national security, regional stability and missile technology reasons and metal powder, controlled for national security and nuclear nonproliferation reasons to	764.2(a) [14] 764.2(e) [4] 764.2(i) [1]	Settlement Agreement – civil penalty of \$2,777,570; complete two audits of its export controls compliance program; and be subject to three years suspended denial of export privileges.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		China and Germany without the required licenses and with knowledge that violations would occur; and failed to comply with recordkeeping requirements. (ECCNs 3E611, 1C002)		
03/06/23	Erick Samuel Chavez-Gonzalez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by knowingly and willfully attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico various rifles and handguns.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until August 12, 2027 under ECRA. (7 years)
03/06/23	Edgar Ariel Bernal-Gonzalez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico approximately 50 rounds of 9 mm ammunition; approximately 50 rounds of .38 caliber ammunition; one MECGAR Colt 38 magazine; one AK-47 Quad rail system; and 12 rubber rifle rail guards.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until June 10, 2026 under ECRA. (5 years)
03/06/23	Mohammad Khazrai Shaneivar	Underlying criminal conviction for violating IEEPA by exporting and causing to be exported goods from the United States to Iran without the required authorization from OFAC.	Section 1705 of IEEPA	Export privileges denied until October 1, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
03/06/23	Parisa Mohamadi	Underlying criminal conviction for violating IEEPA by exporting and causing to be exported goods from the United States to Iran without the required authorizations from OFAC.	Section 1705 of IEEPA	Export privileges denied until September 10, 2029 under ECRA. (10 years)
03/21/23	Randy Lew Williams	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA by knowingly and willfully exporting and causing to be exported from the United States to Iraq Glock 19 gun barrels; Glock 19 slides; a Glock 19 recoil spring assembly; a Glock 19 slide stop lever; a Glock 19 trigger mechanism housing with ejector; and a Glock 19 trigger with trigger bar which are designated as defense articles on the USML, without having first obtained from the U.S. Department of State a license for such export or written authorization.	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until March 3, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
03/21/23	Enrique Reyes-Morales	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico sixty-seven 7.62X39 rifles; fourteen 5.56 rifles; two .308 rifles; one .223 rifle; one 12 gauge shotgun; four 20 gauge	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until January 10, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		shotguns; four 10-22 rifles; fourteen 9mm handguns; seven .22 caliber handguns; two .380 handguns; one gun suppressor; 161 magazines; 562 rounds of ammunition; and 38 miscellaneous weapon accessories including various scopes and flashlights without the required license or written approval.		
03/21/23	Erik Agüero	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico various firearms defined under Category I of the USML without the required license or written authorization.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until July 15, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
03/21/23	Joseph Ormond Kirk, III	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico various firearms.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until October 5, 2026 under ECRA. (5 years)
03/21/23	Aiden Davidson, a/k/a Hamed Aliabadi	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling goods, including motors, pumps, valves, displacement pumps, and other items, and by falsely identifying	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until July 16, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		the ultimate consignee of shipments.		
03/21/23	Gerardo Emmanuel Sifuentes	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico approximately 5,000 rounds of 7.62 x39 caliber ammunition; an Anderson Manufacturing AR-15 rifle; and a Beretta 9mm handgun.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until September 17, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
03/21/23	Genovevo Alvarez-Ronquillo	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by fraudulently and knowingly receiving, concealing, buying, selling, and facilitating the transportation, concealment, and sale of merchandise, specifically firearms, from the United States to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until October 13, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
03/21/23	Jesus Adrian Ramirez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico firearms and firearm components, including one 40 round AK-47 variant firearm magazine; two AK-47 variant firearm barrels; two AK-47 variant firearm bolts; two AK-47	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until December 16, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		variant firearm bolt springs; two AK-47 variant firearm gas pistons; and one AR variant firearm unfinished lower receiver.		
03/21/23	Manuel Alonso Enriquez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by knowingly and unlawfully attempting to export from the United States to Mexico 3,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 caliber ammunition.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until September 17, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
03/21/23	Obed Rafael Cuevas-Serratos	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico approximately 13,000 rounds of 7.62 millimeter ammunition.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until August 3, 2030 under ECRA. (9 years)
03/27/23	Ye Sang "Ivy" Wang	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to willfully export from the United States to China controlled military equipment and supplies for profit, without the required licenses.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until December 21, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
03/27/23	Jose Luis Alonso	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico one AM	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until January 13, 2029 under ECRA. (7 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		15 pistol; one .22 caliber rifle; and one 12-gauge shotgun.		
03/27/23	Mario Ramirez-Rios	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico 3,280 rounds of 7.62 x 39mm ammunition and 200 rounds of 9 mm ammunition, items designated as defense articles on the USML without the required license or written approval.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until October 23, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
03/29/23	UTair Aviation JSC	TDO in matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
03/29/23	PJSC Aeroflot	TDO in matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
03/29/23	Azur Air	TDO in matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the		TDO renewed for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		
03/29/23	Scott Communications, Inc., Mission Communications, LLC., and Kenneth Peter Scott	Attempted to export two portable Motorola radios, controlled for AT reasons and valued approximately \$1700, to Jordan with knowledge that they would be reexported to Iran and engaged in false statements in subsequent interviews with BIS, Office of Export Enforcement. (ECCN 5A991.g)	764.2(e) [1] 764.2(g) [2] 764.2(a) [1] 764.2(i) [1]	Settlement Agreement (after filing of charging letter) – export privileges denied for 20 years.
04/06/23	Microsoft Corporation	Sold and entered into software license agreements involving listed entities in Russia with knowledge or reason to know that a violation of the Regulations was intended or about to occur. (ECCN 5D992.c)	764.2(e) [7]	Settlement Agreement – civil penalty of \$624,013, of which \$276,382 is suspended until Microsoft makes payment of the OFAC civil penalty pursuant to the terms of the OFAC Settlement Agreement.
04/10/23	URAL Airlines JSC	TDO in a matter that involved operating multiple aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991, on international flights, including from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; Khudzhand, Tajikistan; and Tamchy, Kyrgyzstan to Russia after March 2, 2022 without the required BIS authorization.		TDO renewed for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
04/12/23	Gustavo Cavazos	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling firearms from the United States to Mexico without the required licenses.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until November 19, 2025 under ECRA. (5 years)
04/12/23	Darius Zehrbach	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by knowingly and willfully making a materially false, fictitious, fraudulent statement and representation, that is, the defendant stated in a letter to an agent of the U.S. Department of Commerce that any shipment he had caused to be made to Iran had originated in China, when the defendant then and there knew that any shipment he had caused to be made to Iran had originated in the United States.	18 U.S.C. § 1001	Export privileges denied until April 24, 2029 under ECRA. (10 years)
04/12/23	Katie Ellen O'Brien	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by making false statements or misrepresentations to the U.S. Government during the course of an investigation and smuggling and attempting to	18 U.S.C. § 554(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001	Export privileges denied until January 17, 2029 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		smuggle firearms from the United States to Mexico.		
04/12/23	Damian Espinoza-Gonzales	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by conspiring and unlawfully smuggling, and attempting to smuggle, firearms and ammunition from the United States to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001	Export privileges denied until April 6, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
04/14/23	Aviastar-TU	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
04/19/23	Seagate Technology LLC and Seagate International PTE. LTD.	Caused or ordered the export of hard disk drives subject to the EAR and valued at approximately \$1,104,732,205 to listed Huawei entities without a license or other authorization from BIS and in violation of the foreign direct product (FDP) rule. (EAR99)	764.2(a) [429]	Settlement Agreement – civil penalty of \$300,000,000; complete a multi-year audit requirement and be subject to a five-year suspended denial of export privileges.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
05/02/23	Lizzette Jaimes	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle various firearms from the United States to Mexico without the required licenses.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until September 21, 2028 under ECRA. (7 years)
05/02/23	Andres Morales	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling from United States to Mexico approximately ten to fifteen Barrett .50 caliber rifles; and ten or more AK-47 assault style rifles.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until June 28, 2031 under ECRA. (7 years)
05/05/23	Mahan Airways; Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, a/k/a Kosarian Fard; Mahmoud Amini; Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation; Sirjanco	TDO in a matter that involved the reexport and attempted or intended reexport of U.S.-origin Boeing 747s, false statements to BIS regarding the ultimate destination and end-user of these aircraft, and the failure to comply with a BIS order to return the aircraft to the United States. This matter also involved exports and reexports, or attempted or intended exports or reexports, during renewal periods of the TDO of U.S.-origin McDonnell Douglas aircraft, Airbus aircraft with U.S.-origin engines, U.S.-origin jet engines,		TDO renewed for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
	Trading LLC; Mahan Air General Trading LLC; Mehdi Bahrami; Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a Al-Naser Airlines, a/k/a Alnaser Airlines and Air Freight Ltd.; Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay; Bahar Safwa General Trading; Sky Blue Bird Group, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Aviation, a/k/a Sky	and other items subject to the Regulations.		

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
	Blue Bird Ltd., a/k/a Sky Blue Bird FZC; and Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam Muhammad Anwar Nur Shammout, a/k/a Issam Anwar			
05/08/23	Virgil Griffith	Underlying criminal conviction for violating IEEPA by exporting services to North Korea without the required authorization from the U.S. Department of Treasury and evading and avoiding U.S. sanctions on North Korea.	Section 1705 of IEEPA	Export privileges denied until April 12, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)
05/08/23	Juan Marvin Garcia	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling from the United States to Mexico approximately 12,800 rounds of 7.62 x 39mm ammunition; 150 rounds of 38 special ammunition; 60 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition; and one Stoeger Cougar 9 mm pistol without written approval from U.S. Department of Commerce.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until October 13, 2028 under ECRA. (7 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
05/08/23	Juan Antonio Cepeda	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico approximately one .243 caliber rifle; one .22 caliber rifle; one 12-gauge shotgun, one .223 caliber magazine; and one .22 caliber magazine.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until March 25, 2028 under ECRA. (7 years)
05/08/23	Adriana Gabriela Guajardo-Cavazos	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico approximately one .243 caliber rifle; one .22 caliber rifle; one 12-gauge shotgun; one .223 caliber magazine; and one .22 caliber magazine.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until November 12, 2027 under ECRA. (7 years)
05/08/23	Colby Stephan Skolskeg	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by knowingly and unlawfully attempting to export eight firearms from the United States to Canada.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until September 10, 2025 under ECRA. (5 years)
05/12/23	Rossiya Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
05/16/23	Oleg Sergeyevich Patsulya, Vasilii Sergeyevich Besedin, MIC P&I, LLC, Intermodal Maldives, and JSC Smartavia Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved attempting to divert electronics and aircrafts parts to Russia.		Initial TDO issued for 180 days.
05/17/23	Carlos Daniel Rodriguez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling from the United States to Mexico approximately 15,000 rounds of 5.56-millimeter ammunition and approximately 193 thirty-round magazines designed for use in AR-type rifles.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until December 2, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
05/17/23	Manuel Alberto Munoz-Sandoval	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling from the United States to Mexico semi-automatic firearms, to wit: an Iberia Hi-Point, model JCP, .40 caliber pistol; a Smith and Wesson, model SD9VE, 9 mm caliber pistol; a Taurus, model PT111 G2A, 9mm caliber pistol; and a	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until November 10, 2026 ECRA. (5 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		Ruger, model LCP II, .380 caliber pistol.		
05/17/23	David Alberto Duarte-Marquez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico M203 40 mm grenade launcher barrels.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until January 26, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
05/17/23	Reynoldo Lopez-Cota	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by conspiring and smuggling 1,000 rounds of 7.62 caliber ammunition; one 100 rounds of .223 drum magazine; and one speed loader from the United States to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until May 7, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
05/17/23	Luis Manuel Bray-Vazquez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico five 7.62x39mm caliber rifles; four 7.62x39mm caliber pistols; three 5.56 caliber rifles; one Barrett .50 caliber	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until August 24, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		rifle; one .45 ACP caliber pistol; and one 9x19mm caliber pistol.		
05/17/23	Johnathon Martin Soria	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling or attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico firearms as defined in Category I of the USML, without a license or written authorization.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until July 12, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
05/17/23	Alex Yun Cheong Yue	Underlying criminal conviction for violating IEEPA for conspiring to export and knowingly and willfully exporting, attempting to export, and causing to be exported cesium atomic clocks from the United States to Hong Kong without first obtaining the required licenses from the U.S. Department of Commerce, and one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) for fraudulently and knowingly buying, selling, and facilitating the transportation, concealment and sale of cesium atomic clocks to Hong Kong.	Section 1705 of IEEPA and 18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until March 3, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
05/17/23	Oscar Ignacio Lopez Soto	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to straw purchase and smuggle firearms to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until August 10, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
05/17/23	Mario Ismael Quijada, Jr.	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to straw purchase and smuggle firearms to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until January 13, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
05/17/23	Leonel Apolinar Lopez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to straw purchase and smuggle firearms to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until March 9, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
05/17/23	Jacobo Javier Garza-Solis	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA by knowingly and willfully exporting and causing to be exported and attempting to export and attempting to cause to be exported from the United States to Mexico one Glock, .40 caliber, semiautomatic handgun	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until October 16, 2030, under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		charged with a magazine containing 13 rounds of ammunition and approximately 1,540 rounds of 7.62 x 39mm ammunition, which were designated as defense articles on the USML, without first obtaining from the U.S. Department of State a license for such export or written authorization.		
05/17/23	Luiz Sanchez	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to export firearms using an alias from the United States to the Dominican Republic concealed in household items.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until October 15, 2026 under ECRA. (6 years)
05/17/23	Victor Ceballos Polanco	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to export firearms using an alias from the United States to the Dominican Republic concealed in household items.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until November 6, 2025 under ECRA. (5 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
06/01/23	Quicksilver Manufacturing, Inc., Rapid Cut LLC and US Prototype, Inc.	TDO in a matter that involved unlicensed exports of controlled technology to China for 3D printing.		TDO renewed for 180 days to only prohibit items that are the Commerce Control List.
06/07/23	Belavia Belarusian Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
06/08/23	Boris Livshits, Svetlana Skvortsova, Aleksey Ippolitov, Advance Web Services, Strandway, LLC, Nikolaos Bogonikolos, and Aratos Group	TDO in a matter that involved conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws in connection with the unlicensed export of electronic signal generator and measurement equipment, among other items, to BIS-listed entities in Russia.		TDO renewed for 180 days; added two additional respondents.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
06/09/23	Thomas Harris, Jr.	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle 14 firearms from the United States to Saint Lucia.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until March 1, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)
06/10/23	Eli Espinoza	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico firearms components to include front trunnion; AK bolt body; upper hand guard and gas tube; rear sight block; recoil spring rear guide; dust cover; trigger for semi-automatic rifle; bolt carrier assembly; and bolt catch without a license or written approval from the U.S. Department of Commerce.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until December 14, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
06/10/23	Luis David Armendariz	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling from the United States to Mexico approximately 19,000 rounds of assorted ammunition which is a controlled item as defined in the Commerce Control List, without the required license.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until May 11, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
06/10/23	Patrick Lee Sousa	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to knowingly, intentionally, and willfully engage in the business of dealing firearms without a license.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until October 29, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
06/10/23	Khalid Jarrah	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to knowingly, intentionally, and willfully engage in the business of dealing firearms without a license.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until August 11, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
06/10/23	Samet Doyduk	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to export firearm parts purchased in the United States to be shipped to Turkey and the Republic of Georgia.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until July 12, 2029 under ECRA. (7 years)
06/10/23	Shaohua Eric Wang	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to willfully export from the United States to China, controlled military equipment and supplies for profit, without the required licenses.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until February 3, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
06/10/23	Jorge Jesus Sigala	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by smuggling from the United States to Mexico various pistols.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a)	Export privileges denied until April 22, 2026, under ECRA. (5 years)
06/15/23	Siberian Airlines d/b/a S&A Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
06/15/23	Pobeda Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
06/15/23	Nordwind Airlines and Pegas Touristik, a/k/a Pegas Touristik OOO	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for 180 days; added Pegas Touristik, a/k/a Pegas Touristik OOO as a related person.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
06/27/23	Nordwind Airlines	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		Modified TDO to remove Pegas Touristik, a/k/a Pegas Touristik OOO as a related person.
07/05/23	Jaeyoun Jung	Exported optical magnifiers to South Korea without the required licenses, controlled for Crime Control reasons and valued at approximately \$10,987. (ECCN 0A987.e)	764.2(a) [1]	Settlement Agreement – two-year suspended denial of export privileges and complete an export compliance training on the Regulations within twelve months.
07/14/23	Victor Thomas Diaz	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to knowingly, intentionally, and willfully engage in the business of dealing firearms without a license.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until April 18, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)
07/14/23	Tyler James Sumlin	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554 by attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico firearms, namely silencers, a short-barreled rifle, and a destructive device.	18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until September 11, 2026 ECRA. (7 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
07/25/23	Empresa de Transporte Aéreo cargo del Sur, S.A., a/k/a Aerocargo del Sur Transportation Company, a/k/a EMTRASUR	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by a previously issued BIS TDO against Iranian airline Mahan Air, by acquiring custody or control of a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 aircraft from Mahan Air of Iran in violation of U.S. export controls and for engaging in further violations by operating that aircraft on flights between Venezuela, Iran, and Russia.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
08/10/23	Guiliano Pecci	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554 by smuggling firearm kits from the United States to Paraguay.	18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until March 31, 2029 under ECRA. (7 years)
08/10/23	Bradley Jon Matheny	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554 by smuggling from the United States to Arad, Israel .117 caliber hunting pellets, and smuggling from the United States to Sderot, Israel and Scottsville, South Africa a Winchester 42-piece firearm brush cleaning kit.	18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until November 12, 2028 under ECRA. (7 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
08/10/23	Vladimir Volgaev	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554 by smuggling and attempting to smuggle firearm parts from the United States to Ukraine without having obtained a license or other approval from the U.S. Department of State.	18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until August 4, 2030 under ECRA. (10 years)
08/10/23	Omran Ismail	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to straw purchase several handguns on behalf of co-defendant Ola Sayed, who allegedly tried to smuggle the firearms into Egypt.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until December 3, 2026 under ECRA. (7 years)
08/10/23	Emilie Voissem	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, 18 U.S.C. § 554 and Section 1705 of IEEPA by conspiring to violate IEEPA, exporting and attempting to export, and smuggling four rEvo III rebreathers from the United States to Libya without the required license or written approval.	18 U.S.C. § 371, 18 U.S.C. § 554, Section 1705 of IEEPA	Export privileges denied until January 12, 2029 under ECRA. (7 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
08/21/23	Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by unlawfully procuring and exporting from the United States electronic devices subject to the EAR to the FSB of the Russian Federation, a Russian Party on the Entity List, and to the DPRK without the required U.S. government authorization.		TDO renewed for 180 days.
08/22/23	Esteban Andres Alexander	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to export firearms and firearms parts from the United States to Mexico without first having obtained the required export license and authorization from the U.S. Department of State or U.S. Department of Commerce.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until March 8, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)
08/22/23	Tuqiang Xie	Underlying criminal conviction for violating Section 38 of the AECA by knowingly and willfully engaging in brokering activities involving the People's Republic of China in negotiating and arranging purchases, sales, transfers, export, and import of a defense article, namely an eyepiece assembly, National Stock Number 1240-01-063-	Section 38 of the AECA	Export privileges denied until March 30, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
		1352, without first registering with, and obtaining a license or written approval from the U.S. Department of State.		
08/22/23	Naomi Natal Haynes	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to fraudulently and knowingly export and send firearms from the United States to Canada without the required license.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until January 11, 2031 under ECRA. (10 years)
08/28/23	Arthur Petrov aka Artur Petrov, Astraferos Technokosmos LTD, Zhanna Soldatenkova, Ultra Trade Service LLC, Ruslan Almetov, Juzhoi Electronic LLC	TDO in a matter that involved illegally exporting sensitive U.S.-sourced microelectronics with military applications to Russia.		Initial TDO issued for 180 days.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
	and LLC Electrocom VPK VPK/OOO/LL C/SPB			
09/06/23	Ruben Beltran Pedroza	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554 by smuggling a Smith & Wesson M&P Shield .40 pistol, SN: HDY2067 from the United States to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until November 3, 2027 under ECRA. (5 years)
09/06/23	Jonathan Santiago	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554 by smuggling a Smith & Wesson M&P Shield .40 pistol, SN: HDY2067 from the United States to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until October 25, 2029 under ECRA. (7 years)
09/06/23	Nicholas Ayala	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18U.S.C. § 554 by conspiring to smuggle various handguns and firearms from the United States to Ecuador.	18 U.S.C. § 371, and 18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until November 16, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
09/06/23	Peter Sotis	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, Section 1705 of IEEPA, and 18 U.S.C. § 554 by conspiring to export, exporting and attempting to export and smuggling four rEvo III rebreathers from the United States to Libya without the required license or written approval.	18 U.S.C. § 371, Section 1705 of IEEPA, and 18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until January 12, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)
09/12/23	Katie Ellen O'Brien	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by making false statements or misrepresentations to the U.S. Government during the course of an investigation and smuggling and attempting to smuggle firearms from the United States to Mexico.	18 U.S.C. § 554(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001	Amended April 12, 2023 Order to reflect the last known address of the convicted individual.
09/23/23	UTair Aviation JSC	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for one year.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
09/23/23	PJSC Aeroflot	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for one year.
09/23/23	Azur Air	TDO in a matter that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		TDO renewed for one year.
09/28/23	Jacques Yves Sebastien Duroseau	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, 50 U.S.C. § 4819, Section 38 of the AECA, and 18 U.S.C. § 554 by conspiring to illegally export and smuggle firearms and controlled equipment from the United States to Haiti, as well as transporting USML controlled firearms and Commerce Control List-controlled riflescopes without a license to the Haitian Army.	18 U.S.C. § 371, 50 U.S.C. § 4819, Section 38 of the AECA, and 18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until May 24, 2032 under ECRA. (10 years)

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
09/28/23	Carlos Eduardo Zepeda	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554 by smuggling from the United States to Mexico approximately 800 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition.	18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until December 1, 2029 under ECRA. (7 years)
09/28/23	Leonel Molina, Jr.	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554 by smuggling from the United States to Mexico Wolf 7.62x39mm caliber ammunition without a license or written approval from the U.S. Department of Commerce.	18 U.S.C. § 554	Export privileges denied until March 2, 2033 under ECRA. (10 years)
09/28/23	Saphara Lynn Anderson	Underlying criminal conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to fraudulently and knowingly export and send firearms from the United States to Canada without the required license.	18 U.S.C. § 371	Export privileges denied until January 11, 2031 under ECRA. (7 years)
09/29/23	Southwind Airlines	TDO originally issued against Nordwind Airlines that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		Final Decision (TDO Appeal): TDO appeal is dismissed.

Order Date	Respondent	Case Details	Provision Violated [# of violations]	Penalty
09/23/23	OOO Pegas Touristik	TDO originally issued against Nordwind Airlines that involved prohibited conduct by operating aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into Russia without the required BIS authorization, and there are heightened concerns of future violations.		Final Decision (TDO Appeal): TDO appeal is dismissed.

^[1] Information related to three convictions during FY 2023 are not included in this table due to the information being under seal by the Court.

APPENDIX B: SUMMARIES OF ANTIBOYCOTT CASES AND BOYCOTT REQUESTS

Table 1: Summary of Antiboycott Cases in FY 2023

Company Name & Location	Date Order Signed	Alleged Violations of EAR	Settlement Amount
Regal Beloit FZE (Dubai) (Dubai)	05/18/23	84 x 760.5 - Failure to report receipt of a boycott request	\$283,500
B.E. Meyers & Co., Inc. (Redmond, WA)	07/12/23	2 x 760.2(d) - furnishing information about business relationships with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons 1 x 760.5 - Failure to report receipt of a boycott request	\$44,750
Profense LLC (Phoenix, AZ)	07/12/23	2 x 760.2(d) - Furnishing information about business relationships with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons 2 x 760.5 - Failure to report receipt of a boycott request	\$48,500
Pratt & Whitney Component Solutions, Inc. (Muskegon, MI)	09/06/23	13 x 760.5 - Failure to report receipt of a boycott request	\$48,750

Table 2: Boycott Requests Reported to the Office of Antiboycott Compliance FY 2023

Country	Prohibited Boycott Requests	Permissible Boycott-Related Requests	Amended Boycott Requests	Boycott Exceptions	Totals
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0
Bahrain	0	0	0	1	1
Iraq	43	0	0	4	47
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	5	0	0	6	11
Lebanon	0	0	0	0	0
Libya	0	0	0	0	0
Oman	0	1	0	0	1
Qatar	8	7	0	28	43
Saudi Arabia	4	3	1	11	19
Syria	0	0	0	0	0
United Arab Emirates	3	18	0	6	27
Yemen	0	0	0	0	0
Total (Arab League members)	63	29	1	56	149
Bangladesh	3	4	1	32	40
Iran	0	0	0	0	0
Malaysia	2	6	0	1635	1643
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	4	1	0	185	190
All other Countries	4	2	2	7	15

Total (All countries and Arab League members)	76	42	4	1915	2037
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Antiboycott Glossary:

Prohibited boycott-related requests describe those requests to take an action that would be prohibited under Section 760.2 of the EAR, mainly actions to enforce the secondary and tertiary aspects of a foreign unsanctioned boycott.

Permissible boycott-related requests are for actions that fall outside the prohibitions of the EAR but still require compliance with some level of a foreign unsanctioned boycott.

Amended boycott-related requests were ones that were prohibited as an initial matter but were subsequently adjusted and reclassified as permissible or as falling within an exception under the EAR.

Boycott-related exceptions are requests to take actions that would otherwise be prohibited but are allowed under Section 760.3 of the EAR.

APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF ACTIONS FY 2023

October 4, 2022: Additions of Entities to the Entity List

October 7, 2022: Export Administration Regulations: Guidance on Penalty Determinations in the Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases Involving Antiboycott Matters

October 13, 2022: Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification

October 13, 2022: Revisions to the Unverified List; Clarifications to Activities and Criteria that May Lead to Additions to the Entity List

October 13, 2022: Procedures for Access to the Public Briefing on Additional Export Controls on Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items

December 1, 2022: Request for Public Comments Regarding Areas and Priorities for U.S. and Japan Export Control Cooperation for the Japan-U.S. Commercial and Industrial Partnership Export Control Working Group

December 7, 2022: Extension of comment period for Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification

December 7, 2022: Additions of Entities to the Entity List; Removal of an Entity from the Entity List

December 16, 2022: Revisions to the Unverified List and the Entity List

December 19, 2022: Additions and Revisions to the Entity List and Conforming Removal from the Unverified List

December 23, 2022: Modification to the Entity List

January 17, 2023: Implementation of Australia Group Decisions from 2021 and 2022 Virtual Meetings: Controls on Marine Toxins, Plant Pathogens and Biological Equipment

January 18, 2023: Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification; Updates to the Controls to Add Macau

February 1, 2023: Additions to the Entity List

February 14, 2023: Additions to the Entity List

February 24, 2023: Implementation of 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Decisions

February 27, 2023: Export Control Measures Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to Address Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Their Use by the Russian Federation Against Ukraine

February 27, 2023: Additions of Entities to the Entity List; Revisions of Entities on the Entity List

February 27, 2023: Additions of Entities to the Entity List

February 27, 2023: Implementation of Additional Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls

March 6, 2023: Additions and Revisions to the Entity List

March 24, 2023: Revisions to the Unverified List

March 30, 2023: Additions to the Entity List; Amendment to Confirm Basis for Adding Certain Entities to the Entity List Includes Foreign Policy Interest of Protection of Human Rights Worldwide

April 1, 2023: Additions and Revisions of Entities to the Entity List

April 20, 2023: Section 1758 Technology Export Controls on Instruments for the Automated Chemical Synthesis of Peptides

May 22, 2023: Implementation of Additional Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls

May 22, 2023: Addition of Entities to the Entity List

June 14, 2023: Additions of Entities to the Entity List and Removal of Entity from the Entity List

June 21, 2023: Additions of Entities to the Entity List and Removal of Entity from the Entity List; Correction

July 19, 2023: Additions of Entities to the Entity List

August 14, 2023: Expansion of Nuclear Nonproliferation Controls on the People's Republic of China and Macau

August 18, 2023: Commerce Control List: Updates Based on the Latest Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Plenary Meetings

August 22, 2023: Revisions to the Unverified List

August 30, 2023: Revisions of Temporary Denial Order Provisions to Allow for Extended Renewals in Certain Circumstances

September 18, 2023: Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Transfer of Access Information and Release of Software (Source Code and Object Code)

September 27, 2023: Addition of Entities and Revision to Existing Entities on the Entity List; Removal of Existing Entity from the Military End User List

####END OF REPORT####