


JOINT LOGISTICS COMMANDERS





19 JUNE 1987





PREPARED BY

THE JOINT PRECISION OPTICS
TECHNICAL GROUP
OF
THE JOINT GROUP
ON THE INDUSTRIAL BASE



Joint Logistics Commanders Precision Optics Study



Prepared by

U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security Strategic Analysis Division

19 June 1987

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Joint Logistics Commanders, Precision Optics Study - Written by the Joint Precision Optics Technical Group chartered under the Joint Logistics Commanders, this report assesses the precision optics industry based on surveys of U.S. producers. The report finds a shortfall in domestic production capacity to meet mobilization requirements and concludes that this shortfall presents a threat to national security in time of emergency. Concern is also expressed about the continued availability of optical glass. The report concludes that the underlying cause of the shortfall is the lack of international competitiveness on the part of U.S. firms and recommends that procurement of certain items be restricted to domestic companies in order to maintain a mobilization base.

FINAL REPORT

JOINT PRECISION OPTICS TECHNICAL GROUP

ROBERT P. O'SHAUGHNESSY, ET AL

JUNE 1987

Special Acknowledgement - The Chairman of the Joint Precision Optics Technical Group of the Joint Group on Industrial Base wishes to express his deep gratitude for the support given to this study by the Office of Industrial Resource Administration (OIRA) of the Department of Commerce. The data collected and analyzed by the OIRA formed the major basis from which the conclusions were drawn. Also appreciated was the administrative assistance in the formulation of this report.

JOINT LOGISTICS COMMANDERS PRECISION OPTICS STUDY

19 JUNE 1987

ERRATA

Page 37 Line 35: Change "Fujitsu" to "Fujinan"

Page 51 Lines 5 to 7: Replace sentence beginning "The work ethic..." with "Efficient work patterns may not be as developed in countries like Singapore and China as they are in Japan and the United States."

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 OVERVIEW

The Joint Precision Optics Technical Group (JPOTG) was chartered under the Joint Group on Industrial Base (JGIB) of the Joint Logistics Commanders (JLC) to perform the following tasks:

- a. Identify the Military Services' projected peacetime, surge and mobilization requirements for Precision Optics.
- b. Identify projected requirements for Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Optics.
- c. Assess the capability of the U.S. Precision Optics Base to provide for these requirements.
- d. Assess the degree of erosion in capability that has occurred because of foreign competition.
- e. Prepare recommendations to eliminate any production shortfalls which may be identified.

As part of the JPOTG study effort, the Department of Commerce, Office of Industrial Resource Administration, surveyed U.S. Precision Optics and Optical Material producers under mandatory authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended. Plant visits were also conducted by the study team to enhance the survey questionnaire data.

1.2 MAJOR FINDINGS

1.2.1 Requirements for Optics

In peacetime, the Services require approximately 100,000

optical components per month of the types used for direct application in military systems. Mobilization requirements were found to be much greater.

1.2.2 Domestic Production Capacity

Domestic production capacity (defense and non-defense) totalled about 316 thousand components per month in 1985, down considerably from previous years. Defense production capacity was estimated to be 87 thousand components per month, or approximately 28 percent of the overall total. The industry operated at 60 percent of capacity in 1985 and according to survey responses would require 43 weeks to reach full capacity production levels. This extended "ramp-up" period is caused by shortages of skilled opticians and long lead times for raw materials. Capacity utilization fell below 60 percent in 1986 as production is estimated to have dropped by over 20 percent from 1985 levels.

The potential of converting commercial production capacity to military production appears inadequate to support the rapid increase in optical elements needed to meet emergency defense requirements. To effectively convert capacity to military production, the skill level of many opticians would need to be enhanced and additional specialized equipment would have to be installed. One firm indicated conversion could take a year or more to accomplish. Thus, a significant shortfall exists in the capacity of the domestic industry to meet the needs of the services for mobilization.

1.2.3 Status of Domestic Raw Glass Sector

Foreign competition has reduced the number of domestic optical glass producers to a single firm. Seventy percent of the glass used by U.S. component producers is now imported and this percentage is expected to increase in the near future. In addition, the breadth of the domestic raw optical glass market has declined sharply as the production of lenses, prisms and other end-items that use optical glass has migrated offshore. The loss of this firm's highly specialized glass blending and melting capabilities could not be easily replaced and would make U.S. optical component firms totally dependent on foreign sources.

1.2.4 Status of Domestic Optical Element Sector

The U.S. optical element sector as a whole is in serious decline. Nearly all domestic commercial optical element production has been displaced by offshore producers. The trend in defense procurement is to increasingly buy foreign made optics, primarily because of their lower cost. Imported optical components currently account for over 98 percent of total U.S. consumption. In 1986, imports accounted for approximately 50 percent of DOD consumption. Overall employment declined from 3,096 in 1981 to only 1,655 in 1986. Further declines are expected. The employment of opticians who are critical to the production process has declined by over 40 percent since 1981.

1.2.5 Foreign Dependency

Most optical companies are reliant to some degree on imports of materials, parts, and/or production equipment. This reliance has grown in recent years in reaction to severe international pricing pressures that have forced domestic firms to seek lower cost foreign alternatives. Every phase of the business from raw glass to finished optical systems has been impacted. Almost 70 percent of optical glass consumption was imported in 1985, primarily because of lower prices. Some optical element firms have established production plants in lower cost foreign countries. Nearly all firms are purchasing foreign made production equipment because of its reportedly better quality, lower prices and/or lack of an adequate domestic source. Moreover, foreign sourcing and dependencies can be expected to increase in the future.

1.3 MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

1.3.1 Surge and Mobilization Posture

Surge requirements were not calculated by the individual Services. Surge production "targets", however, were defined for each production plant as a doubling of its 1985 defense production in a six month period, while maintaining non-defense production at peacetime levels. The surveyed firms reported they could increase defense production by 47 percent by the end of a six-month period under these conditions. Major constraints to a surge mentioned by the firms included the availability of raw materials, specialized equipment and trained opticians.

The shortfall in production capacity to meet mobilization requirements presents a threat to national security in time of emergency. A major factor of this shortfall is the declining number of trained opticians. Because of the continuing downward trend in production capacity and the declining employment of opticians, the mobilization capability of the precision optics industry will most likely worsen in the near future. Another major concern is the continued availability of optical glass. If the sole remaining U.S. producer is forced out of business because of increasing foreign competition and declining domestic demand, the severity of the problem could increase dramatically.

The industry's collective judgement may be overly pessimistic. Consideration should be given to the idea that when faced with an actual emergency, specifications and testing procedures could be relaxed and other ways could be found to overcome problems in converting capacity, training people and acquiring equipment. If one were to make the most optimistic estimate about mobilization capacity, the domestic industry would still lack the capacity required.

1.3.2 Domestic Industrial Outlook

Based on current trends, domestic optics firms can be expected to lose the last remaining vestiges of the already import-dominated lower value end of commercial optical component markets. American firms still competing in these markets will be forced either to exit the business altogether or to reorient themselves into the more sophisticated end of the market as many have already done. Competition in the higher priced optics categories, which include

most defense applications, will continue to intensify in response to this reorientation and serve to moderate future price increases.

The Japanese are now experiencing a similar phenomenon as firms in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore have quickly expanded their shares of the low end global optics market. In reaction to this situation, Japanese firms can be expected to challenge U.S. firms in the more sophisticated end of the market in the near future.

1.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

1.4.1 Establish a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) for Precision Optical Elements and Optical Glass

In compliance with the Competition in Contracting Act, amended 10 USC 2304 (C) (3) and Executive Order 11490, the Secretary of Defense can determine that in order to maintain a mobilization base, certain items can be restricted to domestic procurement. This requires a FAR clause in the FAR supplement. Based on the findings of the Joint Precision Optics Technical Group, such a clause for Precision Optics and Optical Glass is warranted.

It is recognized that there are several disadvantages to such a restriction. The major disadvantage is that the cost of procuring optical components will increase. The percentage rise for any particular system however, may or may not be significant depending on the amount and complexity of the optics in the system. Another concern is that industry could use a restrictive clause to increase profits without making the necessary investments to modernize and enhance its capabilities. To reduce this possibility, the recommended clause is set up as a temporary one, providing the

6 1

industry with a time-limited opportunity to improve its competitive position. Thus, seven years was chosen as a reasonable period for the clause, after which open competition would again take affect.

Furthermore, so as not to initially overwhelm the domestic industry with new orders, the clause should be phased in. The first two years are set aside as a necessary adjustment period with only fifty percent of optical components reserved exclusively for domestic procurement. This will give the industry time to acquire new equipment and raw material needed for increased defense production. Moreover, a two year phase-in would allow sufficient time for training additional needed opticians.

The clause should be as inclusive of the complete optical manufacturing process as possible. This will provide the basis for independent domestic capability to make optical components from the raw glass stage to the final product. Since foreign competition in optical glass production has caused a serious decline in domestically produced glass, the addition of bulk optical glass to the clause is essential to protect the production base.

It is recognized that from time to time the Service Commands will face conditions under which a waiver to this proposed FAR clause is justified. Provisions for such waivers are provided for in the clause through major command approval. Such waivers shall be in effect for only the period of time needed to permit the prime contractor to identify a domestic source of supply.

1.4.2 Review Possible Trade and Economic Remedies

The JPOTG has determined that the underlying cause of the shortfall in surge and mobilization capacity is the lack of

international competitiveness on the part of U.S. firms. It did not judge the fairness of international trade, nor determine what specific measures the government could take to improve the condition of the optics sector. Many in the industry believe that the present international optics market is biased in favor of foreign firms because of strong government supports, unfair trade practices and a lack of concern by the U.S. Government. These are questions which fall primarily under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce. Accordingly, the second major recommendation is to request the Commerce Department to assess the trade and economic factors impacting this critical industry and formulate options to rectify the situation.

While potential policy measures designed to assist this industry may take considerable time to implement, they can be an important step toward providing a longer term solution to the competitive problems confronted by the domestic optical industry.

2. ASSESSMENT

2.1 BACKGROUND

This study is a follow-up effort to a study undertaken by the Army Materiel Command (AMC) in 1985. A detailed description of the events preceding that AMC study are presented in the final report and will not be repeated here. The important fact to note is that an earlier ('84) AD HOC study group has received JLC approval of a recommendation for a FAR clause. This proposed clause was made policy by the Under Secretary of Defense in May of 1984, but never reached full FAR status from the FAR Council. In June of 1985, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition (SARDA) requested an AMC review which concluded that the Optical Industry was failing and that the need existed for FAR clause implementation. Since the AMC study dealt solely with Army requirements, it was decided to request the Joint Group on Industrial Base (JGIB) of the JLC establish the Joint Precision Optics Technical Group (JPOTG) to determine the total DOD requirements. The Department of Commerce, Office of Industrial Resource Administration was asked to participate in this assessment due to their expertise in industrial economic and trade issues.

Readers who lack a background in Optics might benefit by referring to the description of the manufacturing process for precision optics found in Appendix A.

2.2 STUDY GOALS

The goals of the JPOTG were to:

- a. Identify the Military Services' projected peacetime, surge and mobilization requirements for Precision Optics.
- b. Identify projected requirements for Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Optics.
- c. Assess the capability of the U.S. Precision Optics Base to provide for these requirements.
- d. Assess the degree of erosion in capability that has occurred because of foreign competition.
- e. Prepare recommendations to eliminate production shortfalls.

2.3 STUDY METHODS

2.3.1 Requirements of the Services and SDI

Individual command members of the JPOTG sent requests to their subordinate agencies responsible for the acquisition of systems using optics. Counts were made of the quantity of optical elements per system; then using the number of systems required, requirements were calculated. Emphasis was placed on those items on the Critical Items List (CIL). Peacetime requirements were determined by the President's Budget for the years through 1991.

Meetings were also held at the SDIO in an effort to determine its projected requirements.

2.3.2 Industry Surveys

The Group prepared and released through the Department of Commerce, Office of Industrial Resource Administration, two in-depth industry surveys under mandatory authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended. One survey dealt with the capacity of precision optics producers to manufacture optical components. The other survey addressed producers of optical material used in both the visible (optical glass) and the infrared (germanium, etc.) ranges. (Copies of the survey instruments are attached at Appendix B.)

2.4 STUDY RESULTS AND FINDINGS

2.4.1 DOD Requirements

2.4.1.1 Peacetime Requirements

Peacetime requirements for precision optics, as shown in figure

1, were derived from the FY87 President's Budget, Procurement

Appropriations, Army, Feb 86, FY 84-91. The President's Budget

lists weapon system buys projected to FY91. Those systems using

precision optics were identified and the number of precision optical

elements per system determined. (Not all CIL items are in the

President's Budget and not all items procured during peacetime FY

84-91 are on the CIL.) Based on this information, peacetime


requirements were estimated to average approximately 1.2 million per

year or 100,000 per month.


By analyzing those systems being procured for the next five years, the study team could identify systems being procured offshore. (See figure 2.)

FIGURE 1

OPTICAL ELEMENTS (000) EACH



SOURCES OF DOD PEACETIME PURCHASES OPTICAL COMPONENTS 9



2.4.1.2 Mobilization Requirements

Army mobilization requirements for precision optics were taken directly from the AMC FAR Assessment Study. Air Force and Navy requirements were determined through data requests to procurement elements within each Service and analysis of the available critical item list (CIL) information.

2.5 INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES

2.5.1 Peacetime Production Capability

2.5.1.1 Practical Capacity

Nine firms responding to the Department of Commerce industry survey reported a combined practical capacity to grind and polish 3,795,014 optical elements in 1985. Practical capacity, sometimes referred to as engineering or design capacity, is the greatest level of output a plant can achieve within the framework of a realistic work pattern. These firms are estimated to represent about 85 percent of total U.S. precision optics production capacity. Almost 28 percent of this total was allocated for defense related production. About 97 percent of capacity is used to produce optical elements in the visible range (lenses, prisms, mirrors, other flats). The remaining three percent of capacity includes infrared and ultraviolet optical

1985 U.S. Optical Element Production Capacity

Category	Capacity	Capacity Utilization	Defense Capacity	Percent Defense
	(units)		(units)	
Visible Optics				
Lenses	2,017,916	64.3%	704,253	35.0%
Prisms	57,998	69.6	35,727	61.7
Mirrors	1,026,282	60.0	97,497	9.6
Other Flats	564,457	46.0	110,634	19.7
Other Optics				_
Infrared	98,694	57.5	91,588	92.8
Ultraviolet	29,667	58.4	4,658	15.8
Total	3,795,014	60.4%	1,044,357	27.6%

categories. The military accounted for the largest shares of capacity for visible prisms (61.7 percent) and infrared optics (92.8 percent). In 1985, capacity utilization for the nine firms averaged

only 60.4 percent, ranging from a low of 40 percent to a high of 100 percent for individual plants.

2.5.1.2 Interpreting Capacity Estimates

The surveyed firms were asked to comment on various factors that could change their capacity estimates. Capacity estimates were based on individual producers' 1985 product mix. Conditions that would lower estimated capacity include: tighter tolerances and specifications; the use of harder, more difficult to work materials; material availability; and increases in optical element varieties which would put additional demands on tooling and fixture capabilities. Conditions that would increase estimated capacity include: longer production runs; more skilled opticians; additional trained supervisors for second and third shifts; and more efficient production scheduling.

2.5.1.3 Ramp-Up Time

The precision optics industry reported it would take an average of 43 weeks to reach practical capacity from the average 60 percent capacity utilization rate it cited in 1985. The removal of one larger firm from this average would reduce the average "ramp-up" time to 25 weeks. Individual plants estimated this time from a low of only four weeks to a high of 78 weeks. The long time period , needed to reach practical capacity is caused primarily by shortages of skilled opticians and long lead times for raw materials such as optical glass, grinding and polishing compounds, and coating materials.

2.5.1.4 Lead Times

Lead time information was collected separately for defense and non-defense orders. Lead time averages were reported by each surveyed firm as representative of the time between receipt of orders and delivery of finished optical components to the customer. The time customers spend in preparing orders and the time they take after accepting delivery to test, inventory, and catalog the components were not evaluated. However, customer processing and handling could add an additional 30 to 50 percent to overall lead times.

Average defense lead times were reported at 20 weeks in 1985. Individual plant defense lead times ranged from a low of only six weeks to a high of 26 weeks. Five plants, accounting for over 80 percent of defense production, reported lead times of 20 weeks or more. Three firms reported they were experiencing increases in their defense lead times. Reasons given included increasingly complex specifications and testing procedures, insufficient labor skill levels, inadequate equipment, and high volumes of government mandated paper work which delay the release of orders.

Average non-defense lead times were reported at 13 weeks, 35 percent less time than defense orders. Individual plants ranged from a low of only two weeks to a high of 26 weeks. Commercial orders have shorter lead times because they involve less paper work, less testing, often less product complexity, and they tend to use more standardized, less exotic raw materials in production.

The cause of long lead times includes raw material availability (mentioned by six firms) and tooling (mentioned by four firms).

Shortages of opticians were mentioned by one firm, but opticians are

not seen as a problem under current utilization rates. However, were orders to increase significantly, shortages of opticians would be a major cause of longer lead times. To shorten lead times firms recommended the stockpiling of raw materials, adding toolmakers, purchasing new equipment, better communications between customers and suppliers, and the issuance of higher volume orders.

2.5.1.5 Capacity Conversion from Commercial to Defense Production

A healthy precision optic commercial base that can be redirected or converted to supply expanded military needs in a surge or mobilization emergency is an important strategic asset that can significantly enhance national security. Historically, a large domestically based commercial optical element sector provided the skilled opticians, investment, research and development, managerial skills and overhead that largely underwrote defense purchases. However, the commercial optical element base has eroded in the face of rapidly rising element imports and the loss of the optical end market to overseas suppliers. Consequently, the Department of Defense has risen from a relatively minor purchaser to the U.S. optical component industry's largest single customer, currently acquiring about 42 percent of the value of U.S. component production.

The conversion potential of commercial production capacity to military production has diminished with declines in the commercial base. Most firms cited shortages of skilled opticians and limited testing, inspection, and coating equipment as constraining their capability to switch from commercial to defense production. This concern is complicated by a growing reliance on imported machinery

and equipment and related spare parts/services. One larger firm estimated a conversion to military production, assuming availability of all necessary inputs, would take a year or more to accomplish.

Defense production generally requires tighter tolerances and specifications than commercial production. The raw glass is frequently ordered in smaller volumes and often made of special blends which creates scheduling problems and increases lead times for the glass producer. Additionally, the skill level of many opticians, while adequate for most commercial work, may be inadequate to maintain low enough defect levels to keep costs and lead times under control and still meet defense requirements.

Defense production also requires more metrology equipment such as auto collimators and interferometers, testing equipment to measure salt and humidity resistance, and equipment to test for vibration integrity. Further, expensive vacuum coating equipment would be needed. Availability of this needed equipment in an emergency will add to the already long lead times necessary for conversion.

The conversion potential of the domestic optical element sector to military production appears inadequate to support a rapid increase in defense requirements. The situation may deteriorate further in the future as foreign incursions into commercial end markets continue to undermine the U.S. commercial production base. The growing dependence of U.S. firms on the volatile and unpredictable military market could make investment in modern equipment less attractive and more difficult to justify. Moreover, the already diminished pool of highly skilled opticians will be difficult to maintain in the more volatile military market. In

addition, essential civilian requirements (e.g., microscopes and lasers for medical use, or sophisticated optical testing and inspection equipment needed in a number of defense related manufacturing industries) will make claims on optical component capacity during an emergency and could be an additional limit to conversion.

2.5.2 Surge and Mobilization Capabilities

Surge and mobilization production capabilities for precision optics were reported by the nine firms in their survey responses. Surge, for this study, is defined as the maximum sustainable level of defense production within an existing establishment by the end of six months. During a surge, commercial deliveries are to be maintained as well. Idle capacity and additional labor can be employed. Under a mobilization scenario, defense production is to be increased to the maximum sustainable level after 12 months.

Commercial production is restricted to 25 percent of base year (1985) levels, and government financial and other assistance is available. In a mobilization, existing plant facilities can be expanded over the period.

In the analysis of the firms' surge and mobilization capabilities, average 1985 monthly defense production was used as a proxy for peacetime defense requirements. Firms were asked to report their monthly defense production capability after three months and six months for a surge, and to target a doubling of production by the end of the six months. For mobilization, monthly production capability was reported after six and twelve months, with a target of quadrupling production after one year.

2.5.2.1 Surge Capabilities

For a surge, the following table shows that the firms cannot increase production enough to meet the targeted twofold increase, with only a 46.7 percent increase in production levels after six months. In individual product categories, all visible optics failed to meet production targets, while the more specialized infrared and ultraviolet optics were more successful. Visible optics, however, account for the bulk of peacetime defense needs; 91.4 percent on a unit basis, and 43.7 percent on a value basis. Infrared optics, although a small volume item, are much more significant to national defense in terms of value, accounting for over one half of total dollar defense shipments. Moreover, almost 93 percent of infrared production is utilized for defense purposes.

Surge Production Capabilities (in average monthly units)

	1985 Defense	Produc	onth tion Rate	Produc	onth tion Rate
Category	Production	% Gain	Quantity	% Gain	Quantity
Visible Optics				67 54	54 000
Lenses	37,716	14.3%	43,109	37.5%	51,860
Prisms	2,070	20.3	2,490	39.1	2,879
Mirrors	4,886	16.5	5,692	39.6	6,821
Other Flats	4,248	18.8	5,047	44.9	6,155
Other Optics					
Infrared	4,383	54.1	6.754	115.5	9,445
Ultraviolet	227	133.0	529	506.2	1,376
Total:	53,530	18.9%	63,622	46.7%	78,537

2.5.2.2 Mobilization Capabilities

Under a mobilization scenario, the same conclusion is drawn: visible optics categories cannot be produced in sufficient

quantities to satisfy the targeted quadrupling (300 percent increase) of production within the one year period. Weaknesses are particularly evident in the mirror and other flats categories, with increases of only 77.4 percent and 88.4 percent, respectively, after 12 months. On the other hand, the infrared and ultraviolet optics are able to meet the objective, with the ultraviolet showing the strongest potential for increased production.

Mobilization Production Capabilities (in average monthly units)

	1985 Defense		lonth tion Rate	12 Month Production Rate		
Category	Production	% Gain	Quantity	% Gain_	Quantity	
Visible Optics Lenses Prisms Mirrors Other Flats	37,716 2,070 4,886 4,248	105.7% 138.4 39.6 44.9	77,582 4,935 6,821 6,155	273.2% 227.3 77.4 88.4	140,756 6,775 8,668 8,003	
Other Optics Infrared Ultraviolet	4,383 227	149.3 1060.8	10,927 2,635	315.7 1060.8	18,220 2,635	
Total:	53,530	103.7%	109,055	245.8%	185,057	

2.5.2.3 Bottlenecks to a Surge/Mobilization

The firms were also requested to provide details on specific bottlenecks they foresaw in attempting to increase production for a surge or mobilization. Among the problems that would be encountered is the limited availability of supplies and raw materials due to the inadequacy of domestic sources and reliance on foreign suppliers. In an emergency situation, the continued availability or deliverability of these items may be in question.

Another major area of concern is the supply of equipment and machinery related to spare parts for the grinding, polishing,

coating and testing processes. As with raw materials, much of this equipment originates abroad, domestic production capacity is limited, and long lead times are common. Under surge or mobilization conditions, pressures on the optical equipment and machine tool industries would be great, leaving doubt as to the availability of vital equipment.

The most often mentioned bottleneck to increased production relates to the supply of skilled labor. This problem was named by every firm and across almost every optics-producing operation and process - coating, grinding, polishing, testing, hand correction and assembly. As discussed in detail in the section on Work Force, an extended period is required to train opticians and other vital optical personnel.

2.5.2.4 Critical Work Force Requirements in a Surge/Mobilization

In the survey, optics producers were asked to identify critical occupations and the number of workers in each occupation they would need to meet surge and mobilization targets. Critical occupations are defined as those for which an anticipated or potential shortage of qualified personnel would occur during a surge or mobilization. In general, critical occupations would include skilled occupations that require an extended training period. The table below presents the aggregated predictions for needed employment of critical occupations during a surge or mobilization. Also shown is the range given of the training period for these positions.

Number of Critical Workers Needed in a Surge and Mobilization

Critical Occupation	Current Employment	Number Needed to Surge	Number Needed to Mob	Training Period (Months)
Opticians	216	313	470	2-36
Engineers	67	101	167	2–48
Testing & Quality Control	34	50	90	6-24
Other Production Workers	209	296	488	4-48
Coating Opticians	105	139	205	4-18
Total	631	899	1,420	

2.5.3 Work Force

2.5.3.1 Trends

Since 1981, the optics industry has experienced an almost 50 percent decline in its work force. Closer examination of this industry revealed substantial work force reductions across the board in precision optic occupations. Producers reported a total of 1,655 employees in 1986, down from 3,096 in 1981. This overall employment decline has dramatically affected this industry's production capability, particularly under surge and mobilization conditions.

Pre	cision	Optics -	Work Fo	rce		
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	<u>1986</u>
Scientists and Engineers Production Workers Administration & Other	253 2,457 386	251 2,265 412	243 1,232 324	243 1,252 328	369 1,353 358	198 1,108 349
Totals	3,096	2,928	1,799	1,823	2,080	1,655
Opticians (also included in above numbers)	1,015	938	727	723	741	602
Percent of Work Force	32.7%	32.0%	40.4%	39.6%	35.6%	36.3%

Optical Materials - Work Force

	1981	1982	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u> 1985</u>
Scientists & Engineers	114	101	103	103	97
Production Workers	835	764	658	650	703
Administration & Other	245	221	223	230	246
Totals	1,194	1,086	984	983	1,046

2.5.3.2 Shortage of Skilled Opticians

Specialized and lengthy training is required by some of the work force. While unskilled labor is plentiful, the availability of journeymen and master opticians dropped from 1,015 in 1981 to only 602 in 1986, a 41 percent decline. One firm reported that 90 percent of its master opticians are approaching retirement age and no viable programs are in place to supply future needs.

The definition used in the industry survey to describe opticians was technicians who grind, polish, and test precision optical components (i.e., lenses, prisms, etc.) and assemble these components into optical systems. (Note: This definition of opticians does not include "dispensing opticians" who grind eyeglasses. Dispensing opticians are substantially different from precision optical opticians and can not be converted to precision optical production without extensive retraining.)

To become highly skilled, an optician requires two to three years of training and usually apprentices under a master optician. The skills of an optician are highly technical and most training is currently provided on the job. Skills and knowledge required include:

Skills 0

- equipment operation and maintenance

- use of various grinding and polishing compounds, and

- testing with a micrometer, spherometer, lens bench, auto collimator and interferometer

Knowledge 0

- fundamental theory of light

principles of refraction and diffraction

- characteristics of glass and other refractive materials
- processing procedureselementary mathematics

blueprint reading, and

- interpretation of specifications, tolerances and tests

Other critical occupations in short supply that could constrain a surge or mobilization are coating technicians, optical assemblers, quality controllers, grinders, and polishers.

2.5.3.3 Industry Sponsored Training Programs

The optical element producers have formed through the American Precision Optics Manufacturing Association (APOMA), a committee to institute a future training program. It will be an apprentice-type program with training conducted on the job. Two years of this training will be sponsored by APOMA. At the end of two years, the top 10 percent of those trained will be eligible to continue for another year of more intensive training to become supervisors and The others will go on to become opticians. By the end of 1987, APOMA expects to have the training program in full operation.

Back in 1980, a training program was developed by one company with a local community college. In this program a two year A.S. degree in precision optics was established. In addition to donating \$100,000 worth of equipment, this company provided instructors and laboratory assistants. The company noted that college level

training was necessary to acquire the needed specialized skills more rapidly than on the job training. It believes that two years of college training are equal to four years of training on the job. However, a downturn in the economy caused demands for skilled employees to lessen. The program, which received little support from the local community, was inactivated in 1984.

While this program is currently inactive, it could be reactivated within four to six months. Another company responding to the survey noted that increased business would be needed to offset the training costs of more opticians.

2.5.3.4 Shift Productivity

Producers noted that they could significantly increase production by operating multiple shifts. Using one shift as a starting point, producers estimated that production could be increased an average of 73 percent with the addition of a second shift and by 112 percent with the addition of both a second and third shift. However, the shortage of skilled employees would severely limit projected increases.

The precision optics producers also reported the number of production workers employed by shift and major production operation for 1985 and estimated what those numbers would be if they were operating at practical capacity. The total increase in production workers required to reach practical capacity was estimated at 82.2 percent or 1,113 workers. Since the industry was using 60.4 percent of its capacity in 1985, production at 100 percent of capacity would amount to a 65.6 percent production increase (i.e., (100-60.4)/60.4 = .656).

The smaller percent increase in production than in the work force translates into about a 20 percent decline for the additional workers in the productivity of labor. A productivity drop of this magnitude may not be acceptable during an extended surge or mobilization period with the expected shortage of opticians. To counteract such a drop, additional capital equipment would be needed to restore the capital/labor ratio closer to its optimal range.

Percentage increases in employment vary significantly by major production operation when expanding to practical capacity. The employment increase for the coating operation was the smallest at only 55.9 percent. All other operations show diminishing returns to scale or declines in labor productivity with incremental additions to the work force. Employment in the assembly operation showed the greatest increase at 119.9 percent with hand correction and rough grinding slightly less.

NUMBER OF PRODUCTION WORKERS PER SHIFT IN 1985 AND THE NUMBER REQUIRED IF OPERATING AT PRACTICAL CAPACITY

	1985	5 Oper Shift	ations	Prac	tical C Shift	apacity	Overall Percent
Operation	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd	Increase
Rough Grinding	(60.4% 68	utili 28	zation) 7	(100% 104	utiliz 67	ation) 48	112.7%
Fine Grinding	70	19	4	87	52	36	88.2%
Polishing	197	87	30	250	166	136	75.8%
Hand Correction	31	8	0	41	27	16	115.4%
Coating	113	68	23	141	111	66	55.9%
Assembly	86	20	Ö	115	, 78	40	119.9%
Testing	80	36	0	122	86	22	98.3%
Other	237	93	47	397	144	113	73.5%
Total	882	359	111	1,257	731	477	82.2%

2.6 Industry Performance

2.6.1 Shipments

Perhaps the most startling finding of this assessment is the small share of the U.S. market comprised of domestically produced precision optical elements. It is estimated that U.S. production in units accounts for less than two percent of total U.S. consumption. On a value basis, the U.S. share of shipments is higher because many U.S. firms continue to participate in highly specialized, low-volume optic markets. In these markets, a single element (such as for the space telescope or for the research being done by Lawrence Livermore Laboratories on laser fusion) may be several yards in diameter and cost several million dollars. This compares with an average import price of only three or four dollars. Total value shipment numbers are not available and it is with prudence that we estimate the U.S. market.

Unit shipments of precision optics by the nine surveyed firms varied over the 1981-1985 period. In 1981, 1.7 million units were shipped. This number rose to 2.1 million in 1982. Shipments declined to only 1.9 million or by 7.6 percent in 1983, but rose along with several major end markets including the military in 1984 to 2.5 million. 1985 brought a slump in shipments to 2.3 million although some individual firms showed improvement. A further overall decline is expected in 1986 due to continued pressures from foreign competitors and continued offshore migration of commercial end-markets.

Among individual optical component categories, the same general unit shipment trends prevail, except that shipments of

visible mirrors showed expansion in 1985 over their 1984 levels.

Ultraviolet optics have experienced continued growth over the entire five year period.

UNIT SHIPMENTS BY MAJOR COMPONENTS 1981-1985 (In Thousands)

VISIBLE OPTICS					
LENSES	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	656.7	909.0	782.0	925.3	846.0
Defense	190.7	252.1	295.6	429.2	452.6
Total	847.4	1161.1	1077.6	1354.4	1298.6
Defense Share	22.5%	21.7%	27.4%	31.7%	34.9%
20101100 0110.0					
PR I SMS	1981	1982	1983	1984	<u> 1985</u>
Non-Defense	18.5	17.2	11.6	26.9	15.5
Defense	26.8	27.8	13.9	38.1	24.8
Total	45.3	45.1	25.5	65.0	40.3
Defense Share	59.2%	61.8%	54.4%	58.7%	61.6%
				4004	1005
MIRRORS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	349.3	450.7	429.2	514.2	557.5
Defense	20.2	24.1	32.2	50.2	58.6
Total	369.6	474.8	461.4	564.5	616.1
Defense Share	5.5%	5.1%	7.0%	8.9%	9.5%
					4005
OTHER FLATS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	398.1	296.9	254.5	335.5	208.7
Defense	32.2	46.3	48.3	59.6	51.0
Total	430.3	343.2	302.8	395.1	259.7
Defense Share	7.5%	13.5%	16.0%	15.1%	19.6%
					4005
INFRARED OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	5.9	5.1	3.9	5.4	4.1
Defense	42.3	41.9	39.8	52.5	52.6
Total	48.2	46.9	43.7	57.9	56.7
Defense Share	87.8%	89.2%	91.0%	90.7%	92.8%
					4005
ULTRAVIOLET OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	5.3	5.5	6.4	12.4	14.6
Defense	2.7	2.7	4.3	4.3	2.7
Total	8.0	8.2	10.7	16.7	17.3
Defense Share	34.1%	33.2%	40.3%	25.8%	15.7%
	•				4.5.5
TOTAL ALL OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	1433.7	1684.4	1487.6	1819.7	1646.3
Defense	315.0	394.9	434.1	633.9	642.4
Total	1748.8	2079.3	1921.7	2453.6	2288.6
Defense Share	18.0%	19.0%	22.6%	25.8%	28.1%

Overall, just over 28 percent of unit optics shipments in 1985 for the nine firms went to defense purposes. This percentage has risen consistently over the period, demonstrating the firms' increasing reliance on military sales as the growth of commercial markets has been stifled by foreign competition. The percentage of optics used for defense purposes varies greatly from component to component, ranging from a low of 15.7 percent for ultraviolet types to a high of 92.8 percent for infrared types. Defense shipments, in contrast to commercial shipments, show consistent growth over the 1981–1985 period for most component categories and in the overall total.

Total value of shipments of precision optics follows the pattern of unit shipments closely, but price increases mask the decline in unit shipments in 1985.

DOLLAR SHIPMENTS BY MAJOR COMPONENTS 1981-1985 (In Thousands of Current Dollars)

VISIBLE OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	\$23,056	\$26,110	\$22,941	\$28,772	\$28,343
Defense	7,846	7,837		6,983	9,392
Total	30,902	33,947	29,833	35,755	37,735
Defense Share	25.4%		23.1%	19.5%	24.9%
•					
INFRARED OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	\$ 341	\$ 312	\$ 836	\$ 1,011	\$ 958
Defense	4,645	10,072	12,430	12,523	11,740
Total	4,986	10,384	13,266	13,534	12,698
Defense Share	93.2%		93.7%	92.5%	92.5%
ULTRAVIOLET OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	<u> 1985</u>
Non-Defense	\$ 210	\$ 211	\$ 239		
Defense	362	362	442	443	365
Total	572	573	. 681	753	713
Defense Share	63.3%		64.9%	58.8%	51.2%
50101100 011410					
TOTAL ALL OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	\$23,607	\$26,633	\$24,016	\$30,093	\$29,649
Defense	12.853	18,271	19,764	19,949	21,497
Total	36,460			50,042	51,146
Defense Share	35.3%	·	45.1%		

Defense shipments measured in value terms present a different picture. On a value basis, 42 percent of total shipments went to defense applications. Individual categories ranged from 25 percent to defense for visible optics to over 92 percent for infrared. The share of shipments in terms of value devoted to defense is much more volatile than the equivalent unit calculation, changing from year to year with no particular pattern apparent. This is because of the wide fluctuations in unit prices of optics reflecting the wide variability in their size, quality, and type.

2.6.2 Prices

Average prices (dollars per unit) were calculated for the major categories of optics and are presented below. Again care must be taken in interpreting these figures because of the wide variation in price for different optics, even within the same general category. On the whole, defense optics are more expensive than their non-defense counterparts, averaging \$33 per item versus \$18 for commercial optics in 1985. In the visible and infrared optics categories, however, the commercial price has edged slightly higher than the defense price in recent years. This reflects the fact that, among the nine surveyed firms, many pursued the more specialized, higher-valued commercial markets as foreign producers became dominant in the low end of the market. Furthermore, increased competition among domestic producers for defense business has brought defense prices down relative to commercial prices. To a great extent, high end commercial and defense applications have become the only markets that remain for domestic producers as traditional markets, such as lenses for cameras, binoculars and

telescopes are almost completely offshore today. In the future, defense tolerances and specifications are expected to become tighter and more sophisticated. This could drive defense costs and prices higher in years to come.

AVERAGE PRICE OF MAJOR COMPONENTS 1981-1985

VISIBLE OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	\$16.21	\$15.60	\$15.53	\$15.97	\$17.41
Defense	29.06	22.37	17.67	12.10	16.00
Total	18.26	16.77	15.98	15.03	17.04
INFRARED OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	\$57.96	\$61.36	\$212.45	\$187.40	\$235.90
Defense	109.77	240.61	312.43	238.59	223.1 9
Total	103.45	221.19	303.43	233.82	224.10
ULTRAVIOLET OPTICS	1981_	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	\$39.87	\$38.52	\$ 37.40	\$ 24.95	\$ 23.87
Defense	133.09	133.09	102.31	102.55	134.19
Total	72.62	69.90	63.59	44.97	41.21
TOTAL ALL OPTICS	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Non-Defense	\$16.47	\$15.81	\$ 16.14	\$ 16.54	\$ 18.01
Defense	40.80	46.26	45.52	31.47	33.47
Total	20.85	21.60	22.78	20.40	22.35

2.6.3 Imports and Exports

We estimate that the United States imported a staggering 279.2 million optical elements in 1986. This import total was more than one hundred times as many optical elements as the surveyed firms produced domestically (i.e., elements that were ground and polished). In terms of value, imported elements were estimated to equal about a billion dollars in 1986.

Over 80 percent of these imports originated in the Far East, primarily Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Over 95 percent of the imports entered the United States as "contained elements" in end-products such as cameras, telescopes, photographic lenses and

binoculars. Only 4.7 percent of the imported elements entered as "unmounted" optical elements. In absolute terms, element imports have increased by over 140 percent since 1978.

Exports of optical elements, on the other hand, ranged between 27.1 and 48 million units during the 1978 to 1986 period. Most exports, however, are actually re-exports of either mounted or unmounted imported elements assembled in the United States into end-products for export. The U.S. has maintained a small trade surplus with the European Community. A huge trade deficit exists with the Far East. (See Appendix E for a detailed accounting of imports and exports.)

TOTAL U.S. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF OPTICAL ELEMENTS, 1978-1986

(in millions of optical elements)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports</u>	Exports
1978 1979	116.3 124.3	31.8 41.5 36.6
1980 1981 1982	128.6 144.8 148.2	34.8 48.0
1983 1984	156.4 223.2	31.6 27.1
1985 1986	280.8 279.2	36.6 35.6

Source: Department of Commerce

Import statistics were collected for 11 major end-products (cameras, binoculars, microscopes, etc.) containing optical elements. Imported optical elements "contained" in these end-products were then estimated. Of the end-products, still cameras contained almost 44 percent of the total imported elements

in 1986, which was by far the largest single end-product share.

Other major end-products with significant shares included telescopes

(15.4 percent), mounted photographic lenses (13.8 percent), and

binoculars (12.2 percent).

Camera imports rose dramatically since 1983 from only 30.1 million (contained elements) to 122.3 million elements in 1986, more than a 300 percent increase. Imports of contained camera elements from Taiwan grew from under 5 million to over 50 million in this short period as both American and Japanese multinationals opened export facilities there. Taiwan emerged with the largest share of camera exports to the U.S. (41.4 percent), surpassing Japan (34.6 percent) in 1985. Taiwan also became the major supplier of motion camera elements (66.1 percent), edging past Japan (23.4 percent) in 1984. Motion cameras, however, are the smallest of the 11 end-product markets, and in fact have declined in overall number

1986 U.S. IMPORTS OF CONTAINED OPTICAL ELEMENTS BY END PRODUCT AND BY MAJOR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

End Product	Imported elements	percent of total	Major Source	percent of total
·	(millions)			
Still Cameras	122.3	43.8%	Taiwan	41.4%
Telescopes	42.9	15.4	Japan	40.7
Photographic Lenses, Mounted	38.5	13.8	Japan	78.2
Binoculars	34.0	12.2	Japan	54.9
Optical Elements, Unmounted	13.2	4.7	Japan	65.7
Optical Elements, Mounted	10.8	3.9	Japan	85.1
Photocopiers	8.6	3.1	Japan	94.4
Projection Lenses, Mounted	4.7	1.7	Japan	85.6
Microscopes	2.0	.7	Japan	79.3
Projectors	1.6	.6	Japan	21.6
Motion Cameras	. 5	. 2	Taiwan	66.1
Total	279.2	100.0%	Japan	50.4%

Source: Department of Commerce

since 1978. Japan has the largest share of the import market for each of the other nine end-product categories.

Further analysis of this information showed that not only have domestic producers lost ground to imports, but that large cross sections of element "end-markets" have moved offshore. This occurred despite rapid growth in many optics end markets in the U.S., in which U.S. firms failed to participate. The large scale displacement of end markets has substantially reduced the overall size of the element market available to domestic producers and could jeopardize their long term viability.

SHIFTS IN U.S. IMPORT TRADE WITH JAPAN, TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA

(in millions of optical elements)

Year	Total Imports_	lmp Jap		Taiv	wan	Total f	rea	Three C	Total
	units	units	%	units	%	units	%	units	%
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986	116 124 129 145 148 156 223 281 279	86 94 101 109 112 117 155 155	70.3% 75.8 78.5 74.9 75.4 74.5 69.6 55.1	7 7 5 5 7 9 23 46 63	5.7% 5.3 3.8 3.5 4.7 5.7 10.1 16.4 22.4	6 5 7 8 9 16 23	5.0 4.2 3.9 4.9 5.7 6.0 7.3 8.0	98 106 111 121 127 135 194 223 226	84.5% 85.3 86.2 83.3 85.8 86.3 87.1 79.5 81.0

Growth Rates by Country, 1978-1986

World	Japan	Taiwan	S. Korea	Three Countries
140%	64%	843%	295%	130%

Source: Department of Commerce

A major shift in U.S. import patterns has occurred in recent years with Japan losing large portions of its share of the U.S. import market to Taiwan and South Korea. Japan's share of total imported optical components peaked at 78.5 percent in 1980 and remained near or above 70 percent through 1984. However, since 1984 Japan's share of the U.S. import market has fallen to 50.4 percent in a trend that is expected to continue.

Most of Japan's lost share was captured by Taiwan and South Korea, which expanded their share of the U.S. import market from 17.4 percent in 1984 to 30.6 percent in 1986. Imports from Japan also declined in absolute terms after peaking in 1984 at 155.4 million elements. By 1986, imports from Japan had fallen to 140.6 million elements or a decline of 9.5 percent. This occurred while total U.S. imports expanded by over 25 percent from 223 to over 279 million imported elements.

Several important circumstances underlie this shift. Perhaps paramount among these is the competitive struggle between large end user firms such as Fujitsu and Kodak. In efforts to reclaim, maintain or expand market shares these end users must seek out least cost supply alternatives which are clearly, in the case of optics, located in the developing economies of the Far East. In addition, newly industrializing countries such as Taiwan and Singapore encourage companies to locate in their countries, offering tax holidays (up to ten years in the case of Singapore) and other incentives to attract them. Moreover, Japan's wage scale has increased to near parity with the United States making Japan much less attractive from a cost standpoint for the production of standard type optical elements.

Associated with these conditions, it also appears the U.S. market is saturated. As evidence of this, optical element imports peaked at 280.8 million units in 1985 after years of solid growth. This could further motivate foreign (and domestic) producers to find lower cost production alternatives needed to either maintain or expand their market shares. Thus the on-going exodus of optics production capacity from high cost industrialized countries (especially from Japan) to low cost countries in the Far East should continue. Not surprisingly, many recently constructed Far East manufacturing facilities are owned by Japanese, European and American firms.

In this rapidly changing environment, Japanese firms are rethinking their long term optics strategy. We expect some Japanese firms to increase the sophistication of their domestic production capabilities and challenge American firms in the high value end of the market in the near future. This strategy may include opening or purchasing some plants in the United States. Recently a Japanese concern purchased Pyramid Optical Company, perhaps motivated by the opportunity to acquire technology. Pyramid had developed a unique processing capability to produce high precision retro-reflectors (pyramid shaped optics used in communication satellites to return light signals to precise locations) at low cost. Furthermore, continued investment in lower cost production facilities in less developed countries could help Japanese firms maintain a presence in lower valued standard optical markets.

2.6.4 Investment

Investment in new plant and equipment by the nine precision

optics firms varied over the 1981-1985 period, as shown in the table below. Total aggregated investment spending was at its highest in 1981, at over \$13.2 million. This total dropped slightly in 1982 to \$11.8 million, and then fell dramatically by 52 percent in 1983 due to poor industry performance that year. Investments improved somewhat from this depressed level in 1984, reaching \$7.8 million. The upward trend continued in 1985, with investment at \$9 million. Indications from the firms are that current levels of investment will be maintained over the next two to three years.

INVESTMENT SPENDING
(In Thousands of Dollars)

Investment	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
in Plant In Machinery/Equipment	\$4,644 8,589	\$4,597 7,219	\$ 883 4,783	\$ 850 6,923	\$2,146 \$6,855
Total	\$13,233	\$11,816	\$5,666	\$7,773	\$9,001

Investment in machinery and equipment accounts for the bulk of total investment, running at about 75 percent in 1985. The two broad categories of investment (in plant and in machinery/equipment) followed the same pattern over the period. Plant investment, however, is much less consistent than investment in machinery, as it tends to occur in large, intermittent blocks rather than evenly distributed over time. Both investment categories attained their highest level in 1981 before a sharp drop, followed by a partial recovery in the last two years. This recent increase, however, did not bring investment back to the high levels of the early 1980's.

Firms have invested heavily in recent years in an attempt to reduce high costs and survive in the face of stiff foreign competition. For example, most firms are investing in new, sophisticated machinery (such as diamond point turning machines, and high-speed polishers and coaters) that reduce labor needs, shorten equipment set-up times and lower scrap rates, thereby increasing overall productivity. Semi-automatic manufacturing processes, statistical process controls, and cost accounting systems are also being installed. Some firms are attempting to reduce unit overhead and general accounting costs by expanding operations that spread fixed costs over greater production. These actions involve investment in both new plant and equipment. Others are diversifying their product mixes, and at least two firms are planning additional investment in their own Far East operations to capitalize on low production costs there.

2.6.5 Inventories

Inventory policy is highly variable from firm to firm. Several firms maintain little inventory of supplies and materials used to manufacture optics. These firms operate on a job by job basis, ordering necessary materials only after receipt of a customer's order. Other firms maintain larger inventories. The weighted average of inventory size (in days supply) across all firms (including those who said they had none) was 119 days for optical glass, 88 for filter glass, and 40 days for infrared materials. The lengthy on-hand supply of optical glass is partly a safety measure because there is only one remaining domestic source of supply, which raises concerns about the material's availability. However, minimum

purchase quantities and associated price discounts are also important influences in maintaining inventory levels.

Among the optical materials firms, most held no inventory at all for the selected materials listed in the Department of Commerce survey. Of those that did, a one to three month supply of materials (e.g., hydrogen sulfide, zinc, hydrogen selenide) was average. Factors which influenced inventory policy included limited availability of some materials (inventory needed to compensate for long lead times), minimum purchase quantities, and price breaks for larger purchases. In the future, inventory levels may increase because of the deteriorating availability and expanding lead times for raw materials.

2.6.6 Research & Development

A related and perhaps more important area of spending than direct investment is research and development (R&D). All but two smaller firms reported the expenditure of at least some money trying to develop new materials, processes or products related to precision optics manufacture. The amount spent on R&D over the past five years is as follows.

R & D Expenditures

(in thousands of dollars)

1981 \$3,663 1982 3,564 1983 3,676 1984 3,612 1985 3,829

The aggregate R&D amount is remarkably consistent from year to year, at around \$3.6 million. (These amounts should be viewed with

caution as they are based on a small sample. Moreover, one large firm accounts for most of the R&D expenditures.) Most of the expenditures are devoted to process and equipment development, with a smaller portion allocated to product development and materials research.

Several firms mentioned finished lens molding techniques as desirable to acquire. Also mentioned by the firms were development of machines and equipment to increase manufacturing productivity, development of more sophisticated coating technologies, and research in aspheric lens production. Several firms also use R&D expenditures to develop prototypes for customers. In many cases, the optical firm that develops the prototype may also be contracted to produce the element. However, if production volumes are large, the end user may designate a foreign concern to mass produce the components to save costs.

In a broader context, the United States may be gradually falling behind in optical research and technology development and losing the initiative to the Japanese. The U.S. has led the world in creating optics technology and establishing optical production capabilities since seizing the initiative from the Germans in the aftermath of World War II. When lasers began entering the market place in large numbers about 1970, R&D efforts by U.S. industry were given new life. However, this upsurge was temporary. U.S. R&D spending has suffered greatly in the last decade because of massive foreign encroachment into the U.S. market and a decline in U.S. Government involvement. Japanese firms are currently funding more optics research in American universities than is U.S. industry. The technologies developed through these programs will most likely be

transferred offshore and eventually be translated into competitive advantages for the Japanese.

2.6.7 Profitability

The table below presents profitability information for the nine precision optics participants in the Commerce Department survey. It should be kept in mind that these figures are estimates. Several surveyed plants produce optics solely for internal consumption by other divisions of the same firm. These firms operate as "cost centers" and thus have no profitability data available. We estimated the overall industry profitability based on five valid survey responses.

PROFITABILITY

(In Thousands of Dollars)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Net Sales Cost of Goods Sold Gross Profit Net Income	\$36,460 29,350 7,146 984	\$44,904 36,058 8,801 539	\$43,780 33,360 10,463 2,145	\$50,042 37,782 12,310 3,503	\$51,146 37,848 13,349 4,347
Net Income/Sales	2.7%	1.2%	4.9%	7.0%	8.5%

As can be seen from the table, both gross profits and net income have increased over the period, except for a dip in net income in 1982. Profits have increased consistently despite fluctuations in shipment levels and in the face of foreign competition. This has been possible because of efforts by the firms to specialize in higher priced goods which elevate dollar sales. Furthermore, firms have been able to maintain increasing profit levels because of numerous actions they have taken to reduce overhead and production costs such as investing in more productive equipment, importing

supplies and finished goods from overseas, and instituting productivity enhancing manufacturing techniques.

2.6.8 Plant Closings

Because of foreign competitive pressures many precision optics manufacturing plants have closed, reduced optical operations or switched production to more profitable products during the last decade. The result has been a major reduction in the size of the industry and its almost complete displacement from the larger volume optical production categories by foreign competitors.

Rochester, New York, the long time center of the optics industry, saw the closing of several plants including llex (visible and near infrared elements), Wallensach (lenses), and Bausch and Lomb (optical glass melting). Also, Eastman Kodak, a major element producer in Rochester, has dramatically reduced operations in recent years.

Reichert-Jung (formerly American Optical), the last full line scientific instrument producer remaining in the United States, shut down its Keene. New Hampshire facility in a consolidation move to improve production efficiency. Weaver, a Texas firm that produced elements for rifle scopes, went out of business several years ago. And most recently (in early 1987) J. L. Long of California (night vision optics) closed its doors because of insufficient business with few prospects for improvement.

Additional information on plant closings was obtained from respondents to the Department of Commerce industry survey. Because of unprofitable operations, Herron Optical Company, in Long Beach, California was sold by one of the surveyed firms after more than 20 years of successful operation. The new owner has since shut the

facility down. A plant in Durango, Colorado that supplied elements for rifle scopes was closed in 1982 because the end-user placed 95 percent of its optics orders in foreign countries. Another firm consolidated its operations in 1983 by closing a facility in Dallas, Texas.

The Federal Government was also involved in a plant closing. In 1977, the Department of Defense closed down the Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia for budgetary reasons. The Frankford Arsenal played a leading role in supplying optics to the military during World War II, when its work force swelled to about 19,000. In the 30 years following the War, the Arsenal was central to advances in all aspects of optical research including optical manufacturing technology, materials research and product development. Frankford made prototypes that were later contracted commercially for production, establishing new capabilities within private firms. The facility also manufactured low volume optics that private concerns were not interested in or could not produce profitably. Moreover, the Arsenal was a training ground for opticians, affording them hands—on experience which was transferable to industry.

2.7 SOURCES OF SUPPLY

The optics industry is becoming less integrated at the plant level as foreign competitive pressures have led many firms to subcontract out certain costly operations which can no longer be justified in-house or can be done more cheaply by either foreign or more specialized domestic firms. These same pressures have greatly expanded foreign sourcing and have increased foreign dependencies in recent years at all levels of optics production.

2.7.1 Subcontracting

All but one of the ten plants surveyed utilized at least one subcontractor, domestic or foreign, in some aspect of their operations. All types of optical element products (lenses, flats, reticles, aspherics, prisms) as well as the process of coating were subcontracted out. The most frequently subcontracted operation was coating, which five out of the ten surveyed plants used for at least part of their coating needs. The range of subcontractor use for coating was 5 percent to 100 percent. The main reason for using subcontractors for this specialized process was because the equipment is very expensive, making an in-house capability in low volume shops difficult to justify. Other frequently subcontracted items were reticles (4 out of 10 firms), flats (4 out of 10), lenses (4 out of 10), and aspherics (2 out of 10). The main reasons given for subcontracting these items were: (1) volume too small to be cost effective, (2) to take advantage of lower cost producers offshore, and (3) lack of in-house design and/or equipment capability.

Overall, the trend toward subcontracting has increased over

the industry survey period (1981-85), and the firms expect this trend to continue in the future. Especially important will be the trend in shifting of domestic production of commercial quality optics to lower cost foreign producers, such as those in the Far East.

2.7.2 Supply Disruptions

Most plants (8 out of 10) reported that they had experienced shortages and/or long lead times in obtaining necessary materials and equipment that disrupted their operations. Of particular concern is the availability of optical glass, which is currently limited to one domestic producer. Infrared materials, although produced by several sources, is a long lead time item, as are various imported machines and equipment used in the optic-making process (including coating equipment, polishing machinery, and micro-optics production equipment). These availability problems are expected to continue in the future. Also in the future, at least one respondent foresaw a problem in the availability of skilled labor.

Among optical materials manufacturers, long lead time items included Germanium metal (12 to 18 months) and crystal growers for producing special optical materials. Moreover, several firms mentioned that there is only one source for hydrogen sulfide and hydrogen selenide gases used in the glass making process. A growing concern, especially in the event of a national emergency, is the availability of a whole range of imported raw materials used as blending agents in a wide variety of glasses. Schott Glass Technologies maintains the critical capability to formulate

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substitute glasses using available blending materials should imported materials be cut off. However, this highly specialized capability is at risk in the current environment. Should Schott shut down, domestic defense optical production capabilities would be substantially reduced.

2.7.3 Foreign Dependency

Most optical and optical material companies are reliant on imports to some degree. Overall, firms used an average of 32 percent imported optical and filter glass in their production, while 41 percent of infrared material was imported. If materials used for making "unground" molded glass lenses (a process that eliminates the grinding and polishing production operations) are included, the percentage of imported optical glass used jumps to almost 70 percent.

The primary foreign suppliers of optical glass are Japan (Hoya and Ohara) and West Germany (Schott). All firms that purchased raw optical glass (rather than pressings) used some imported bulk glass from one or more of these sources, and did so because a domestic source was not available or was inadequate. Infrared raw materials were imported by all four domestic firms competing in the infrared optics market, mainly from Europe (France, West Germany and Belgium). The reasons given for importing were price and lack of adequate domestic sources.

Machinery, equipment and tools used in optics production were by far the most common items mentioned as being produced offshore. The main sources of these items (including diamond tools, generators, polishers, grinders, profilometers, etc.) were Japan, West Germany,

and England. Reasons given by respondents for utilizing imported equipment were better quality and inadequate domestic supply.

Another item mentioned by several firms was polishing compound, imported from France. Lastly, two firms listed imported finished optics — lenses and prisms — purchased from Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore. As might be expected, the primary reason for importing these items was their lower cost.

and oxides. For metals, imports ranged from a low of 40 percent to a high of 100 percent for individual firms. The reasons given for using imported metals were lower prices and availability. The most common item mentioned was Selenium metal, imported from Japan.

Other examples are Lanthanum Oxide from France, and Barium Nitrate from the Peoples Republic of China.

In general, imports are used because of availability

(4 mentions), price (3 mentions) and sole source (3 mentions).

Several precision optics firms have set up subsidiaries/affiliates in the Far East in an attempt to reduce costs and increase competitiveness. Other firms do not have formal arrangements, but rely on imports from these countries to reduce their costs. Half of the optical material's respondents had affiliates overseas, all in Europe.

2.8 INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS

2.8.1 International Competitive Comparisons

The surveyed firms were asked to compare various competitive factors between optics industries in the United States and other leading countries. In both the precision optics and optical material sectors, U.S. firms rated themselves most competitive in the technology area (engineering, design and quality) and least competitive in costs and prices. The Far East was rated just the opposite, as most competitive in costs and least competitive in technical capabilities. European firms were not viewed as a competitive problem.

The technical capabilities of Japan are increasing but currently estimated to be about 80 to 90 percent of those of U.S. producers. Singapore's comparative capabilities were rated at about 60 percent, and Mainland China's at only about 35 percent. Western European producers are considered roughly equivalent to U.S. firms in technical capabilities.

Wage scales in the Far East are much lower than in either the United States or Europe. About 70 to 75 percent of the total cost of optical element production is "people cost". This is an extraordinarily high percentage compared with most other manufacturing industries and underlies the massive displacement of both American and European producers from the high volume optical markets in the last decade by Far East producers.

Hourly wage scales by country in 1985 were approximately as follows: United States, \$8.00; Japan, \$6.00; Singapore, \$2.20; Taiwan, \$2.00; Korea, \$1.80; India, \$.65; and Mainland China, \$.15.

However, other factors besides low labor rates can also influence the competitive position of these countries and the markets they compete in.

Work patterns may not be as developed they are in Japan and the United States. Also, management and supervision may not be as adept which affects both production efficiency and the quality of finished products. Moreover, very low wage rates make it harder to justify investment in sophisticated equipment. It is, therefore, difficult to envision these countries challenging the U.S. in the high end of the market in the near future. On balance, however, the low labor rates enable these countries to make standard type optical components from one half to one third the cost of equivalent American made products.

As for the material producers, the U.S. infrared material producers are competitive with any producers in the world. Far East producers have not entered the infrared market as yet.

However, several competitive problems exist in the optical glass and preform markets. An estimated 400 to 500 optical glass blends are in use. Schott Glass Technologies has the capability to produce all of these which is an enormous competitive strength. However, only about 18 percent of these blends constitute 90 percent of total world-wide consumption. Schott has largely been eliminated from these higher volume markets by Hoya and Ohara of Japan, which do not produce as many types of glass, preferring to concentrate their efforts on the high volume types.

The following tables show the surveyed firms aggregated estimates comparing the listed competitive factors between leading countries.

PRECISION OPTICS INDUSTRY

Competitive Factor	United States	<u>Japan</u>	West Germany	Singapore
Price Quality	3 1	2 3	4 2	1 4
Input costs: labor capital optical materials other (specify)	4 3 3 3	2 1 1 1	3 2 2 3	1 4 4 2
Delivery (lead time)	<u> </u>	2	3	4
Follow-up service	1	2	3	4
Design capability	1	3	2	4
Engineering capabili	ty 1	3	2	4
Customer satisfaction	n 1	2	2	3
Trade barriers	5	3	2	4
Government supports	4	1	3	2

OPTICAL MATERIALS INDUSTRY

Competitive Factor	United States	Japan	West Germany	<u>Belgium</u>
Price Quality	3 1	2 3	4 4	1 2
Input costs: labor capital other (specify)	2 3 3	1 2 2	1 1	1 1
Delivery (lead time)	1	2	2	2
Follow-up service	1	2	2	2
Research capability	2	1	3	4
Customer satisfactio	n 2 .	3	4	1
Trade barriers	3	1	· 1	2
Government supports	3	1	2	4

Note: One means most competitive, five means least competitive.

2.8.2 Competitive Prospects

In the industry surveys the companies were asked to comment on their competitive prospects over the next five years. On balance the optical element producers view their prospects as improving somewhat. In the last ten years most of the firms have reoriented their production into the higher value precision optical categories which are less impacted by foreign competition. This reorientation is evidenced by their stepped—up purchases of sophisticated production and testing equipment in recent years. In addition, profits have improved for several companies as they have taken actions to reduce overhead and production costs. These actions include establishing lower cost foreign facilities to provide unfinished parts as well as using greater amounts of lower cost imported equipment and raw materials.

Two firms see their competitive prospects as improving greatly, one because of rapid growth in its commercial markets (laser printers) and the other because of investments in improved, more efficient manufacturing equipment and procedures. (Note: Domestic laser printer producers are currently losing market share to foreign suppliers.)

One optical element producer indicated with some caution that its competitive prospects would stay about the same and another said its prospects would decline. The former noted that technology is being transferred to the Far East, in part because of offshore procurement by the U.S. Government. The other firm stated the technology capabilities in all countries are gaining on the U.S. This firm noted that technical capabilities have been our major competitive strength, but could be undermined in the near future as

additional foreign firms seek to participate in the higher end of the market.

Among the optical material producers the competitive outlook is mixed. The infrared material market looks the most promising. Two of the infrared firms said their prospects will improve greatly in the next five years. One of these cited its involvement in new advanced materials research that will lead to new products. The other recently formed a joint venture with a foreign firm that will allow market growth utilizing domestic production capacity. Another firm in the infrared material market reported competitive prospects would improve somewhat, depending on currency exchange fluctuations, while a fourth competitor in this market said prospects would stay about the same. One firm noted that infrared raw material costs are lower in the United States than in Europe which gives U.S. firms a slight advantage.

The optical glass sector presents an entirely different picture. One glass melter permanently shut down its plant in 1986 because low volume production could not justify accepting continued losses. The competitive prospects for the one remaining glass melter and the one remaining glass preform producer are not good. These firms have been priced out of the high volume optical glass markets which are critical to efficient operations. The uncertainty of U.S. Government funding for various programs and the continued (alleged) predatory pricing practices of Japanese firms jeopardize the survival of these firms.

2.8.3 Offset Agreements

An area of limited but growing concern to optical element and optical material producers was the increasing demand for offsets by foreign governments when purchasing U.S. defense and related equipment. Offsets are defined as a range of industrial and commercial compensation practices mandated, directly or indirectly, by a purchasing government or company. Offset agreements include coproduction, licensed production, subcontractor production, overseas investment, investment and countertrade.

Two precision optics producers cited specific examples of lost element sales due to offset agreements between the United States and the Governments of Canada and Switzerland for anti-tank and air-to-ground missiles. In both cases, the U.S. optics producer is the supplier of optical elements for Defense Department consumption in these particular missiles. However, as part of the offset agreement, both U.S. producers found their elements displaced by Swiss and Canadian produced-optical elements.

Similarly, three optical material suppliers surveyed complained that offset agreements were indirectly affecting them by taking away business from their customer base (precision optics firm) which in turn reduced the sales of these three firms. Instead, raw material needs were being supplied by local country material suppliers directly to the local country optical producers.

with the commercial optical base already severely eroded, offset agreements involving defense precision optics serve to further aggravate an already deteriorating situation. Moreover, the technologies and production capabilities involved in these offsets are transferred to foreign firms which can negatively impact long-term U.S. competitiveness.

2.8.4 Actions Companies Have Taken to Increase Competitiveness
The optical element firms have responded to international
competitive pressures by investing in automation and other more
productive equipment. They have also reduced overhead, increased
the skill level of their work force, enhanced their production
capabilities and consolidated certain operations. In addition,
several firms have established foreign subsidiaries in the Far East
to take advantage of prevailing lower labor rates in that area. The
result of these on going actions has been a shift by the industry
into the more sophisticated end of the optical element market, the
avoidance of head-to-head competition with foreign competitors, and
in a leaner, more versatile group of companies.

As mentioned in <u>Laser Focus</u> magazine in its November 1986 issue, the companies are finding ways to survive. The "ingredients for success" suggested in that article include: (1) offer high-quality products that imports do not compete with, (2) provide fast, dependable service so as not to delay customer's important projects, (3) manufacture as efficiently as possible using automated equipment and computer assisted manufacturing processes, (4) find a "niche" and become the best at what you do, and (5) work hard, persevere, and be lucky.

The surveyed optical element producers appear to be responding in these areas. However, perhaps the larger and more ominous problem for the industry is the continuing and massive migration offshore of end markets, such as cameras, microscopes and telescopes that contain optical elements. U.S. firms may not even get an opportunity to bid on orders, once they move offshore.

The optical material companies have stepped up research to develop new products, imported basic material in an effort to lower costs and formed joint ventures to acquire technology. Schott Glass Technologies independently developed a unique capability to continuously produce glass types which heretofore could only be melted discontinuously.

2.8.5 U.S. Government Actions To Improve Industry's Competitiveness

Seven out of the ten optics plants surveyed believe that U.S.

Government support is necessary to improve their competitive position. They believe that the present international optics market is biased in favor of foreign firms, particularly those in Japan, because of unfair trade practices, and strong foreign government supports, combined with a perceived lack of concern by the U.S.

Government.

Most precision optics firms support implementation of a Federal Acquisition Regulation requiring use of domestically produced optics in military applications. It is thought that a FAR will do much to preserve the domestic optics base and reduce dependency on foreign suppliers. Other Government actions or support programs suggested include: reforming the tax code to encourage investment in new equipment and R&D, revision of U.S. trade laws, adopting retaliatory trade practices, and funding training programs for opticians and other necessary personnel.

Also, most firms believe that DoD modernization programs (IMIP, Tech Mod, etc.) could be very beneficial to the optics industry, although many were unaware that these programs existed.

2.8.6 Age of Equipment

The age of equipment may have a bearing on the competitiveness of U.S. firms because as it ages it may become both technically obsolete and more difficult to maintain. In the survey we asked the companies to identify the numbers and ages of selected equipment and followed this up with a discussion with several firms.

Survey results show that 74 percent of the capital equipment used to produce optical elements is ten or more years old, and 44 percent is more than 20 years old. Japanese equipment of the same types, for comparison purposes, is believed to be somewhat younger than American equipment. Although new high speed grinding and polishing machinery could substantially increase productivity, firms would encounter delays both in their actual use and in added start up costs associated with retraining employees currently accustomed to older equipment. However, it is estimated that this new equipment, once in full operation, could increase industry's productivity by as much as 50 percent.

In general, the average life of machines (polishing, grinding) can be as long as 30 or 35 years, depending on maintenance and spare part availability. Producers noted that older equipment could be a constraint during a surge or mobilization because it may break down more frequently and spare parts are often more difficult to obtain. Expanded production in a surge or mobilization using older equipment would require more labor than would be needed with newer equipment. This could be an additional problem with the expected shortage of opticians as well as other critical occupations.

PRECISION OPTICS INDUSTRY - AGE OF CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

	0-4 <u>Yrs.</u>	5-9 <u>Yrs.</u>	10-19 <u>Yrs.</u>	20 Yrs. <u>& Up</u>
Optical Sawing and Shaping Machines	13	17	32	22
Curve Generating Machines (Ring Tool)	108	17	16	35
Spindles (Lap Machines)	172	217	309	388
Centering and Edging Machines	8	19	23	43
Interferometers	26	91	11	2
Diamond Point Turning Machines	5	1	0	0
Vacuum Coating Chambers	12	_22	_22	_10
Total	344	384	413	500

OPTICAL MATERIALS INDUSTRY - AGE OF CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

	0-4 Yrs.	5-9 Yrs.	10-19 <u>Yrs.</u>	20 Yrs. <u>& Up</u>
Furnaces	12	11	40	15
Annealing Ovens	5	15	28	20
Vacuum Chambers	4	1	3	1
Finishing Equipment	3			20
Grinding & Sawing Equipment	_4	_2	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>
Total	28	29	81	67

Older machinery that runs at slower speeds may have advantages over high speed equipment in low volume production. However, newer equipment with computer assisted tooling adjustments and production monitoring have made much of this older equipment technically obsolete. At the same time, newer equipment is expensive and it may be difficult for many optics firms to justify the expenditure in the current uncertain economic environment.

However, some firms are actively replacing older equipment. One producer reported a \$500,000 budget for new high speed equipment. This same producer also has constructed specialized machinery in-house that may confer unique capabilities and/or provide a competitive "niche" that established equipment vendors could not do economically. However, design time to build in-house machines can be expensive. While most firms build or modify some of their equipment in-house to fill special needs, only a few producers have the genuine capability to develop or build their own equipment from the ground up.

2.9 OTHER FACTORS

2.9.1 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

During the '85 Army review of Precision Optics, the question arose as to how much of an increase in requirements for optics could be expected from the SDI. Such a program which relies heavily on lasers and sensor technology will be a significant user of Optics. In an attempt to obtain quantifiable data, visits to the SDIO were arranged. Unfortunately, because deployment of any SDI system is many years away and with the program only in a research phase, quantities of required Optics could not be identified with any significant degree of confidence. Therefore, it was decided not to include SDI requirements with the rest of DOD's, but to recognize that a significant increase in requirements for optics would occur if SDI deployment takes place.

2.9.2 Advanced Technology

Since one of the key ingredients to the competitive edge of the Far East producer is the lower pay scale for labor, the obvious remedy for domestic industry is to automate the process as much as possible. Unfortunately, since optics is still somewhat in the realm of a "Black Art", automation is extremely difficult. The 1985 Army (AMC) report describes on-going efforts that attempt to foster automation. Other advanced technologies such as molded glass are also discussed.

A new program for the development of improved optical performance technical resources is being proposed by the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Its objective is to

develop the technology for manufacture of high performance optical systems. The three program elements are design, glass manufacturing, and component surfacing. Some of the areas being proposed for investigation are artificial intelligence aids to design, sol-gel forming of glass, and plasma or ion stream finishing using computer controlled machinery.

The bottom line is that the industry is still using some of the same basic methods developed over a half century ago; any radical change in utilized technology is many years away from adoption, primarily due to declining firm profitability which limits the firm's ability to afford new technology when available.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 CONCLUSIONS

The following seven conclusions can be drawn based on the findings of the JPOTG:

- a. Without the bulk of DOD procurements the domestic

 Precision Optics industry will continue to decline.
- Based on current trends, foreign producers will capture an increasing share of the DOD market
- c. Further reductions in domestic production capacity threaten the national security.
- d. Available trade and economic corrective measures have not been fully investigated.
- e. Domestic producers are not cost competitive with the low labor rates that prevail in the Far East.
- f. Shortages of trained opticians would hinder a surge or mobilization.
- g. Additional funds from the Department of Defense for optics will be required.

The domestic Optical Industry has declined dramatically in recent years because of foreign competition in both optical elements and element end-markets. The resulting deterioration in surge and mobilization capabilities can threaten our national security.

3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The fact that this study, which incorporates the requirements of the three services, has reached the same basic conclusions as the '84 AD HOC and the '85 Army review, affirms that action is needed to reduce the continued erosion of this critical industry. Following a review of many options, two major recommendations were chosen as the best means to correct the national security problems over both the short and long term for the Precision Optics and Optical Material Industries.

The first recommendation is the implementation of a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause. The scope of this FAR clause and how it compares to earlier proposals can be found in the appendices. The short term benefits are that it will:

- stop the incursion of foreign producers into the defense market
- encourage domestic capital investment and capacity expansion
- 3) provide incentives for technology enhancement and development

In the long term, the FAR clause will contribute to the restoration of a viable surge/mobilization protection base and contribute indirectly to the re-establishment of the commercial base.

Implementation of the FAR will of course generate some negative factors, but this must be considered on balance with the national security implications of losing the entire optical industry

production base. One obvious consequence is the increase in cost for domestic optics. Even though competition within the U.S. will help reduce this burden, domestic manufacturing can be expected to cost the systems managers (Army, Navy, Air Force) between \$10 and \$20 million per year.

The second recommendation is for an assessment of trade and economic factors impacting this industry by the Department of Commerce, as these are questions which fall primarily under the jurisdiction of DOC. Accordingly, the second major recommendation is to request the Commerce Department to assess the trade and economic factors impacting this critical industry and formulate options to rectify the situation.

A final recommendation is that the Services place more emphasis on technology programs which foster optical fabrication advancement. As the new technology mentioned in section 2.9.3. matures, the program managers should require their contractors to utilize it as much as possible.

Since it is not expected that the actions recommended will result in any immediate increase in domestic capacity, a few years should elapse before any new review should be undertaken.

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations presented above have been coordinated and concurred in by the Four Commands of the Joint Logistics Commanders and the Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration.

APPENDIX A

Description of the Precision Optics Production Process

Description of the Manufacturing Process

The manufacture of optical elements involves three broadly defined stages of production. The finishing or third stage was the major focus of this assessment. This is the most difficult and expensive stage of production, representing between 80 and 90 percent of the value added of finished optical elements. The finishing stage is preceded by raw glass (stage one) and preform production (stage two). In raw glass production, raw materials are heated and blended together in a closely controlled furnace. Typical raw materials include silica, oxides and rare earth compounds. In the case of visible glass, the heated mixture is used to form molten glass. The precise blend depends on the specifications required for the final glass. The molten glass is annealed and cooled, and formed into blocks, slabs or gobs.

The second stage begins by annealing the blocks, slabs or gobs. The material is then cut or sliced into pieces which are heated and pressed in molds into sizes approximating the finished component. This reduces the time required to generate the required precision component. These raw glass products are referred to as pressings, blanks or preforms.

Both the first and second stages are capital intensive operations that require volume production to achieve cost economies. Only one major firm, Schott Glass Technologies in Duryea, Pennsylvania currently produces the raw glass in the United States and only one firm, United Lens Company in Southbridge, Massachusetts makes the preforms. The Department of Commerce survey

revealed that neither of these firms is operating profitably at this time because of dwindling domestic markets, increasing foreign competition, and low rates of capacity utilization. In the case of non-visible optics, several domestic firms produce the raw material and blanks for infrared and ultraviolet optical components.

The third stage of optical component production is the finishing The finishing process is very labor intensive and is sometimes referred to as a "black art" because of special skills required of the opticians. When preforms (often flat discs) are received they are ground to near net shape (generated) by cutting wheels made of brass impregnated with industrial diamonds. generating a lens, the cutting wheel will grind the preform to within two hundredths of an inch of final thickness and one tenth of an inch of its final diameter. After generation the workpiece is first rough ground, then medium and fine ground before polishing and lapping to its finished dimensions. Very little stock is removed during the grinding and polishing operations, ranging between only five to eight thousandths of an inch off each face. The edges are then trimmed to bring the diameter to design specifications and finally the optical element is coated with Magnesium Flouride or some other substances to enhance or reduce reflections, improve corrosion and/or scratch resistance, eliminate fogging, or endow the element with some other special quality. The coating operation is extremely capital intensive requiring expensive equipment and processes. Coating is very important to military applications. Department of Defense requirements are currently the major driving force for advances in coating technology in terms of both material formulations and machinery capabilities.

After production of the optical element is completed, the element is then assembled into final product. This is also a labor intensive operation which utilizes special fixtures and tooling.

All components (optical, mechanical and electrical) must be interfaced, inspected and tested as final assemblies. (This final stage was not analyzed for this investigation.)

APPENDIX B

Precision Optics and Optical Material Industry Surveys

NATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF PRECISION OPTICS INDUSTRY

THIS REPORT IS REQUIRED BY LAW

This report is required by law (50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2155). Failure to report can result in a maximum fine of \$1,000 or imprisonment up to one year, or both. Information furnished herewith is deemed confidential and will not be published or disclosed except in accordance with Section 705 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2155).

General Instructions

- 1. It is not our desire to impose an unreasonable burden on any respondent. IF INFORMATION IS NOT READILY AVAILABLE FROM YOUR RECORDS IN EXACTLY THE FORM REQUESTED, FURNISH ESTIMATES AND DESIGNATE BY THE LETTER "E". Any necessary comments or explanations should be supplied in the space provided or on separate sheets attached to this questionnaire. Ensure that you reference the proper question if you use extra sheets. If any answer is "none", please indicate.
- 2. Report calendar year data, unless otherwise specified in a particular question. Please complete Parts II and III separately for each of your establishments that produce precision optics in the United States. Please make photocopies of forms if additional copies are needed. For Parts I, IV and V, firms operating more than one establishment may combine the data for all establishments into a single report.
- 3. In addition to the original report form to be returned to us, a file copy is enclosed for your records. You are not legally required to fill out or retain this file copy. While it would be a convenience to the Government for a file copy to be made and retained for reference purposes, no assurances can be provided that file copies will be exempt from compulsory examination in the future.
- 4. Questions related to the questionnaire should be directed to Mr. Robert O'Shaughnessy, Physicist, (201) 724-6223, Department of the Army, Mr. Rod White, General Engineer, (309) 782-6226, Department of the Army, or Mr. John Tucker, Industry Analyst, (202) 377-3795, Department of Commerce.
- 5. Before returning your completed questionnaire, be sure to sign the certification and identify the person and phone number to contact your firm.
- 7. Return completed questionnaire by October 24, 1986 to:

U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Office of Industrial Resource Administration Attn: Brad Botwin, Program Manager for Industrial Capabilities, Room H3876 Washington, D.C. 20230

EFINITIONS

SOTTLENECK-During a production expansion, the production process, operation or procedure, or material or labor requirement within your manufacturing establishment that

would ultimately prevent or delay increased production. CRITICAL OCCUPATIONS—Includes occupations for which you anticipate a potential shortage of qualified personnel during surge or mobilization. In general, this would include skilled occupations that require an extended training period.

ESTABLISHMENT—All facilities in which precision optics are produced. Includes auxiliary facilities operated in conjunction with (whether or not physically separate from)

such production facilities. Does not include wholly owned distribution facilities. FIRM—An individual proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, association, corporation (including any subsidiary corporation in which more than 50 percent of the outstanding voting stock is owned), business trust, cooperative, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers under decree of any court, owning or controlling one or more

INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM (IMIP)—IMIP is a joint venture between Government and industry to reduce weapon system acquisition cost through the implementation of modern manufacturing processes and increased or accelerated capital investments. IMIP is formalized through a contractual business agreement providing Government incentives for contractor capital investments.

MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (MANTECH)-Any action which has as its objective, 1) the timely establishment or improvement of the manufacturing processes, techniques, or equipment required to support current and projected programs, and 2) the assurance of the ability to produce, reduce lead time, ensure economic availability of end items, reduce costs, increase efficiency, improve reliability, or to enhance safety and anti-pollution measures.

MOBILIZATION PRODUCTION CAPABILITY—The maximum realistic increase of austainable defense production a manufacturing establishment can achieve in the 12 month period following a declared national emergency. Report achievable increase in defense production at the end of 6 months, 12 months, and 24 months in Part II of the questionnairs. Non-Defense production limited to 25% of 1985 peacetime levels. Government financial assistance and prioritization of construction materials and outfitting equipment is evaluable. Your existing manufacturing buildings may be enlarged, new buildings constructed or existing buildings currently used by you for non-manufacturing purposes may be converted into manufacturing facilities, and plant equipment acquired. Consider critical labor skills to operate at maximum sustained production levels. Minimum defense requirement is 4X your average monthly defense production in 1985.

OFFSET AGREEMENTS—In international trade a range of industrial and commercial compensation practices when mandated, directly or indirectly, by a purchasing government or company as a condition of purchase. Offsets include co-production, licensed production, subcontractor production, oversees investment, technology transfer,

OPTICIANS-Technicians trained to grind, polish, and test optical components (e.g. lenses, mirrors, prisms, and windows) and assemble these components into an optical system. Training takes place under the supervision of a master optician with many years of experience. Training can be either on the job or formal training.

PRACTICAL CAPACITY-Sometimes referred to as engineering or design capacity, this is the greatest level of output this plant can achieve within the framework of a realistic work pattern. In estimating practical capacity, please take into account the following considerations:

- 1. Under most circumstances assume your 1985 product mix. If no production took place in 1985 of a particular item or group of items which you have, or will have the capability to produce and can anticipate receiving orders for in the future, include a reasonable quantity as part of your 1985 product mix.
- 2. Consider only the machinery and equipment in place and ready to operate. Do not consider facilities which have been inoperative for a long period of time and, therefore, require extensive reconditioning before they can be made operative.
- 3. Take into account the additional downtime for maintenance, repair, or clean-up which would be required as you move from current operations to full capacity.
- 4. Do not consider overtime pay, added costs for meterials, or other costs to be limiting factors in setting capacity.
- 5. Although it may be possible to expand plant output by using productive facilities outside of the plant, such as by contracting out subassembly work, do not assume the use of such outside facilities in greater proportion than has been characteristic of your operations.

PRECISION OPTICS—Elements made by grinding, polishing, turning or molding material to be used to transmit, refrect or reflect light in the ultra-violet (.1 to.4 micrometers), visible (.4 to .7 micrometers), near infrared (.7 to 3.0 micrometers), and/or infrared (3.0 to 16.0 micrometers) spectra. Excluded are ophthalmic elements, molded plastics, fiber optics, gratings, faceplates for tubes, ordinary window glass, windshields, and canopies.

PRODUCTION WORKERS-Persons, up through the line supervisor level, engaged in fabricating, processing, assembling, inspecting, receiving, storing, handling, packing, warehousing, or shipping. In addition, persons engaged in supporting activities such as maintenance, repair, product development, suchiary production for your firm's own use, record keeping, and other services closely associated with production operations at your firm. Employees above the working supervisor level are excluded from this item.

REPAIR TECHNOLOGY (REPTECH)—Projects which improve DOD overhaul and repair operations.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT-Research and development includes basic and applied research in the sciences and in engineering, and design and development of prototype products and processes. For the purposes of this questionnaire, research and development includes activities carried on by persons trained, either formally or by experience, in the physical sciences including related engineering, if the purpose of such activity is to do one or more of the following things:

- 1. Pursue a planned search for new knowledge, whether or not the search has reference to a specific application.
- 2. Apply existing knowledge to problems involved in the creation of a new product or process, including work required to evaluate possible uses.
- 3. Apply existing knowledge to problems involved in the improvement of a present product or process.

SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS-Persons engaged in research and development work or production operations that have at least a four-year college education in the physical sciences or engineering.

SHIPMENTS—Report unit and dollar values of domestically produced precision optics shipped by your firm during the reporting period for each category for questions in Part 1. Such shipments should include inter-plant and intra-plant transfers, but should exclude shipments of products produced by other manufacturers for resals under your brand name. Do not adjust for returned shipments. Estimate the defense portion for unit and dollar values where requested at the end of each product grouping in Part 1. The defense portion of your business may be identified by those purchase orders bearing a DO or DX rating and/or a contract number from the Department of Defense, NRC, CIA, FAA, or NASA, as well as the orders of your customers whom you could identify as producing products for defense purposes, and items tested and certified to military specifications shipped to qualified distributors.

SINGLE SOURCE—An item currently being purchased from one source; other sources may be evallable, however, they may not be qualified or were not considered.

SOLE SOURCE—An item being purchased from one source, and no other production capability exists.

SURGE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY—The maximum sustainable level of defense production that can be achieved within an existing establishment by the end of the 6 month period immediately following surge day while maintaining non-defense deliveries. Report achievable defense production quentities of precision optical components at the end of 3 months, and 6 months in Part II of the questionnaire. Procurement actions for additional materials to sustain surge production levels will be initiated on surge day. Existing idle equipment may be activated as is, repaired, or upgraded and brought into service, or used equipment may be purchased and installed if possible within the 8 month time frame. Labor may be hired and trained in numbers sufficient to operate around the clock and weekends allowing for necessary equipment maintenance and downtime. Minimum defense requirement is 2X your average monthly defense production in 1985.

TECHNOLOGY MODERNIZATION (TECH MOD)—The coupling of modernization with the implementation of advances manufacturing technology by providing incentives for contractor and subcontractor capitalization.

UNITED STATES--The term "United States" includes the fifty States, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.

PART I

FIRM IDENTIFICATION

If your firm is wholly or partly owned by another firm, indicate the name and address of the parent firm and extent of ownership. Identify the location of your precision optics manufacturing establishment(s) in the United States. (See definition of precision optics.) Locality State Zip Code (a)	, ,			·
Identify the location of your precision optics manufacturing establishment(s) In the United States. (See definition of precision optics.) Locality State Zip Code (a)	If your firm is wo	m and extent of owne	rship.	
Locality State Zip Code (a) (b) (c) (dentify any U.S. manufacturing establishments in which you ceased precision optics.)				
(a)	dentify the loca n the United Sta	tion of your precisi tes. (See definitio	on optics manufa n of precision o	acturing establishment(s) optics.)
(c)		Locality	<u>State</u>	Zip Code
(c)	(2)			
Identify any U.S. manufacturing establishments in which you ceased precision option	(a)			
Identify any U.S. manufacturing establishments in which you ceased precision option operations since 1980 and the reason production was stopped.	•			
	(b)			
	(b) (c)	manufacturing estab	lishments in whi	ch you ceased precision optic
	(b) (c)	manufacturing estab	lishments in whi	ch you ceased precision optic
	(b) (c)	manufacturing estab	lishments in whi	ch you ceased precision optic
	(b) (c)	manufacturing estab	lishments in whi	ch you ceased precision optic
	(b) (c)	manufacturing estab	lishments in whi	ch you ceased precision optic

PART I - A. PRECISION OPTICS SHIPMENTS (UNITS)

Enter total unit and estimated defense share of shipments of precision optics as indicated below (i.e., for all manufacturing establishments). Count each optical component of a shipped assembly as a separate unit. (See definition of shipments.)

. •	Vis	sible	Optics ·	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	a.	Lens	ęs					
		(1)	Small (under .5* O.D.)			<u></u>		
		(2)	Medium (.5 to 2 " O.D.)		-			
		(3)	Large (2 to 8* O.D.)				# 	
		(4)	Very Large (over 8" O.D.)					
		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)				. 	
	b.	Pris	ms					
		(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in clear aperture area)				·	
		(4)	Very Large (over 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)	<u> </u>				
		Esti	imated Defense Share (%)					,
	c.	Mir	cors (including non-glass s	ubstrates)				
		(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. surface area)					
		(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. surface area)			·		د
		(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in. surface area)				- din di	
		(4)	Very Large (over 64 sq.in surface area)			<u> </u>		
		Est	imated Defense Share (%)			<u></u>		

				1981	1982	1983	1984	1982
	đ.	Othe	r Flats					
		(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. clear aperture area)		-		***************************************	
		(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		(4)	Very Large (over 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)					
2.	Inf	frare	d Material Optics					
	a.	Lens	es					
	-	(1)	Small (under 1 " O.D.)					
		(2)	Medium (under 2.5 ° O.D.)					
		(3)	Large (2.5* to 6* O.D.)				•••	
		(4)	Very Large (6" to 12" O.D.)				
		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)					
	b.	Wind	ows					
		(1)	Small (under 1 ° O.D., under 0.080 ° thick)			<u> </u>		
		(2)	Medium (under 2.5 °O.D., under 0.200 °thick)					
	•	(3)	Large (under 6" O.D., under 0.500" thick)	***************************************				
		(4)	Very Large (6" to 12" O.D. under 1.50" thick)	-			****	
		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)		·		vertices of granulation.	
	b.	Pris	ms					
		(1)	Small (under .50 sq.in. clear aperture area)					

			1981	1982	1983	1984	1900
	(2)	Medium (.50 to 1 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
	(3)	Large (1 to 2 sq.in. clear aperture area)			<u></u>		
	(4)	Very Large (over 2 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
	Esti	mated Defense Share (%)					
3.	Ultravi	olet					
	a. Lens	es					
	(1)	Small (under 0.5 " O.D.)					
	(2)	Medium (0.5 to 1 0.D.)	.	. ——			
	(3)	Large (1 to 3 0.D.)					
	(4)	Very Large (over 3* O.D.)					
	Esti	mated Defense Share (%)					
	b. Pris	ems					,
	(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in.)					
	(2)	Medium (0.25 to 4 sq.in.)					
	(3)	Large (4 to 6 sq.in.)					
	(4)	Very Large (over 6 sq.in.)				
	Est	imated Defense Share (%)		<u> </u>			<u></u> .
	c. Win	dows					
	(1)	Small (under 0.5* O.D.)					
	(2)	Medjum (under 1* 0.D.)				•	
	(3)	Large (under 3" O.D.)					
	(4)	Very Large (over 3* 0.D.			,		
	Est	imated Defense Share (%)		<u></u>			

PART I - B. PRECISION OPTICS SHIPMENTS (DOLLARS)

Enter total dollar and estimated defense share of shipments of precision optics as indicated below (i.e., for all manufacturing establishments). Count each optical component of a shipped assembly as a separate unit. (See definition of shipments.)

1.	<u>Vi</u>	sible	Optics	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	a.	Lens	es					
		(1)	Small (under .5" O.D.)					
		(2)	Medium (.5 to 2" O.D.)					
		(3)	Large (2 to 8 " O.D.)					
		(4)	Very Large (over 8" O.D.)	<u></u>				
		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)					
	b.	Pris	ms					
		(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in clear aperture area)	****			***************************************	
		(4)	Very Large (over 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)				<u> </u>	
		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)				<u></u>	· .
	c.	Mirr	ors (including non-glass su	bstrates)				
		(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. surface area)			•		
		(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. surface area)					
		(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in. surface area)					
		(4)	Very Large (over 64 sq.in. surface area)					
		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)				*******************************	

				1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	đ.	Other	Flats					
		(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. clear aperture area)	,,,				
		(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		(4)	Very Large (over 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		Esti	nated Defense Share (%)		·	,		
2.	In	frare	d Material Optics		•	•		
	a.	Lens	es					
		(1)	Small (under 1 0.D.)		<u> </u>	<u></u>		
		(2)	Medium (under 2.5 " O.D.)					
		(3)	Large (2.5 to 6 0.D.)			<u></u>		
		(4)	Very Large (6" to 12" O.D.)		<u> </u>		
		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)					
	b.	Wind	ows					•
		(1)	Small (under 1 * 0.D., under 0.080 * thick)					
		(2)	Medium (under 2.5 0.D., under 0.200 thick)					
		(3)	Large (under 6° O.D., under 0.500° thick)					
		(4)	Very Large (6* to 12* 0.D. under 1.50* thick)					
			imated Defense Share (%)					<u></u>
	b	. Pri	ems					
		(1)	Small (under .50 sq.in. clear aperture area)		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,			

				1981	1982	1303	1904	1900
		(2)	Medium (.50 to 1 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		(3)	Large (1 to 2 sq.in. clear aperture area)			-		
		(4)	Very Large (over 2 sq.in. clear aperture area)					
		Esti	nated Defense Share (%)					
3.	<u>U11</u>	ravi	olet					
	a.	Lense	es					
		(1)	Small (under 0.5* O.D.)					
	•	(2)	Medium (0.5 to 1 0.D.)					
		(3)	Large (1" to 3" O.D.)					
		(4)	Very Large (over 3" O.D.)					
		Esti	nated Defense Share (%)					
	b.	Pris	ns					
		(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in.)					
		(2)	Medium (0.25 to 4 sq.in.)		<u></u>			
		(3)	Large (4 to 6 sq.in.)					
		(4)	Very Large (over 6 sq.in.)					
		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)					
	c.	Wind	ows .					
		(1)	Small (under 0.5* 0.D.)					
		(2)	Medium (under 1 0.D.)					
		(3)	Large (under 3 0.D.)					
		(4)	Very Large (over 3" O.D.)					
•		Esti	mated Defense Share (%)					

PEACETIME CAPACITY PART II - A.

SURGE AND MOBILIZATION

PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES

WORKFORCE c.

INSTRUCTIONS

o Complete Part II for each establishment that manufactures precision optics.

o Report calendar year data, unless otherwise specified.

- o If information is not readily available from your records in exactly the form requested, furnish estimates and designate by the letter "E".
- o Do not leave questions unanswered. Enter "none" where appropriate.
- o Photocopy this section as necessary.

ESTABLISHMENT IDENTIFICATION

		,		
	(Locality)	(State)	(Zip Code)	-
		A. PEACETIME CAP	•	
۱.	What is your annual practical of the following size and spectra	capacity <u>in units</u> l ranges? (See d	for producing precision opt efinition of practical capac	ics in ity.)
	Visible Optics			
	a. Lenses	c. Mirr	ors (including non-glass sub	strates)
	(1) Small (under .5 * O.D.	(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. surface area)	
	(2) Medium (.5 to 2* O.D.)	(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. surface area)	
	(3) Large (2 to 8" O.D.)	(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in. surface area)	
	(4) Very Large (over 8* 0.	D.) (4)	Very Large (over 64 sq.in. surface area)	
	b. Prisms	d. Othe	er Flats	
	(1) Small (under .25 sq.in clear aperture area)	(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. clear aperture area)	
	(2) Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in clear aperture area)		Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. clear aperture area)	
	(3) Large (4 to 64 sq.in clear aperture area)	(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)	
	(4) Very Large (over 64 so clear aperture area)	=	Very Large (over 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)	

Infrared Material Optics

ì.	Lens	es	C	. Pris	ms
	(1)	Small (under 1 ° O.D.)		(1)	Small (under .5 sq. in. clear aperture area)
	(2)	Medium (under 2.5" O.D.)		(2)	Medium (under .5 to 1 sq. in. clear aperture area)
	(3)	Large (under 6* O.D.)		(3)	
	(4)	Very Large (under 12" O.D.)	(4)	
٠.	Wind	ows			
	(1)	Small (under 1 0.D., under 0.080 thick)			
	(2)	Medium (1 to 2.5 O.D., under 0.200 thick)			
	(3)				
	(4)		,		
"	travi	olet			
à.	Lens	es	C	. Pris	ms
	(1)	Small (under 0.5 0.D)		(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in.)
	(2)	Medium (under 1 0.D.)		(2)	Medium (0.25 to 4 sq.in.)
	(3)	Large (3" O.D.)		(3)	Large (4 to 6 sq.in.)
	(4)	Very Large (over 3 0.D.)		(4)	Very Large Greater than 6 sq.in.
٥.	Win	dows			
	(1)	Small (under 0.5")			
	(2)	Medium (under 1")	·		
	(3)	Large (under 3")			
	(4)	Very Large (over 3*)			

э.	What was this establishment's practical capacity utilization rate in percent in 1985?
	Practical Capacity Utilization:% 1985
۰.	How long would it take to reach practical capacity from the 1985 rate indicate (in weeks)
	en a bar
or	nvertibility of your <u>non-defense</u> production operations to defense production, an oblems that might arise in the conversion (e.g., acquire additional testing equi
or	NVERTIBILITY: Disregarding production efficiency considerations, briefly discus
or	NVERTIBILITY: Disregarding production efficiency considerations, briefly discus nvertibility of your non-defense production operations to defense production, an oblems that might arise in the conversion (e.g., acquire additional testing equi
or	NVERTIBILITY: Disregarding production efficiency considerations, briefly discus nvertibility of your non-defense production operations to defense production, an oblems that might arise in the conversion (e.g., acquire additional testing equi
or	NVERTIBILITY: Disregarding production efficiency considerations, briefly discusnivertibility of your non-defense production operations to defense production, an oblems that might arise in the conversion (e.g., acquire additional testing equiditional skilled labor, dollars, time, etc.).
or	NVERTIBILITY: Disregarding production efficiency considerations, briefly discus nvertibility of your non-defense production operations to defense production, an oblems that might arise in the conversion (e.g., acquire additional testing equi
or	NVERTIBILITY: Disregarding production efficiency considerations, briefly discus nvertibility of your non-defense production operations to defense production, an oblems that might arise in the conversion (e.g., acquire additional testing equiditional skilled labor, dollars, time, etc.).
cor	NVERTIBILITY: Disregarding production efficiency considerations, briefly discusnivertibility of your non-defense production operations to defense production, an oblems that might arise in the conversion (e.g., acquire additional testing equiditional skilled labor, dollars, time, etc.).

a.	During 1985, what was your average lead time (i.e., from receipt of order to delivery to customer) for:
	Non-Defense Ordersweeks Defense Ordersweeks
b.	Regarding your longest lead time defense items list the type of optic (lens, prism, etc.), the average lead time during 1985, and describe how that lead time could be significantly shortened.
	1985 Type Average of Optic Lead Time How to Shorten Lead Time
	·
c.	Are lead times increasing for:
	Non-Defense Orders? yes, no
	Defense Orders? yes, no
d.	If lead times are increasing, what are the reasons?

LEAD TIMES:

B. SURGE AND MOBILIZATION PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES

SURGE PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES: Enter your precision optics surge production capability below. Use 1985's average monthly defense production for each optical category as your base production rate. IN ESTIMATING YOUR SURGE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY, ASSUME ANY OTHER DEFENSE PRODUCTION (i.e., non-precision optics) IN THIS ESTABLISHMENT IS ALSO SURGED. Maintain non-defense production at 1985 levels. (See definitions of surge production capability and shipments.)

Report Monthly Rates in Units

	Size	Range	1985's average monthly defense production rate (Units)	Surge rate at 3 months (Units)	Surge rate at 6 months (Units)
1.	Visible	Optics			
	a. Lens	es			
	(1)	Small (under .5" O.D.			
	(2)	Medium (.5 to 2" O.D.)		
	(3)	Large (2 to 8 0.D.)			
	(4)	Very Large (over 8 0	.D.)		
	b. Pris	ms			
	(1)	Small (under .25 sq.i clear aperture area			
	(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.i clear aperture area			
	(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in clear aperture area)		
	(4)	Very Large (over 64 s clear aperture area	q.in.		
	c. Mirr	ors (including non-gla	ss substrates)	· v.	
	(1)	Small (under .25 sq.i surface area)	n.		
	(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.i surface area)	n.		
	(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in. clear aperture area			
	(4)	Very Large (over 64 s clear aperture area			

	Size	π	nonthly defense production rate (Units)	Surge rate at 3 months (Units)	Surge rate at 6 months (Units)
	d. Othe	er Flats			
	(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. clear aperture area)		•	
	(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. clear aperture area)			
	(3)	Large (4 to 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)			
	(4)	Very Large (over 64 sq. clear aperture area)	.in.		
2.	Infrare	ed Material Optics			
	a. Lens	ses			
	(1)	Small (under 1 " O.D.)			
	(2)	Medium (under 2.5 0.D	.)	*****	
	(3)	Large (under 6* O.D.)			
	(4)	Very Large (under 12" O.D.)	·		
	b. Wind	dows			
	(1)	Small (under 1 0.D., under 0.080 thick)			
	(2)	Medium (under 2.5" O.D under 0.200" thick)	• ,		
	(3)	Large (under 6° 0.D., under 0.500° thick)			
	(4)	Very Large (under 12" under 1.50" thick)	O.D.		
	c. Pri	sms			
	(1)	Small (under .50 sq.in clear aperture area)			
	(2)	Medium (.50 to 1 sq.in clear aperture area)			Management of the Control of the Con

	<u>Si ze</u>	π	.985's average nonthly defense production rate (Units)	Surge rate at 3 months (Units)	Surge rate at 6 months (Units)
	(3)	Large (1 to 2 sq.in. clear aperture area)			
	(4)	Very Large (over 2 sq.: clear aperture area)	in.		
3.	Ultravi	olet			
	a. Lens	ses			
	(1)	Small (under 0.5 0.D)		,, ,,	·
	(2)	Medium (under 1 0.D.)			
	(3)	Large (3 ° O.D.)			
	(4)	Very Large (over 3* 0.	D.)		
	b. Wind	dows			
	(1)	Small (under 0.5" O.D.)		
	(2)	Medium (under 1 0.D.)			
	(3)	Large (under 3 0.D.)			
	(4)	Very Large (over 3° 0.	.D.)		
	c. Pri	sms			
	(1)	Small (under .25 sq.ii	n.)		
	(2)	Medium (0.25 to 4 sq.:	in.)		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	(3)	Large (4 to 6 sq.in.)			
	(4)	Very Large (over 6 sq	.in.)		

B. SURGE AND MOBILIZATION PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES

1. MOBILIZATION PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES: Enter your precision optics mobilization production capability below? Use 1985's average monthly defense production for each optical category as your base production rate. IN ESTIMATING YOUR MOBILIZATION PRODUCTION CAPABILITY, ASSUME ANY OTHER DEFENSE PRODUCTION IN THIS ESTABLISHMENT IS ALSO MOBILIZED. Non-defense production falls to 25 percent of 1985 levels. (See definition of mobilization production capability.)

1.

Report Monthly Rates in Units

Size Range	1985's average monthly defense production rate (Units)	Mob rate at 6 months (Units)	Mob rate at 12 months (Units)	Mob rate at 24 months (Units)
• Visible Optics		•		
a. Lenses				
(1) Small (under .5 ° 0.D	·			
(2) Medium (.5 to 2" O.D				
(3) Large (2 to 8" O.D.)				
(4) Very Large (over 8*	O.D.)		•	
b. Prisms	-			
(1) Small (under .25 sq. clear aperture are		***************************************		
(2) Medium (.25 to 4 sq. clear aperture are				
(3) Large (4 to 64 sq.in clear aperture are		de la companya de la		
(4) Very Large (over 64 clear aperture are				
c. Mirrors (including non-gl	ass substrates)			
(1) Small (under .25 sq. surface area)	in.			
(2) Medium (.25 to 4 sq. surface area)	in.		and the second s	
(3) Large (4 to 64 sq.in clear aperture are				
(4) Very Large (over 64 clear aperture are				

		Size	π	onthly defense croduction rate (Units)	Mob rate at 6 months (Units)	Mob rate at 12 months (Units)	Mob rate at 24 months (Units)
	d.	Other	Flats				
		(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in. clear aperture area)				
		(2)	Medium (.25 to 4 sq.in. clear aperture area)				***************************************
		(3).	Large (4 to 64 sq.in. clear aperture area)	<u> </u>			
		(4)	Very Large (over 64 sq. clear aperture area)	.in.			
2.	In	frare	d Material Optics				
	a.	Lense	es		•		
		(1)	Small (under 1 " O.D.)				<u> </u>
		(2)	Medium (under 2.5 " O.D	.)			
		(3)	Large (under 6* O.D.)				·····
		(4)	Very Large (under 12* O.D.)				
	b.	Wind	ows				
		(1)	Small (under 1* O.D., under 0.080* thick)				
		(2)	Medium (under 2.5 " O.D under 0.200 " thick)	• 1		-	
		(3)	Large (under 6 * O.D., under 0.500 * thick)				
		(4)	Very Large (under 12" under 1.50" thick)	O.D.			
	b.	. Pris	ms				
		(1)	Small (under .50 sq.ir clear aperture area)				
٠		(2)	Medium (.50 to 1 sq.ir clear aperture area)				·

	Size		1985's average monthly defense production rate (Units)	Mob rate at 6 months (Units)	Mob rate at 12 months (Units)	Mob rate at 24 months (Units)
	(3)	Large (1 to 2 sq.in. clear aperture area)				***************************************
	(4)	Very Large (over 2 sq. clear aperture area)				
3.	Ultravi	olet				
	a. Lens	es				
	(1)	Small (under 0.5 0.D)				·
	(2)	Medium (under 1 0.D.)	* 10000000	<u> </u>		
	(3)	Large (3 * O.D.)				
	(4)	Very Large (over 3 0.	D.)			
	b. Pris	ms				
	(1)	Small (under .25 sq.in	.)			
	(2)	Medium (0.25 to 4 sq.i	n.)			
	(3)	Large (4 to 6 sq.in.)		-		
	(4)	Very Large (over 6 sq.	in.)			
	c. Wind	ows			·	
	(1)	Small (under 0.5" O.D.)			
	(2)	Medium (under 1 " O.D.)				
	(3)	Large (under 3 0.D.)				
	(4)	Very Large (over 3" 0.	D.)			

SURGE AND MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECKS

SURGE BOTTLENECKS: List and rank the bottlenecks you envision would be encountered in a

Area of Occurrence	Bottleneck (specify)	Rank	Time and Cost to Correct
Rough Grinding			
Fine Grinding			
Polishing			
Hand Correction			
Coating			
Assembly			
Testing			
Materials			
Parts/Components			
titi i makanahan and b	(S: List and rank the bottlenecks you he time and cost to correct. Rank is	pofflenecks	In Order or
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK	(S: List and rank the bottlenecks you he time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate. Please indicate. Please indicate. Bottleneck (specify)	pofflenecks	In Order or
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK in a mobilization and to occurrence. If the ansbottleneck. Area of	the time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate. Ple	ease refer t	o definition of
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK in a mobilization and to occurrence. If the ansbottleneck. Area of Occurrence Rough Grinding	the time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate. Ple	ease refer t	o definition of
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK in a mobilization and to occurrence. If the ansbottleneck. Area of Occurrence Rough Grinding	the time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate.	ease refer t	o definition of
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK in a mobilization and to occurrence. If the ansbottleneck. Area of Occurrence Rough Grinding Fine Grinding	the time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate.	ease refer t	o definition of
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK in a mobilization and to occurrence. If the ans bottleneck. Area of Occurrence Rough Grinding Fine Grinding Polishing	the time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate.	ease refer t	o definition of
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK in a mobilization and to occurrence. If the ans bottleneck. Area of Occurrence Rough Grinding Fine Grinding Polishing Hand Correction	the time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate.	ease refer t	o definition of
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK in a mobilization and to occurrence. If the ans bottleneck. Area of Occurrence Rough Grinding Fine Grinding Polishing Hand Correction Coating	the time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate.	ease refer t	o definition of
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK in a mobilization and to occurrence. If the ans bottleneck. Area of Occurrence Rough Grinding Fine Grinding Polishing Hand Correction Coating Assembly	the time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate.	ease refer t	o definition of
MOBILIZATION BOTTLENECK in a mobilization and to occurrence. If the ans bottleneck. Area of Occurrence Rough Grinding Fine Grinding Polishing Hand Correction Coating Assembly Testing	the time and cost to correct. Rank is swer is "none", please indicate.	ease refer t	o definition of

C. WORK FORCE

1.	EMPLOYMENT: (See definiti	Enter the r on of Scier	number of ntists and	employees in Engineers	, Producti	through 19 ion Workers	, and Optic	ians)
			1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
	Scientists an	d Engineers	s		-			
	Production Wo	rkers	***					
	Administratio	n and Other	<u> </u>					
		Total:						
	How many Opti included abov		***************************************					
2.	a. Enter wor	k force sh	ift infor	mation belo	w. (See	definition	of producti	on workers)
	Operation	Workers	per Shift	Production t in 1985 d days/w	i	f Operating		rkers/Shift al Capacity days/wk
Rou	gh Grinding				_			
Fin	e Grinding	<u> </u>			_		<u> </u>	
Pol	ishing				_			
Han	d Correction							·
Coa	ting							
Ass	embly				_		<u></u>	
Tes	ting				_			
Oth	er				 -		<u></u>	-
	b. Assuming additiona	you were o	perating on (expre	one eight h ssed as a p	our shift ercent in	, five days crease) cou	per week, ld you ache	how much ive if:
		You added	a second	eight hour	shift?	•••	percen	it
		You added	a second	and third	eight hou	r shift? _	percen	it

opticians or other etc.).	t information good	iven in (2a. or b nion work rules,	.) above (e.g., a	vailiability of urfews, capital
			-	
MOBILIZATION. In generated training per	riod.)		-	
Job Title	Number Employed	Number Needed in a Surge	Number Needed in a Mob.	
Job Title	Number Employed	Number Needed in a Surge		
Job Title				Training Per (in months

PART III - INVESTMENT, R&D, GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROGRAMS, TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIERS, MATERIAL USAGE, AND TRANSPORTATION

INSTRUCTIONS

- o Complete Part III for each establishment that manufactures precision optics.
- o If information is not readily available from your records in exactly the form requested, furnish estimates and designate by the letter "E".
- o Enter "none" where appropriate.
- o Photocopy this section as necessary

ESTABLISHMENT IDENTIFICATION

	(Locality)		(State)		(Zip Code)	
	INVESTMENT: Enter experthrough 1985 as requeste establishment separately	ed below.	for new pla	nt, machi governme	nery, and ent investm	equipment from ent expenditur	n 1981 es at your
			e Investmen thousands				
		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
	Plant						
	Machinery and Equipment						
	Total:						
			ernment Fund h thousands				
		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
	Plant						·
	Machinery and Equipment		· ·			· · · · · ·	
	Total:						
•	Planned expansion: Ente				rease(-) i	n practical pr	oduction
		ge in eacity	Cost of Change	<u>De</u>	scription	and Reason for	Change
	In one year		-			·	
	In two-three years						
	In over three years						

3.	AGE OF CAPITAL EQUIPMENT: Ente on the table below.	r the 1	number of m	achines yo	ou have in	each age inte	erval
	-			Age Inte			
	Capital Equipment		0-4 yrs	5-9 yrs	10-19 yrs	20yrs & up	
			4 - ·	-	_	-	
	Optical Sawing and Shaping Mach	ines		·			•
	Curve Generating Machines (Ring	Tool)					
	Spindles (Lap Machines)						
	Centering and Edging Machines						
	Interferometers						
	Diamond Point Turning Machines					 	
	Vacuum Coating Chambers						
		l devel l Resea in tho	opment) rch and Devusands of d	velopment			•
	-	.981	1982	1303	1304	1903	
	On Materials						
	On Processes						
	Other			<u></u>			
	Total:						
	Government Funde	ed Rese (in tho	earch and Do	evelopment dollars)	Expenditu	res	
	·	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
	On Materials					 	*
	On Processes						
	Other -						
	Total:						

pating alibration and Inspection becific new technologies	,	Testing Other (spec		quiring.
alibration and Inspection	,			quiring.
pecific new technologie	,	e most interes	ted in ac	quiring.
	s you would b	e most interes	ted in ac	quiring.
ENT SPONSORED PROGRAMS				
ENT SPONSORED PROGRAMS				
cions)	: (i.e. IMIP	, TECH MOD, MA	NTECH, RE	PTECH - See
e von currently involv	ed in a Gover	nment sponsore	ed moderni	ization program v
spect to your precision	n optics manu	facturing oper	ations?	yes, no
u barelalah da mon Fo	ol Couernment	changared mad	Bernizatio	on programs are?
w penericial do you re	el Governmenc	, sponsored mod	iel iil ad cic	, programe arev
		,		
ill thev result in redu	ced lead time	es?		_
				-
-		see to DOD?		-
				_
.ll they help you compe	te on the wor	Id markets	•	-
nat problems still exis	t that these	programs do no	ot address	5?
i	spect to your precision w beneficial do you fe Il they result in redu ll they lower producti ll they lower precisio ll they help you compe	spect to your precision optics manually beneficial do you feel Government If they result in reduced lead time they lower production costs? If they lower precision optics price they help you compete on the wor	spect to your precision optics manufacturing oper w beneficial do you feel Government sponsored mod ll they result in reduced lead times? ll they lower production costs? ll they lower precision optics prices to DOD? ll they help you compete on the world market?	ll they lower production costs? ll they lower precision optics prices to DOD?

	. Len	ses F	lats	Reticle	es Asp	nerics	Coating	gs	
Specify	the manufact	uring ope	rations	most fr	equently	subcon	tracted	•	
For the experien	periods indi	cated, es	timate rience.						
		Lenses	Fla	its R	eticles	Aspne	rics	Coatings	5
From 198	l to 1985					-			
From 198	6 to 1990						···		
INVENTOR maintair	RY: For the 17 (in days	following supply)	materi	ials, how	much of	an inv	ventory	qo Aon i	normally
Optical	Glass	miltor					0.5	er (ene	aifu)
What fac	tors influer	nce your i	nventoi	ry policy	for the				
What factax poli	ctors influer cies, minimu	nce your i um purchas	nvento: e quant	ry policy tities, e	for the	ese mate	erials (e.g., a	vailabilit
What factax poli	tors influer	nce your i um purchas u in the p	nventone quant	ry policy tities, e ve years supply, m	for the tc.)?	nced sh	erials (e.g., a	vailabilit
What factax poli	ctors influer cies, minimu	u in the pany materi	nventor e quant past fir al or a curtai	ve years supply, T	for the tc.)? experie achiner eration	nced sh y, equi s?	ortages pment,	or exteor addit	nded lead ional labo
SUPPLIES times in that for yes problem Do you supply.	RS: Have you coed you to	u in the pany materimodify or If yearion and	nventore quant e quant east first al or securtai	ve years supply, m l your op t below. ction you	for the tc.)? experience achiner peration. Identify took t	nced sh y, equi s? fy the o resol	ortages pment, o	or extern addit	nded lead ional laboration of them.

	Optical Glass (Bulk & Pressings)		IR Materi	al	Machinery
				<u> </u>	
		<u> </u>		<u> </u>	
		8			
		source or si	ngle source	suppliers for	manufacturing equipment,
Ye:	s, No_ me of the supplier,	If yes, s and how the	pecify the loss of th	equipment, part at supplier wou	e, component, or material, ald effect your operations
and	d outbound parts or ease complete the f	materials o ollowing tab	r finished	precision optio	low used in shipping inbou c elements or assemblies, Typical
m.,				Fraguatat	III GTANCAG
	ansport P Mode	lease Check If Used	<u>o</u>	Frequency f Shipments	Distances <u>Shipped</u>
			<u>o</u>	-	
	Mode uck		<u>o</u> 	-	
Tra Ra:	Mode uck		<u>o</u> 	-	
Tra Ra:	Mode uck il ailer or container on flat car		<u>o</u>	-	
Tra Ra: Tra	Mode uck il ailer or container on flat car		<u>o</u>	-	
Tra Ra: Tra Ai:	Mode uck il ailer or container on flat car		<u>o</u>	-	
Tra Ra: Tra Ai: Coi Otl	Mode uck il ailer or container on flat car r mbination her (specify) e existing transpor commodate a surge o	If Used	ces and net	f Shipments	
Tra Ra: Tra Ai: Col Otl	Mode uck il ailer or container on flat car r mbination her (specify) e existing transpor commodate a surge o	If Used	ces and net	f Shipments	Shipped

PART IV - FOREIGN RELATIONSHIPS/FOREIGN SOURCING (Part IV may be completed for your firm as a whole)

	Name	Country	Primar	y Activity	
operations or	e foreign establ n a normal basis ovided below.	lishments you listed s, please briefly sp	above are int ecify the natu	egrated with your re of that integra	U.S. tion :
indefinite pe	eriod, what adju	es that you interact istments would you n n, how long would it ct your surge and mo	eed to make in take to estab	your U.S. operati lish a new source,	ons t
			d your firm?	(See definition of	offs
		c agreements arrecte	d Aour Lilus	(Dec derritteren e.	
In recent yea	ars, have offset		no		
agreement)		yes?	no		

material you u	use in the manu	afacture of precision op	tics.	ial to the tot
Optical & Filt	er Glass	IR Material	_ Metal Mirror	Substrate
	Ot	ther (specify)		
If material is	· s imported, why	/ (e.g., price; lead tim	e, availability, qua	ality)?
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
equipment, par	rts, components wing coded reas A. B. C.	e addressing which foreis, or supplies you use is sons why a foreign source. No known domestic source Domestic source not available.	n your manufacturing is used in comple	g operations. ting the tabl
	E. F.	Lower cost Quicker delivery Better quality Other (specify)		
<u>Item</u> .	E. F.	Quicker delivery Better quality Other (specify) For equality Are spare paravailable	uipment ts/maintenance only from a n source?	Reason why foreign source
<u>Item</u> .	E. F. G.	Quicker delivery Better quality Other (specify) For equality Are spare paravailable	ts/maintenance only from a	foreign
<u>Item</u> .	E. F. G.	Quicker delivery Better quality Other (specify) For equality Are spare paravailable	ts/maintenance only from a	foreign
Item .	E. F. G.	Quicker delivery Better quality Other (specify) For equality Are spare paravailable	ts/maintenance only from a	foreign
Item .	E. F. G.	Quicker delivery Better quality Other (specify) For equality Are spare paravailable	ts/maintenance only from a	
Item .	E. F. G.	Quicker delivery Better quality Other (specify) For equality Are spare paravailable	ts/maintenance only from a	foreign

PART V - INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS (Part V may be completed for your firm as a whole)

Competitive Factor	United States	Japan	West Germany	<u>Singapore</u>	Other (specify
Price					
Quality			· 		
Input costs:					
labor					
capital optical materials			 		
other (specify)					<u> </u>
Delivery (lead time)					
Follow up service	·		<u></u>		
Design capability					
Engineering capability					
Customer satisfaction					
Trade barriers					
Government supports	<u></u>		 		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
What, if anything, can t disadvantages of U.S. fi	he Government do t rms you indicated	o help m	itigate the con	ibecirive	
What cost reduction acti international competitiv	ons have you take eness?	n in rece	nt years to inc	crease your	*

T	hey should:	improve greatl	У		
	-	improve somewh			
		stay the same			
		decline somewh	at		
		decline greatl	У	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Please discuss the bas	is for vour an	swer.			
riease discuss the bas	is for your an				
Profitability: Enter	the profitabil	ity of your U.	S. preci	sion opti	cs operations
	the profitabil	ity of your U.	S. preci	sion opti	cs operations
Profitability: Enter the years indicated.		ity of your U. 1 1982		sion opti	
he years indicated.					
the years indicated.	198				
the years indicated.	198				
the years indicated. Net Sales (1) Cost of Goods Sold (2)	198				
he years indicated.	198				

- (2) Includes raw materials, direct labor and other factory costs such as depreciation and inventory carrying costs.
- (3) Difference between Net Sales and Cost of Goods Sold
- (4) Gross Profit or (Loss) less general, selling and administrative expenses, interest expenses and other expenses, plus other income

CERTIFICATION

question Procedure or rep	onna: ure) rese	ire is complete	e and corre	information herein supplied in response to this ct. The U.S. Code, Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal a criminal offense to willfully make a false statement or agency of the United States as to any matter within
		(Date)		(Signature of Authorized Official)
(Area	Code	and Telephone	Number)	(Type or Print Name and Title of Authorized Official)
(Area	Code	and Telephone	Number)	(Type or Print Name and Title of Person to Contact Regarding this Report)
Commen you ma	its: iy wi	Please use th sh regarding y	e space bel our operati	ow to provide any additional comments or information ons, or other related issues that impact your firm.
	·			·

OMB Approval Not Required: less than ten respondents

NATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF OPTICAL MATERIALS INDUSTRY

THIS REPORT IS REQUIRED BY LAW

This report is required by law (50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2155). Failure to report can result in a maximum fine of \$1,000 or imprisonment up to one year, or both. Information furnished herewith is deemed confidential and will not be published or disclosed except in accordance with Section 705 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2155).

General Instructions

- 1. It is not our desire to impose an unreasonable burden on any respondent. IF INFORMATION IS NOT READILY AVAILABLE FROM YOUR RECORDS IN EXACTLY THE FORM REQUESTED, FURNISH ESTIMATES AND DESIGNATE BY THE LETTER "E". Any necessary comments or explanations should be supplied in the space provided or on separate sheets attached to this questionnaire. Ensure that you reference the proper question if you use extra sheets. If any answer is "none", please indicate.
- 2. Report calendar year data, unless otherwise specified in a particular question. Please complete Parts II and III separately for each of your establishments that produce optical materials in the United States. Please make photocopies of forms if additional copies are needed. For Parts I, IV and V, firms operating more than one establishment may combine the data for all establishments into a single report.
- 3. In addition to the original report form to be returned to us, a file copy is enclosed for your records. You are not legally required to fill out or retain this file copy. While it would be a convenience to the Government for a file copy to be made and retained for reference purposes, no assurances can be provided that file copies will be exempt from compulsory examination in the future.
- 4. Questions related to the questionnaire should be directed to Mr. Robert O'Shaughnessy, Physicist, (201) 724-6223, Department of the Army, Mr. Robert Spande, Physicist, (703) 664-6665, Department of the Army, or Mr. John Tucker, Industry Analyst, (202) 377-3795, Department of Commerce.
- 5. Before returning your completed questionnaire, be sure to sign the certification and identify the person and phone number to contact your firm.
- 6. Return completed questionnaire by October 26, 1986 to:

U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Office of Industrial Resource Administration Attn: Brad Botwin, Program Manager for Industrial Capabilities, Room H3876 Washington, D.C. 20230

DEFINITIONS

BOTTLENECK—During a production expansion, the production process, operation, procedure, material or labor requirement within your manufacturing establishment that would ultimately prevent or delay increased production.

CRITICAL OCCUPATIONS—Includes occupations for which you anticipate a potential shortage of qualified personnel during surge or mobilization. In general, this would include skilled occupations that require an extended training period.

ESTABLISHMENT—All facilities in which optical materials are produced. Includes auxiliary facilities operated in conjunction with (whether or not physically separate from) such production facilities. Does not include wholly owned distribution facilities.

FIRM—An individual proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, association, corporation (including any subsidiary corporation in which more than 50 percent of the outstanding voting stock is owned), business trust, cooperative, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers under decree of any court, owning or controlling one or more establishments as defined above.

INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM (IMIP)—IMIP is a joint venture between Government and industry to reduce weapon system acquisition cost through the implementation of modern manufacturing processes and increased or accelerated capital investments. IMIP is formalized through a contractual business agreement providing Government incentives for contractor capital investments.

MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (MANTECH)—Any action which has as its objective, 1) the timely establishment or improvement of the manufacturing processes, techniques, or equipment required to support current and projected programs, and 2) the assurance of the ability to produce, reduce lead time, ensure economic availability of end items, reduce costs, increase efficiency, improve reliability, or to enhance safety and anti-pollution measures.

MOBILIZATION PRODUCTION CAPABILITY—The maximum realistic increase of sustainable optical material production a manufacturing establishment can achieve in the 12 month period following a declared national emergency. Report achievable increase in average monthly production at the end of 6 months, 12 months, and 24 months in Part II of the questionnaire. Non-Defense, non-optical material production limited to 25% of 1985 peacatime levels. Government financial assistance and prioritization of construction materials and outfitting equipment is available. Your existing manufacturing buildings may be enlarged, new buildings constructed or existing buildings currently used by you for non-manufacturing purposes may be converted into manufacturing facilities, and plant equipment acquired. Consider critical labor skills to operate at maximum sustained production levels. Target requirement is 4X your average monthly optical material production in 1985.

OFFSET AGREEMENTS—In international trade a range of industrial and commercial compensation practices when mandated, directly or indirectly, by a purchasing government or company as a condition of purchase. Offsets include co-production, licensed production, subcontractor production, overseas investment, technology transfer, and countertrade.

OPTICAL MATERIALS—Optical materials are materials that are ground, polished or molded from which precision optics are fabricated. These optics are used to transmit, refract or reflect light in the ultra-violet (0.1 to 4. micrometers), visible (0.4 to 0.7 micrometers), near infrared (0.7 to 3.0 micrometers) and/or infrared (3.0 to 16. micrometers) spectra.

PRACTICAL CAPACITY—Sometimes referred to as engineering or design capacity, this is the greatest level of output this plant can achieve within the framework of a realistic work pattern. In estimating practical capacity, please take into account the following considerations:

- 1. Under most circumstances assume your 1985 product mix. If no production took place in 1985 of a particular item or group of items which you have, or will have the capability to produce and can anticipate receiving orders for in the future, include a reasonable quantity as part of your 1985 product mix.
- 2. Consider only the machinery and equipment in place and ready to operate. Do not consider facilities which have been inoperative for a long period of time and, therefore, require extensive reconditioning before they can be made operative.
- 3. Take into account the additional downtime for maintenance, repair, or clean-up which would be required as you move from current operations to full capacity.
- 4. Do not consider overtime pay, added costs for materials, or other costs to be limiting factors in setting capacity.
- 5. Although it may be possible to expand plant output by using productive facilities outside of the plant, such as by contracting out subassembly work, do not assume the use of such outside facilities in greater proportion than has been characteristic of your operations.

PRODUCTION WORKERS—Persons, up through the line supervisor level, engaged in fabricating, processing, assembling, inspecting, receiving, storing, handling, packing, warehousing, or shipping. In addition, persons engaged in supporting activities such as maintenance, repair, product development, auxiliary production for your firm's own use, record keeping, and other services closely associated with production operations at your firm. Employees above the working supervisor level are excluded from this item.

REPAIR TECHNOLOGY (REPTECH) --- Projects which improve DOD overhaul and repair operations.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT—Research and development includes basic and applied research in the sciences and in engineering, and design and development of prototype products and processes. For the purposes of this questionnaire, research and development includes activities carried on by persons trained, either formally or by experience, in the physical sciences including related engineering, if the purpose of such activity is to do one or more of the following things:

- 1. Pursue a planned search for new knowledge, whether or not the search has reference to a specific application.
- 2. Apply existing knowledge to problems involved in the creation of a new product or process, including work required to evaluate possible uses.
- 3. Apply existing knowledge to problems involved in the improvement of a present product or process.

SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS—Persons engaged in research and development work or production operations that have at least a four-year college education in the physical sciences or engineering.

SHIPMENTS—Report unit and dollar values of domestically produced optical materials shipped by your firm during the reporting period for each category for questions in Part 1. Such shipments should include inter-plant and intra-plant transfers, but should exclude shipments of products produced by other manufacturers for resale under your brand name. Do not adjust for returned shipments.

SINGLE SOURCE....An item currently being purchased from one source; other sources may be available, however, they may not be qualified or were not considered.

SURGE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY—The maximum sustainable level of optical material production that can be achieved within an existing establishment by the end of the 6 month period immediately following surge day while maintaining deliveries of all other materials at 1985 peacetime levels. Report achievable production quantities of optical material at the end of 3 months, and 6 months in Part II of the questionnaire. Procurement actions for additional materials to sustain surge production levels will be initiated on surge day. Existing idle equipment may be activated as is, repaired, or upgraded and brought into service, or used equipment may be purchased and installed if possible within the 6 month time frame. Labor may be hired and trained in numbers sufficient to operate around the clock and weekends allowing for necessary equipment maintenance and downtime. Target requirement is 2X your average monthly optical material production in 1985.

TECHNOLOGY MODERNIZATION (TECH MOD)—The coupling of modernization with the implementation of advanced manufacturing technology by providing incentives for contractor and subcontractor capitalization.

SOLE SOURCE-An item being purchased from one source, and no other production capability exists.

UNITED STATES-The term "United States" includes the fifty States, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.

FIRM IDENTIFICATION

If your firm is of the parent fi		ed by another fir	m, indicate the name	and addr
Identify the loc		l materials manuf	acturing establishmen	t(s) in
Jnited States.	(See definition of op	ptical materials. State	Zip Code	
(a)	,,,,			
(b)				
	······································			
(c)				
(c) Identify any U.S		olishments in whi	ch you ceased optical	materi
(c) Identify any U.S	. manufacturing estab	olishments in whi	ch you ceased optical	materia
(c) Identify any U.S	. manufacturing estab	olishments in whi	ch you ceased optical	materia
(c) Identify any U.S	. manufacturing estab	olishments in whi	ch you ceased optical	materia
(c) Identify any U.S	. manufacturing estab	olishments in whi	ch you ceased optical	materia
(c) Identify any U.S	. manufacturing estab	olishments in whi	ch you ceased optical	materia

PART I - A. SHIPMENTS (POUNDS)

Enter total shipments of optical materials <u>in pounds except</u> preshaped blanks which shall be indicated by units.

be	indi	cate	d by un	nits.					
					1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
1.	Opt a	ical	Blanks lass ty	s (Visible, near IR spe ypes except for absorpt	ctra), ion filters.				
	a.			Lens Blanks (size to e lens): all grades.					
		(1)	Small	(under .5" O.D.)					
		(2)	Medium	m (.5 to 2" O.D.)	·	·			
		(3)	Large	(2 to 8" O.D.)					
		(4)	Very I	Large (over 8* O.D.)		<u></u>			
	b.	Stri	ps						
		(1)	Grade	A	<u></u>				******
		(2)	Grade	В					
		(3)	Grade	c		 .		*****	<u></u>
		(4)	Grade	D .			· 		
		(5)	Other	grades		•••			
	c.	Gobs							
		(1)	Grade	A					
		(2)	Grade	В		*			
		(3)	Grade	c					
		(4)	Grade	D					
		(5)	Other	grades	-				
	d.	Slab	s						
		(1)	Grade	A		· ———			
	•	(2)	Grade	В					 ·
		(3)	Grade	С			***************************************	·	

			1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	(4)	Grade D		·		7-21-2-1-1	
	(5)	Other grades			·		
	e. Shee	ets					
	. (1)	Grade A				T-1000-00-00	
	(2)	Grade B					
	(3)	Grade C					
	(4)	Grade D					
	(5)	Other grades					
2.		elenide, Zinc Sulfide, Germanium on Optical Grade IR Materials	η,				
	a. Lens	ses, preshaped blank (size to fa	abricate l	ens)			
	(1)	Small (under 1 0.D.)					
	(2)	Medium (1" to 2.5" O.D.)					
	(3)	Large (2.5" to 6" O.D.)					
	(4)	Very Large (6" to 12" O.D.)					
	b. Wind	lows (when non-circular use smal	lest O.D.	dimension)		
	(1)	Small (under l 0.D., under 0.080 thick)	•	•			
	(2)	Medium (1" to 2.5" O.D., under 0.200" thick)				 	
	(3)	Large (2.5* to 6* 0.D., under 0.500* thick)					 .
	(4)	Very Large (6* to 12* 0.D. under 1.50* thick)					
	c. Pris	ms (blanks sized to fabricate 2	2 prisms)				
	(1)	Small (under .5 sq. in. face)					
	(2)	Medium (.5 to 1 sq. in. face)					

		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	(3) Large (1 to 2 sq. in. face)					
	(4) Very Large (over 2 sq. in face)	n. ——			<u> </u>	
3.	Ultraviolet (specify material in	space at botto	m of page)			
	a. Blanks (sized to fabricate wi non-circular use smallest O	ndows - when .D. dimension,	lenses)			
	(1) Small (under .5* O.D.)					
	(2) Medium (.5" to 1" O.D.)					
	(3) Large (1" to 3" O.D.)				-	
	(4) Very large (over 3* O.D.)				
	b. Prism Blanks (sized to fabric	ate 2 prisms)				
	(1) Small (under .5 sq. in. face)					
	(2) Medium (.5 to 1 sq. in. face)				44444	
	(3) Large (1 to 2 sq. in. face)					
	(4) Very Large (over 2 sq. i	n.				

PART I - B. SHIPMENTS (DOLLARS)

Enter total dollar shipments of optical materials. 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Optical Blanks (Visible, near IR spectra), all glass types except for absorption filters. a. Preshaped Lens Blanks (size to fabricate lens): all grades. (1) Small (under .5" O.D.) (2) Medium (.5 to 2" O.D.) (3) Large (2 to 8" O.D.) (4) Very Large (over 8* O.D.) b. Strips (1) Grade A (2) Grade B (3) Grade C (4) Grade D (5) Other grades c. Gobs (1) Grade A Grade B (2) Grade C (3) (4) Grade D (5) Other grades d. Slabs (1) Grade A (2) Grade B (3) Grade C

			1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	(4)	Grade D				-	
	(5)	Other grades	Secretary to the second				
	e. Shee	ts	•				
	(1)	Grade A	Marketon and the second				
	(2)	Grade B					
	(3)	Grade C					
	(4)	Grade D		.			
	(5)	Other grades					-
2.		lenide, Zinc Sulfide, Germanium on Optical Grade IR Materials	١,	·			
	a. Lens	es, preshaped blank (size to fa	bricate 1	ens)			
	(1)	Small (under 1" O.D.)					
	(2)	Medium (1" to 2.5" O.D.)					wastenide divide
	(3)	Large (2.5" to 6" O.D.)					
	(4)	Very Large (6" to 12" O.D.)					
	b. Wind	ows (when non-circular use smal	lest O.D.	dimension)		
	(1)	Small (under 1 0.D., under 0.080 thick)				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	(2)	Medium (1" to 2.5" O.D., under 0.200" thick)			-		
	(3)	Large (2.5" to 6" O.D., under 0.500" thick)			•		
	(4)	Very Large (6" to 12" O.D. under 1.50" thick)					
	c. Pris	ms (blanks sized to fabricate 2	2 prisms)				
	(1)	Small (under .5 sq. in. face)					
	(2)	Medium (.5 to 1 sq. in. face)				wanter Hall	

		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	(3) Large (1 to 2 sq. in. face)			meno	-	
	(4) Very Large (over 2 sq. in. face)	<u> </u>		-		
3.	Ultraviolet (specify materials in sp	pace at bott	om of page	ı)		
	a. Blanks (sized to fabricate windown non-circular use smallest O.D.		lenses)			
	(1) Small (under .5" O.D.)					·
	(2) Medium (.5* to 1* O.D.)				-	
	(3) Large (1" to 3" O.D.)					
	(4) Very large (over 3" O.D.)					
	b. Prism Blanks (sized to fabricate	2 prisms)				
	(1) Small (under .5 sq. in. face)			**************************************		
	<pre>(2) Medium (.5 to 1 sq. in. face)</pre>					
	(3) Large (1 to 2 sq. in. face)					
	(4) Very Large (over 2 sq. in.					

PART II - A. PEACETIME CAPACITY B. SURGE AND MOBILIZATION PRODUCTION CAPABILITY

INSTRUCTIONS

0	Complete	Part	II	for	each	establishment	that	manufactures	optical	materials.
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o Report calendar year data, unless otherwise specified.

- o If information is not readily available from your records in exactly the form requested, furnish estimates and designate by the letter "E".
- o Do not leave questions unanswered. Enter "none" where appropriate.
- o Photocopy this section as necessary.

ESTABLISHMENT IDENTIFICATION

		(Locali	ty)	(Sta	te)		(Zip C	ode)
			A	, PEACET	IME CAPA	CITY		
siz exc	a and on	octral	l practical capaci ranges? Enter pra lanks which shall	actical c	apacity	in pou	inds of optica	il materials
1.	Optical filters		(Visible, near I	R Spectra	A). All	glass	types except	for absorption
			ens Blanks (size telens): all grade		b. Stri	.ps		
	(1)	Small	(under .5 0.D.		(1)	Grade	A	
	(2)	Mediuπ	(.5 to 2* O.D.)		(2)	Grade	В	
	(3)	Large	(2 to 8 ° O.D.)		(3)	Grade	С	
	(4)	Very I	arge (over 8 0.D	.)	(4)	Grade	D	
					(5)	Other	Grades	
	c. Gobs				d. Slabs	3		
	(1)	Grade	A		(1)	Grade	A	
	(2)	Grade	В		(2)	Grade	В	
	(3)	Grade	c		(3)	Grade	C	
	(4)	Grade	D		(4)	Grade	a	
	(5)	Other	grades		(5)	Other	grades	

	e. Snee	CS			
	(1)	Grade A wt. in lbs			
	(2)	Grade B wt. in lbs			
	(3)	Grade C wt. in lbs	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	(4)	Grade D wt. in lbs			
	(5)	Other grades			
2.	Zinc Se	lenide, Zinc Sulfide, German	ium, Sili	con Optic	al Grade IR Materials.
		es, preshaped blank (size to bricate lens)			ows (when non-circular use allest O.D. dimension)
	(1)	Small (under 1 " O.D.)		(1)	Small (under 1" O.D., under 0.080" thick)
	(2)	Medium (1" to 2.5" O.D.)		(2)	Medium (1" to 2.5" O.D., under 0.200" thick)
	(3)	Large (2.5" to 6" O.D.)		(3)	Large (2.5" to 6" O.D., under 0.500" thick)
	(4)	Very Large (6" to 12" O.D.)		(4)	Very Large (6" to 12" O.D., under 1.50" thick)
	c. Pri	sms (blanks sized to fabrica	te 2 pris	ems)	
	(1)	Small (under .5 sq. in. face)			
	(2)	Medium (.5 to 1 sq. in. face)			
٠	(3)	Large (1 to 2 sq. in. face)			
	(4)	Very Large (over 2 sq. in. face)			
3.	Ultravi	olet (specify material)			
	wh	ks (sized to fabricate windown en non-circular use smallest mension, lenses)	ws - O.D.		sm Blanks (sized to fabricate Prisms)
	(1)	Small (under .5" O.D.)		(1)	Small (under .5 sq. in. face
	(2)	Medium (.5" to 1" O.D.)		(2)	
	(3)	Large (1" to 3" O.D.)		(3)	
	(4)	Very large (over 3" O.D.)		(4)	

•	
a.	What was this establishment's practical capacity utilization rate in percent 1985?
	Practical Capacity Utilization:% 1985
b.	How long would it take to reach practical capacity from the 1985 rate indication weeks) Weeks
LEA	AD TIMES:
a.	During 1985, what was your average lead time (i.e., from receipt of order to delivery to customer)? Weeks
b.	Regarding your longest lead time items, list the type of materials, the average lead time during 1985, and describe how that lead time could be significantly shortened.
	1985 Type Average of Material Lead Time (specify)
	Type Average of Material Lead Time How to Shorten Lead Time (specify)
	Type Average of Material Lead Time How to Shorten Lead Time (specify)
- - -	Type Average of Material Lead Time How to Shorten Lead Time (specify)

B. SURGE AND MOBILIZATION PRODUCTION CAPABILITY

Enter your optical material surge and mobilization production capabilities below? Use 1985's average monthly production of optical material for each category shown on the table as your base production rate. Enter production rates in pounds of optical materials except preshaped blanks which shall be indicated by units. (See definition of surge and mobilization production capability.)

						Surge	Rate		Mob Rate	
					Base	at 3	at 6	at 6	at 12	at 24
					Rate	mo.s	mo.s	mo.s	mo.s	mo.s
1.				(Visible, near IR pes except for ab		rs)				
	a.			Lens Blanks (size e lens): all grad						
		(1)	Small	(under .5 * O.D.)				<u> </u>		
		(2)	Mediu	n (.5 to 2" O.D.)						
		(3)	Large	(2 to 8" O.D.)	-					
		(4)	Very 1	Large (over 8 ° 0.)	D.)					
	b.	Stri	ps							
		(1)	Grade	A `	-				-	
		(2)	Grade	В				·		
		(3)	Grade	c						
		(4)	Grade	D						
		(5)	Other	grades						
	c.	Gobs								
		(1)	Grade	A			····			
		(2)	Grade	В					 	***************************************
		(3)	Grade	c						-
		(4)	Grade	D						
		(5)	Other	grades						

						Surge	Rate	1	lob Rate	
					Base	at 3	at 6	at 6	at 12	at 24
					Rate	mo.s	mo.s	mo.s	mo.s	mo.s
	đ.	Slab	s							
	۷.									
		(1)	Grade	Α	-					
		(2)	Grade	В						
		(3)	Grade	c						
		(4)	Grade	D						
		(5)	Other	grades						
	e.	Shee	ts							
		(1)	Grade	A					<u></u>	
		(2)	Grade	В						
		(3)	Grade	С						
		(4)	Grade	D						
		(5)	Other	grades						
2.				Zinc Sulfide, Germaniu al Grade IR Materials	ım,					
	a.	Lens	es, pr	eshaped blank (size to	fabricate	e lens)				
		(1)	Small	(under 1 0.D.)						
		(2)	Mediu	m (1" to 2.5" O.D.)						
		(3)	Large	(2.5" to 6" O.D.)						
		(4)	Very	Large (6" to 12" O.D.)						
	b.	Wind	lows (w	hen non-circular use s	smallest O	.D. dime	ension)			
		(1)	Small	(under 1" 0.D., under 0.080" thick)		· 				
		(2)	Mediu	um (1" to 2.5" O.D., under 0.200" thick)			water A			
		(3)	Large	e (2.5" to 6" O.D., under 0.500" thick)						

					Surge	: Kate		Mob Rate	
				Base	at 3	at 6	at 6	at 12	at 24
				Rate	mo.s	mo.s	mo.s	mo.s	mo.s
					•				
		(4)	Very Large (6" to 12" O.D.						
			under 1.50* thick)				-		
	c:	Pris	ms (blanks sized to fabricat	e 2 prisms)				
		(1)	Small (under .5 sq. in.	,					
		\-/	face)						
		(3)				***************************************		•	·
		• •	face)						
	•								
		(2)							
			face)						

		(4)	Very Large (over 2 sq. in.						
			face)						
3.	Ultr	aviol	et (specify material)						
	a.		ks (sized to fabricate windo on-circular use smallest 0.0.		, lense	es)			
		(1)	Small (under .5 ° O.D.)					**************************************	
		(2)	Medium (.5" to 1" O.D.)						
		(3)	Large (1" to 3" O.D.)						
		(3)	harge (1 to 3 O.D.)					- 1,.,	
		(4)	Very large (over 3" O.D.)						
	b.	Pris	m Blanks (sized to fabricate	2 prisms)					
		(1)	Small (under .5 sq. in.						
		(1)	face)						
			2.000,						
		(2)	Medium (.5 to 1 sq. in.						
			face)						
									•
		(3)	_						
			face)						
		, , , ,	****** *****						
		(4)	Very Large (over 2 sq. in.						
			face)						

Area of Occurrence	Bottleneck (specify)	Rank	Time and Cost to Correct
Raw Materials Handling			
Crystal Growing			
Processing			
Inspection			
Testing			
Support other than Clerical or Administrative			
List and rank the bott	lenecks you envision would be encountere	d in a mo	bilization an
the time and cost to c is "none", please indi	orrect. Rank bottlenecks in order of occate. Please refer to definition of bot	currence.	Time and Cos
the time and cost to c	orrect. Rank bottlenecks in Order Of OC	currence.	, II the answ
the time and cost to c is "none", please indi Area of	orrect. Rank bottlenecks in order of oc cate. Please refer to definition of bot	tleneck.	Time and Cos
the time and cost to C is "none", please indi Area of Occurrence Raw Materials	orrect. Rank bottlenecks in order of oc cate. Please refer to definition of bot	tleneck.	Time and Cos
the time and cost to cois "none", please indi Area of Occurrence Raw Materials Handling	orrect. Rank bottlenecks in order of occate. Please refer to definition of bot Bottleneck (specify)	tleneck.	Time and Cos
the time and cost to C is "none", please indi Area of Occurrence Raw Materials Handling Crystal Growing	orrect. Rank bottlenecks in order of occate. Please refer to definition of bot Bottleneck (specify)	tleneck.	Time and Cos
the time and cost to C is "none", please indi Area of Occurrence Raw Materials Handling Crystal Growing Processing	orrect. Rank bottlenecks in order of occate. Please refer to definition of bot Bottleneck (specify)	tleneck.	Time and Cos
the time and cost to C is "none", please indi Area of Occurrence Raw Materials Handling Crystal Growing Processing Inspection Testing Support other than Clerical	orrect. Rank bottlenecks in order of occate. Please refer to definition of bot Bottleneck (specify)	tleneck.	Time and Cos
the time and cost to C is "none", please indi Area of Occurrence Raw Materials Handling Crystal Growing Processing Inspection Testing Support other than Clerical or Administrative	orrect. Rank bottlenecks in order of occate. Please refer to definition of bot Bottleneck (specify)	Rank	Time and Cos

PART III - INVESTMENT, EQUIPMENT, R&D, TECHNOLOGY, EMPLOYMENT, SUPPLIERS, MATERIAL USAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROGRAMS

INSTRUCTIONS

- o Complete Part III for each establishment that manufactures optical materials.
- o If information is not readily available from your records in exactly the form requested, furnish estimates and designate by the letter "E".
- o Enter "none" where appropriate.

ESTABLISHMENT IDENTIFICATION

	(Locality)		(State)		(:	Zip Code)	•
. •	INVESTMENT: Enter expenthrough 1985 as requeste establishment separately	d below.	for new plan Enter any	nt, machi governme	nery, and ent investme	equipment from ent expenditure	1981 s at your
		Privato (in	e Investment thousands	Expendi of dollar	tures s)		
		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
	Plant Machinery and Equipment					· ·	
	Total:		_				
			rnment Fund thousands				
		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
	Plant						
	Machinery and Equipment						
	Total:						
2.	Planned expansion: Ente	r percen the time	tage increa frames ind	se(+)/dec icated.	rease(-) i	n practical pro	oduction
		ge in acity	Cost of Change	<u>De</u>	scription	and Reason for	Change
	In one year						
	In two-three years						<u> </u>
	In over three years						

				e Interv			
		0-4			10-19	20 yrs	
Capital Equipment		yrs	yr yr	\$	yrs	& up	
Furnaces		•					
Annealing Ovens					·		
Vacuum Chambers				<u> </u>			
Other (specify)		_	 —	·			
RESEARCH AND DEVE through 1985 as r (See definition o	equested be	low. Ente and develo ded Resea	er any gov	ernment evelopmen	runded ex t Expendi	penditur	es separat
		1981	1982	1983	1984	19	185
On Materials				<u> </u>	. 		
On Processes		,	,	·	. —		
Other				•	. 		
	Total:						•
Go	overnment Fu	nded Rese (in tho	arch and lusands of	Developme dollars)	nt Expend	itures	
		1981	1982	1983	1984	4 1	985
On Materials	,			•	<u> </u>		
On Processes					_	<u></u>	
Other							
	Total:						
							tion of op

		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
Scientists an	d Engine	ers					
Production Wo	rkers				-		
Administratio	n and Otl	her			***************************************	-	
	Total:						
a. Enter wor	k force	shift inf	ormation be	low. (See	definition	of product	ion worker
	Average	Number o	f Production		Number of P		
		_	ift in 1985		if Operatin	_	_
Operation	lst	2nd	3rd days	/WK	lst	2nd 3rd	l days/v
Raw Materials Handling							
-							
Crystal Growing							······
Processing				-			
Inspection							
Testing							
Support other than Cleric or Admin- istrative							
b. Assuming y additional pr	ou were o	operating (express	one eight ed as a per	hour shift cent incre	five days	per week, i you acheive	now much
	You add	ed a seco	nd eight ho	ur shift?		per	cent
	You add	ed a seco	ond and thir	đ eight ho	our shift?	per	cent
c. Please use	enace h	alow for	any additio	nal explar	natory comme	ents vou ha	ve regardi
the work forc	e shift	informati	on given in	(7a. or b	o.) above.		
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
						·A#5	

Job Title	Number Employed	Number Needed in a Surge	Training Period (in months)
JOB IICIE			
			
		- Levy Williams	
INVENTORY: For the following maintain? (in days supply)			
Germanium Concentrate	Zinc Metal	Hydroge	en Selenide
Hydrogen Sulfide Silicor			
What factors influence your inv			
What factors influence your inv tax policies, minimum purchase	ventory policy quantities, et	c.)?	. (0090)
tax policies, minimum purchase	quantities, co		
			ho manufacture of
SUPPLIERS: For the following optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply	a sud diva the	incarion iscale ul	TOTETAN CORNESI.
optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply purchased from each.	a sud diva the	incarion iscale ul	TOTETAN COMMERT
optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply purchased from each. Materials	e and give the y and the perce	ntage of the total	TOTETAN COMMERT
optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply purchased from each. Materials	e and give the y and the perce	ntage of the total	materials/machine
optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply purchased from each. Materials a	e and give the y and the perce	ntage of the total	materials/machine
optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply purchased from each. Materials a	e and give the y and the perce	ntage of the total	materials/machine
optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply purchased from each. Materials a	e and give the y and the perce	ntage of the total	materials/machine
optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply purchased from each. Materials a	e and give the y and the perce	ntage of the total	materials/machine
optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply purchased from each. Materials a	e and give the y and the perce	Machinery shortages or extended equipment, or additional state of the total	materials/machine
optical materials in 1985, name your top five sources of supply purchased from each. Materials a b c Have you in the past five year obtaining any material or supply	e and give the y and the perce	Machinery Shortages or extended equipment, or additions?	materials/machine % % % ded leadtimes in tional labor that

and the precaution	If yes, pleas mary actions you can	e describe the nature a take to ease the impac	and duration of the problet on your operations.
		source suppliers for m	manufacturing equipment,
Yes, No	If yes, speci	fy the equipment, part, s of that supplier woul	component, or material, deffect your operations
Mame of the suppli	cery and now one roo	o or chart dapper would	
		nsportation listed belo se complete the follow	ow used in shipping inboting table.
•			Typical
Transport <u>Mode</u>	Please Check <u>If Used</u>	Frequency of Shipments	Distances Shipped
Marrate			
rruck			
			<u></u>
Rail	ner		***************************************
Rail Trailer or contain on flat car	ner		
Rail Trailer or contain on flat car Air	ner		
Rail Trailer or contain on flat car Air Combination	ner		
Rail Trailer or contain on flat car Air Combination Other (specify) Are existing trans	**************************************	and networks in adequat	ce supply and condition
Rail Trailer or contain on flat car Air Combination Other (specify) Are existing transaccomodate a surge	sportation services or mobilization?		ce supply and condition
Air Combination Other (specify) Are existing transaccomodate a surge	sportation services or mobilization?	lease explain why	

b. How beneficial	tly involved in a Government sponsored modernization program with roptical material manufacturing operations? yes, no do you feel Government sponsored modernization programs are?
	do you feel Government sponsored modernization programs are?
c. Which programs	could help your firm?
d. Will they resu	alt in reduced lead times?
Will they lowe	er production costs?
Will they lowe	er optical material prices?
Will they help	you compete on the world market?
e. What problems	still exist that these programs do not address?
•	

PART IV - FOREIGN RELATIONSHIPS/FOREIGN SOURCING (Part IV may be completed for your firm as a whole)

1.	Enter the location and primary activity of any establishment outside the United States that your firm wholly or partly owns or controls or is affiliated with or has license agreements with, that manufactures optical materials, or supplies raw materials from which optical materials are manufactured.
	Name Country Primary Activity
2.	If any of the foreign establishments you listed above are integrated with your U.S. operations on a normal basis, please briefly specify the nature of that integration in the space provided below.
3.	If the foreign establishments that you interact with suddenly ceased operations for an indefinite period, what adjustments would you need to make in your U.S. operations to counteract this interruption, how long would it take to establish a new source, and ho would the interruption effect your surge and mobilization capabilities?
	•
4.	In recent years, have offset agreements affected your firm? (See definition of offset agreement)
	Yes, No
-	If yes, how (cite examples)?

manufacture of			Cotalvets	
Metals	Concentr	ates	Gases Catalysts	
If material is	s imported, wh	y (e.g.,	price, lead time, availability, qu	uality)?
aguinment na	rts, component	s. or sup	sing which foreign made critical moplies you use in your manufacturi oreign source is used in completin	ng operations.
	A.	No known	n domestic source	
			source not avaitable of induedna	ice
		Offset a	c source not available or inadequa agreement	ice
	C. D.	Offset a Lower co	agreement ost	i Ce
	C. D. E.	Offset a Lower co Quicker	agreement ost delivery	ice
	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co	agreement ost delivery quality	i Le
	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co Quicker Better o	agreement ost delivery quality specify) For equipment	
	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co Quicker Better o	agreement pst delivery quality specify) For equipment Are spare parts/maintenance	Reason Why
Item	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co Quicker Better Q Other (s	agreement ost delivery quality specify) For equipment	
Item	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co Quicker Better Q Other (s	agreement pst delivery quality specify) For equipment Are spare parts/maintenance available only from a	Reason Why foreign
Item	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co Quicker Better Q Other (s	agreement pst delivery quality specify) For equipment Are spare parts/maintenance available only from a	Reason Why foreign
Item	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co Quicker Better Q Other (s	agreement pst delivery quality specify) For equipment Are spare parts/maintenance available only from a	Reason why foreign
Item	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co Quicker Better Q Other (s	agreement pst delivery quality specify) For equipment Are spare parts/maintenance available only from a	Reason Why foreign
Item	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co Quicker Better Q Other (s	agreement pst delivery quality specify) For equipment Are spare parts/maintenance available only from a	Reason Why foreign
Item	C. D. E. F.	Offset a Lower co Quicker Better Q Other (s	agreement pst delivery quality specify) For equipment Are spare parts/maintenance available only from a	Reason Why foreign

PART V - INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS

Competitive Fac	tor <u>U</u> r	nited States	Canada	Austria	Belgium	Other (specify
Price						
Quality					*****************	
Input costs:						
labor						
capital						·
other (sp	ecify)					
Delivery (lead-	time)					
Follow up servi	ce	*****	·			
Research capabi	lity					**************************************
Customer statis	faction					
Trade barriers						
Government supp	orts					
What, if anythi disadvantages o	ng, can the Gov f U.S. firms yo	vernment do t ou indicated	o help mit: above?	igate the com	petitive	
*****					, May 19 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	
What cost reduc	tion actions ha	ave you taker ?	n in recent	years to inc	rease your	
What cost reductional conternational conternational conternational contents.	ompetitiveness:	?			···	

_,		prove great	117			
They s	hould: in	prove great prove somewh	nat			
		ay the same				
		cline somewh	nat			
	d€	cline great:	<u></u>			
Please discuss the basis fo	r vour angl	ier.				_
Please discuss the basis in	or your answ	AGT •				
	-					
						···-
						ons f
Profitability: Enter the p	profitabili	ty of your U	.S. optic	cal mater	ial operati	ons f
Profitability: Enter the paths years indicated.	profitabili	ty of your U	.S. optic	cal mater	ial operati	ons f
Profitability: Enter the part the part of				cal mater	ial operati 1985	ons f
Profitability: Enter the part the part indicated.	profitabili 1981					ons f
the years indicated.						ons f
the years indicated. Net Sales (1)						ons f
the years indicated.						ons f
the years indicated. Net Sales (1) Cost of Goods Sold (2)	1981					ons f
the years indicated. Net Sales (1)	1981					ons f
the years indicated. Net Sales (1) Cost of Goods Sold (2) Gross Profit or (Loss) (3)	1981					ons f
the years indicated. Net Sales (1) Cost of Goods Sold (2)	1981					ons f
the years indicated. Net Sales (1) Cost of Goods Sold (2) Gross Profit or (Loss) (3)	1981	1982				ons f

 ⁽³⁾ Difference between Net Sales and Cost of Goods Sold
 (4) Gross Profit or (Loss) less general, selling and administrative expenses, interest expenses and other expenses, plus other income

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certifies that the information herein supplied in response to this questionnaire is complete and correct. The U.S. Code, Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), Section 1001, makes it a criminal offense to willfully make a false statement or representation to any department or agency of the United States as to any matter within its jurisdiction.

(Date)	(Signature of Authorized Official)					
(Area Code and Telephone Number)	(Type or Print Name and Title of Authorized Official)					
(Area Code and Telephone Number)	(Type or Print Name and Title of Person to Contact Regarding this Report)					
	low to provide any additional comments or information ions, or other related issues that impact your firm.					
	•					

APPENDIX C
'84 Proposed FAR Clause

ORIGINAL PROPOSED '84 CLAUSE

Insert for Part 8 of the DoD FAR Supplement

Part 8 - Required Sources of Supplies and Services

Subpart 8.77 - Precision Optics Items used for direct military application including military binoculars

8.7701 - Definitions.

"Precision optics items" means lenses either in prototype or production quantities that must meet specified tolerances and dimensions with optical wavefront errors across most of the useful field of view which do not exceed one micrometer in magnitude.

"Domestic manufacture" means precision optics items manufactured

in the United States and Canada/ "End-item" means a final combination of end products, component parts, and/or materials which is ready for its intended use per JCS Publication #1 (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

8.7702 - Policy

It has been determined that defense requirements for Precision Optics Items must be acquired from domestic sources (U.S. and Canada) to the maximum extent practical. Accordingly, all acquisitions of precision optics items including preforms/blanks, and components (smaller than 12 inches in diameter) and all acquisitions of items containing precision optics items shall include, except as provided in 8.7702 below, a requirement that such items and precision optics items incorporated in end items delivered under the contract be of domestic manufacture only. restriction does not include medical or personal optics items such as microscopes, reading glasses, and commercial binoculars.

8.7703 - Procedures

- The clause set forth at 52.208-7004, Required Sources of Precision Optics Items, shall be inserted in all contracts except:
 - when the contracting officer knows that the item being (1) acquired does not contain precision optics items;
 - when purchases are made overseas for overseas use; (2)
- Subsequent to the award of a contract, the contracting officer may waive the requirements set forth at 52.208-7004, Required Sources for Precision Optics Items. Such waiver may be granted on a case-by-case basis when adequate domestic supplies of precision optics items are not available to meet DoD needs on a timely basis. Also, these waivers will only be granted to the extent and for the period of time necessary to permit the contractor to acquire and use precision optics items of domestic manufacture.

ORIGINAL PROPOSED '84 CLAUSE

Insert for Part 52 of DoD FAR Supplement

Subpart 52.208-7004, Required Sources for Precision Optics Items used for direct military application including military binoculars, as prescribed at 8.7703, insert the following clause:

Required Sources for Precision Optics Items (May 1984)

For the purpose of this clause: "Precision optics items" means lenses either in prototype or production quantities that must meet specified tolerances and dimensions with optical wavefront errors across most of the useful field of view which do not exceed one micrometer in magnitude.

"Domestic manufacture" means precision optics items

manufactured in the United States or Canada.

"End-item" means a final combination of end products, component parts, and/or materials which is ready for its intended use, per JCS Publication #1 (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

- The contractor agrees that end items, components, and processed materials thereof delivered under this contract shall contain domestic precision optic items including preforms/blanks, and components (smaller than 12 inches in diameter) of U.S. or Canadian manufacture only. This restriction does not include medical or personal optics items such as microscopes, reading glasses, and commercial binoculars.
- The contractor agrees to insert this clause, including this (c) paragraph (c), in every subcontract and purchase order issued in performance of this contract, unless he knows that the item being purchased contains no precision optics items.
- The contractor agrees to retain until the expiration of three (d) years from the date of final payment under this contract and to make available during such period, upon request of the contracting officer, records showing compliance with this clause.
- The requirement for delivery in (b) above may be waived in (e) whole or in part on a case-by-case basis by the contracting officer when such a waiver is determined to be in the government's interest and it meets the provisions of subpart 8.77.

Note: These cost estimates, particularly for the more distant future, should be viewed with care as they apply only to the weapon systems shown. Orders for some of these systems will be completed during the forcast period, which may give the false impression that forcasted defense spending for optical components is on a declining trend. Omitted from the calculation are new weapon systems that will undoubtably go into production, but for which information was not available.

APPENDIX D JPOTG Proposed FAR Clause

RECOMMENDED REVISED FAR CLAUSE (with Attachment A-1)

Insert for Part 8 of the DOD FAR Supplement

Part 8 - Required Sources of Supplies and Services.

Subpart 8.77 - Precision Optical Elements used for direct military applications including military binoculars.

8.7701 - Definitions:

"Precision Optics" means elements made by grinding, polishing, turning, or molding material to be used to transmit, refract, or reflect light in the visual (.4 to .7 micrometers), near infrared (.7 to 3.0 micrometers), and/or infrared (3.0 to 16.0 micrometers) spectra. This includes elements in systems which are type-classified or purchased as Non-Developmental Items (NDI).

"Precision Optical Elements" includes, but is not limited to lenses, prisms, mirrors, reticles, beamsplitters, windows, filters, laser rods, and pressings/preforms/blanks/optical glass for the foregoing.

"Optical Glass" is material which meets specification MIL-G-174 and is used for visual and/or infrared precision optical elements.

"Domestic manufacture" means Precision Optical Elements manufactured in the United States and Canada.

"End-item" means a final combination of end products, component parts, and/or materials which is ready for its intended use.

"Components" mean those articles, materials, elements, and supplies directly incorporated into end products.

Excluded are: infrared blanks/pressings/preforms (such as germanium, zinc sulfide, zinc selenide), filter glass blanks/pressings/preforms, prescription eyeglasses, molded plastics, fiber optics, windshields and canopies, medical instruments, microscope components, faceplates for tubes, gratings, coverplates for indicators, vehicle head-lamps, and traffic reflectors.

8.7702 - Policy

DOD has determined that defense requirements for Precision Optics Elements must be acquired from domestic sources (United States and Canada) to the maximum extent practical. Defense requirements must be acquired in such a way as to assure domestic production capability. To ensure a domestic production capability for precision optical elements is available, DOD has determined that a seven (7) year FAR restriction be implemented. For procurements signed before October 1, 1989, a minimum of 50% of the quantity of each optical element must be of domestic manufacture. Between October 1, 1989 and September 30, 1994, 100% of the quantity of

each optical element must be of domestic manufacture.

Based upon the production surge and mobilization objectives established by the cognizant DOD component, the provisions of FAR 6.202 and 6.302-3 will be used to ensure that domestic capability exists to produce all parts of a weapon system and that the production process for all parts and final weapon system production/assembly can be accomplished by domestic producers.

Accordingly, all acquisition of precision optical elements including pressings/preforms/blanks of optical glass and all acquisitions of end items containing precision optical elements shall include, except as provided in 8.7703 below, a requirement that such precision optical elements in end items delivered under the contract be of domestic manufacture only.

8.7703 - Procedures:

The clause set forth at 52.208-7004, Required Sources of Precision Optics Elements, shall be inserted in all contracts except:

- a. when the contracting officer knows that the item being acquired does not contain precision optics items;
 - b. when purchases are made overseas for overseas use;
- c. when the contracting officer determines that domestic sources are incapable of or unavailable to provide such elements. The contracting officer shall request from the Command level a waiver of the provisions of part 52.208-7004 and shall provide in writing justification for each action. The waiver granted by the proper level of authority shall only be for the period of time necessary to permit the contractor to acquire and use domestic production sources; that procurements made under this determination are subject to periodic audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency to avoid possible excessive cost to DOD;

Implementation of this restrictive clause shall be determined on a contract by contract basis at the Procuring Contracting Office (PCO) level. Prior to award of a contract for items containing optical elements as defined in 8.7701 above, the PCO shall ensure that 50% of each optical element be purchased from domestic sources for the first two years of implementation of this restriction. For the five following years, the PCO shall make sure that 100% of optical elements are purchased from domestic sources.

ATTACHMENT A-1

Insert for Part 52 of DOD FAR Supplement

Subpart 52.208-7004, Required Sources for Precision Optics Items used for direct military application including binoculars, as prescribed at 8.7702, insert the following clause:

Required Sources for Precision Optics Elements

a. For the purpose of this clause:

"Precision Optics" means elements made by grinding, polishing, turning, or molding material to be used to transmit, refract, or reflect light in the visual (.4 to .7 micrometers), near infrared (.7 to 3.0 micrometers), and/or infrared (3.0 to 16.0 micrometers) spectra. This includes elements in systems which are type-classified or purchased as Non-Developmental Items (NDI).

"Precision Optical Elements" includes, but is not limited to lenses, prisms, mirrors, reticles, beamsplitters, windows, filters, laser rods, and pressings/preforms/blanks/optical glass for the foregoing.

"Optical Glass" is material which meets specification MIL-G-174 and is used for visual and/or infrared precision optical elements.

"Domestic manufacture" means Precision Optical Elements manufactured in the United States and Canada.

"End-item" means a final combination of end products, component parts, and/or materials which is ready for its intended use.

"Components" mean those articles, materials, elements, and supplies directly incorporated into end products.

Excluded are: infrared blanks/pressings/preforms (such as germanium, zinc sulfide, zinc selenide), filter glass blanks/pressings/preforms, prescription eyeglasses, molded plastics, fiber optics, windshields and canopies, medical instruments, microscope components, faceplates for tubes, gratings, coverplates for indicators, vehicle head-lamps, and traffic reflectors.

- b. The contractor agrees that end items, components, and processed materials thereof delivered under this contract shall contain domestic precision optics items including preforms/blanks/pressings/optical glass, and components of U.S. or Canadian manufacture only. This restriction does not include those items excluded in a. above.
- c. The contractor agrees to insert this clause, including this paragraph (c), in every subcontract and purchase order issued in performance of this contract, unless he knows that the item being purchased contains no precision optics items.

- b. The contractor agrees to retain all receipts until the expiration of three years from the date of final payment under this contract and to make available during such period, upon request of the contracting officer, records showing compliance with this clause.
- c. The requirement for delivery in (b) above may be waived in whole or in part on a case-by-case basis by the contracting officer when such a waiver is determined to be in the Government's interest and it meets the provision of subpart 8.7703. The contracting officer must first receive major command level approval.

APPENDIX E

Optical Elements: U.S. Trade Statistics, 1978-1986

1/4

OPTICAL ELEMENTS: U.S. TRADE STATISTICS, 1978-1986

TABLES

1. Total U.S. Imports and Exports: By Quantity
2. Total U.S. Imports: Percentage Market Shares by Country
3. Total U.S. Imports: Percentage Market Shares by Country
4. Total U.S. Imports of Optical Elements: By End Products
5. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Still Cameras
6. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Telescopes
7. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Mounted Photographic Lenses
8. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Binoculars
9. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Unmounted Optical Elements
10. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Mounted Optical Elements
11. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Photocopiers
12. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Mounted Projection Lenses
13. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Projectors
14. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Microscopes
15. U.S. Trade in Contained Elements: Motion Cameras

FIGURES

- 1. Trade Balance: All Optical Elements
- 2. Total U.S. Imports of Optical Elements: Quantity and Value
- 3. Total U.S. Exports of Optical Elements: Quantity and Value
- 4. U.S. Imports: Share Contained in Top Four End Products
- 5. U.S. Trade Balance, Contained Elements: Still Cameras, Telescopes
- 6. U.S. Trade Balance, Contained Elements: Mounted Photo Lenses, Binoculars

U.S. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1978-1988 OPTICAL ELEMENTS INCLUDING ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN END-PRODUCTS:

BY QUANTITY

			F	TOTAL IMI	IMPORTS: 0	QUANTITY	>		
Country	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
WORLD	116,280,480	124,302,493	128,641,770	144,814,088	148,208,523	158,435,785	223,167,418	280,785,822	279,182,091
JAPAN	85,844,985	84,265,152	100,926,859	108,495,014	111,758,847	116,579,653	155,410,850	154,618,887	140,573,428
TAIMAN	8,839,080	8,829,970	4,834,072	5,022,992	6,928,401	8,919,774	22,735,833	48,025,504	82,627,073
KOREA	5,788,497	5,185,330	5,065,248	7,088,596	8,401,365	9,428,450	18,188,975	22,453,523	22,799,801
SINGAPORE	527,390	388,950	483,873	1,407,810	753,840	775,588	895,855	679,252	881,111
8	3,338,740	4,188,993	4,721,274	6,258,779	5,649,448	8,153,289	7,682,483	7,941,013	12,233,313
놀	280,833	487,918	875,338	472,373	681,859	1,886,685	2,294,308	3,085,000	6,725,328
W. GERMANY	2,558,907	3,074,247	3,832,208	4,878,524	3,171,487	2,378,705	2,293,094	2,191,694	2,268,200
ALL OTHERS	14,165,807	13,644,098	12,630,678	16,533,097	14,718,823	12,585,051	20,453,843	48,067,884	40,087,367
			-	TOTAL EX	EXPORTS: 0	QUANTITY	> -		
Country	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
MORLD	31,800,271	41,528,942	36,616,337	34,775,097	48,003,305	31,580,163	27,118,278	38,838,589	35,611,100
JAPAN	2,354,683	3,105,432	2,979,748	2,585,042	5,376,703	3,381,693	3,140,541	2,785,752	2,211,007
TAIMAN	445,212	81,695	140,787	391,052	179,011	355,359	137,607	373,963	226,985
KOREA	394,865	495,180	124,373	289,082	275,553	1,028,217	482,030	1,040,543	417,988
SINGAPORE	196,577	223,130	277,580	589,413	1,315,329	622,185	1,153,227	83,788	79,083
8	11,689,880	15,607,685	13,558,518	13,713,529	18,149,773	12,584,788	9,708,402	12,931,003	18,482,256
¥	2,742,483	3,250,649	7,653,819	4,988,340	6,838,122	9,245,929	3,014,781	4,605,081	4,978,948
W. GERMANY	2,748,449	2,454,103	4,148,980	5,022,488	4,734,547	3,438,895	1,045,395	514,487	257,464
ALL OTHERS	18,719,155	22,005,819	19,537,354	17,196,976	22,706,936	13,607,928	12,488,471	19,444,540	16,213,781

Sources Department of Commerce

TABLE 2

U.S. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1978-1988 OPTICAL ELEMENTS INCLUDING ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN END-PRODUCTS:

BY VALUE

			TOT	TOTAL IMPORTS:		DOLLAR VALUE	3 n I		
Country	1978	1978	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
WORLD	167,356,577	1 81 ÷	283,558,348 150,980,993	313,071,399 188,521,185 8,295,012	371,125,502 130,381,991	404,863,382 170,838,259 16,216,422	601,587,890 254,957,731 42,987,876	891,844,427 324,503,719 200,242,907	991,858,103 309,180,927 298,332,929
KOREA	2,690,083	5,885	8,901,642	7,905,825	49,338,854	18,306,782	142,613,180	238,080,099	107,905,016
SINGAPORE	3,468,843	22,907	6,851,848	5,387,536	5,411,681	10,174,782	13,647,361	15,080,924	21,080,418
88	20,908,315	39,825,436	38,311,408	44,428,135	101,574,213	47,686,533	38,028,744	35,751,194	77,530,729
¥	5,163,890	8,047,872	1,445,582	1,880,116	5,113,507	1,972,257	5,813,575	5,181,745	19,423,997
W.GERMANY	14,928,008	28,626,945	55,711,300	46,015,075	76,438,812	28,186,780	14,331,085	33,980,402	45,285,282
ALL OTHERS	11,423,139	28,230,470	17,072,435	21,659,483	20,785,746	33,209,734	109,355,219	42,898,282	158,984,360
Country	1978	1878	T 0	T A L E X P 1981	TOTAL EXPORTS; DOLLAR 1981 1982 1983	L L A R V A 1983	V A L U E 1984	1985	1986
Q IBU	94.537.026	154.787.088	181,422,965	150,359,521	240,411,158	163,358,460	146,193,801	180,504,880	252,981,589
IAPAN	R-789-744	10.180.973	13,136,208	11,177,203	26,927,602	17,503,979	16,931,912	13,625,475	15,706,998
TATMAN	1.279.983	300,027	620,571	1,690,829	898,520	1,839,343	741,894	1,842,328	1,612,501
KOREA	1,134,661	1,620	548,300	1,283,212	1,380,027	5,322,151	2,652,729	5,128,237	2,968,383
SINGAPORE	565,180	730	1,223,713	2,548,508	6,587,430	3,220,490	8,217,509	412,832	581,808
8	33,608,692	51,088	59,783,902	59,294,529	90,897,694	65,038,600	52,331,098	63,704,585	118,947,884
¥	7,884,888	10,636	33,741,881	21,611,823	34,236,667	47,857,854	16,253,944	22,886,933	35,370,447
W. BERMANY	7,898,041	8,028	18,290,780	21,718,233	23,711,557	17,789,712	5,636,143	2,534,520	1,829,024
ALL OTHERS	48,178,815	90,907,437	86,130,271	74,355,241	113,721,882	70,435,897	67,318,459	95,793,203	115,183,036

Sources Department of Commerce

U.S. IMPORTS, 1978-1988 OPTICAL ELEMENTS INCLUDING ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN END-PRODUCTS:

PERCENTAGE MARKET SHARES BY COUNTRY

Country	1978	1978	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
TORLD	100.00%	100,00%	100,00%	100.00%	100,00%	100,00%	100.00%	100.00%	100,00%
APAN	73.83%	75,84%	78,46%	74,92%	75.41%	74,52%	89.84%	55.07%	50,35%
TAIWAN	5.74%	5,33%	3.78%	3,47%	4.87%	5,70%	10,18%	16.39%	22,43%
KOREA	4.96%	4.17%	3.94%	4.90%	5.87%	8.03%	7,25%	8.00%	8.17%
INGAPORE	0.45%	0.31%	38%	0.97%	0.51%	0.50%	0.91%	0.24%	0.32%
ម្ព	2,87%	3,37%	3.67%	4.32%	3.81%	5,21%	3.44%	2.83%	4.38%
¥	0.25%	0.39%	0.52%	0.33%	0.46%	1,21%	1.03%	1.168	2.41%
1. BERMANY	2,20%	2.47%	2.82%	3,23%	2.14%	1.52%	1.03%	0.78%	0.81%
ALL OTHERS	12,18%	10.98%	8-82%	11.42%	8.83%	8.04%	9.17%	17.48%	14,35%
			-	- -			i	!!!	
Country	1978	1979	1990	1981-	1982	1983	1984	1985	1988
MORLD	100.00%	100.00%	100,00%	100.00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%
JAPAN	70.87%	51,20%	53,24%	53,83%	35.13%	42,20%	42,38%	48,82%	34.18%
TAIMAN	0.68%	3,88%	2,05%	2.85%	7.10%	4.01%	7.15%	28,95%	29,88%
KOREA	1.81%	2,54%	3.14%	2.53%	13,29%	4.52%	29.71%	34.57%	10.88%
SINGAPORE	2,07%	88.8	2.42%	1.72%	1.46%	2,51%	2.27%	2,18%	2,13%
8	12,49%	17,19%	13,51%	14.19%	27,37%	11,78%	8.32%	5,17%	7.82%
美	3.09%	3,46%	0.51%	0.53%	1,38%	0.49%	0.97%	0.75%	1.98%
W. GERMANY	8,92%	11,49%	19.85%	14,70%	20.60%	%96°9	2,38%	4.91%	4.58%
AN I NTHERS	360 0	40 40%	360	3600	R. RIPK	ALIC O	48.48%	8,0 <u>0</u> 8	15,83%

Source: Department of Commerce

TOTAL U.S. IMPORTS OF OPTICAL ELEMENTS 1978-1988

BY END-PRODUCT; ELEMENTS

TUTAL 118,280,480 124,302,483 128,641,770 144,814,088 148,208,523 156,435,785 223,167,418 280,786,822 279,182,097 Still cameras 19,039,300 124,302,483 22,448,802 28,780,488 34,796,532 57,948,608 101,151,612 122,258,150 Talescopes 19,073,902 21,885,180 21,059,70 23,881,882 28,356,890 30,112,180 57,186,870 42,300,410 Photographic Lenser, Mounted 22,381,322 32,385,482 32,385,180 22,358,710 24,385,170 24,385,170 34,795,580 30,112,180 57,222,470 34,000,410 Optical Elements, Unmounted 12,228,372 10,504,116 11,330,116 13,215,187 7,387,438 10,219,830 12,828,436 10,717,427 34,717,427 Optical Elements, Unmounted 12,228,372 10,504,116 11,7330,116 11,244,888 38,306,180 26,728,688 10,219,830 12,828,684 36,317,168 Photocopiers NA A,243,786 10,504,118 4,421,560 5,981,489 1,982,488 1,982,488<	22,381,820 22,381,822 20,380,800 12,228,872 8,785,218 7,142,502 7,142,502	1 -	28,780,484 21,059,750 38,978,098 22,538,710	148,208,523 30,055,388 23,981,860 41,144,988 21,853,150	34,796,532 25,356,890 38,306,180	223,167,418 57,848,608 30,112,180		
21,830,358 24,080,516 22,448,802 28,780,484 30,055,398 34,796,532 67,948,608 101,151,612 12 19,073,900 19,620,430 21,685,190 21,059,750 23,981,880 25,356,890 30,112,180 57,188,870 4 22,391,922 31,733,502 32,368,492 36,976,098 41,144,988 38,306,160 55,935,884 38,211,222 3 20,380,900 14,290,400 16,495,270 22,538,710 21,653,150 26,725,530 37,722,470 39,531,770 3 12,226,872 12,938,265 10,504,118 11,330,118 13,215,187 10,820,057 13,866,840 14,084,942 1 6,795,218 8,937,000 10,044,174 10,729,728 7,875,074 7,387,436 10,219,830 12,822,884 7,203,296 7,142,502 7,386,534 8,219,018 4,421,550 5,008,970 5,981,874 6,023,480 7,45,768 289,648 683,788 1,349,188 1,478,812 2,047,208 1,883,289 1,795,104 2,974,3	21,830,358 19,079,900 22,391,922 20,360,800 12,228,872 8,785,218 NA 7,142,502 745,768		28,760,484 21,059,750 36,976,098 22,538,710	30,055,398 23,981,880 41,144,988 21,853,150	34,796,532 25,356,890 38,306,180	57,948,608 30,112,180		
18,078,900 19,620,430 21,685,190 21,059,750 23,981,880 25,356,680 30,112,180 57,168,870 4 22,391,922 31,733,502 32,366,482 36,976,086 41,144,988 38,306,160 55,935,684 39,211,222 3 20,360,800 14,290,400 16,465,270 22,538,710 21,653,150 26,725,530 37,722,470 39,531,170 3 12,228,672 12,389,265 10,504,114 11,330,114 13,215,197 10,820,057 13,656,940 14,064,942 1 R, 795,214 8,937,000 10,044,174 10,729,728 7,875,074 7,867,436 10,219,830 12,622,884 12,622,884 NA NA 2,603,784 3,537,580 3,288,672 4,473,720 5,888,024 7,203,296 7,203,296 7,142,502 7,388,534 6,287,86 8,219,016 4,421,550 5,006,870 5,981,024 7,203,296 7,45,768 289,646 683,766 1,314,246 1,478,881 2,047,206 1,818,720 1,795,104	18,078,900 22,381,922 20,380,800 12,228,872 6,785,218 7,142,502 745,788		21,059,750 38,976,098 22,538,710	23,981,860 41,144,988 21,853,150	38,306,180	30,112,180		
22,391,922 31,733,502 32,368,482 36,976,088 41,144,888 38,306,160 56,935,684 38,211,222 38,211,222 38,211,222 38,211,222 38,211,222 38,211,222 38,211,70 38,21,70 38,21,71 38,21,71	22,331,922 3 20,360,800 1 12,228,672 1 8,785,218 NA 7,142,502 745,788	3,502 0,400	38,976,098 22,538,710	41,144,988	38,308,180		57,189,870	42,900,410
20,380,800 14,280,400 16,485,270 22,538,710 21,853,150 26,725,530 37,722,470 39,531,170 3 12,228,872 12,838,255 10,504,118 11,330,118 13,215,187 10,820,057 13,666,840 14,084,942 1 RA 12,938,255 10,044,174 10,729,728 7,875,074 7,387,436 10,219,830 12,822,884 1 7,142,502 7,388,534 3,537,580 3,288,672 4,473,720 5,898,024 7,203,296 7,442,502 7,388,534 6,218,018 4,421,550 5,006,870 5,951,874 6,023,460 745,78 289,648 563,78 1,312,488 1,312,488 1,514,298 1,818,720 1,795,104 2,974,362 2,713,748 1,305,888 1,149,188 1,478,812 2,047,208 1,837,398 3,810,240 2,089,848 1,919,412 7,44,216 783,592 2,184,624 1,353,448	20,380,800 1 12,228,872 1 8,735,218 NA 7,142,502 745,788	0,400	22,538,710	24,653,150	200 200 000	55,835,684	38,211,222	38,517,158
Ls, Unmounted 12,228,672 12,938,255 10,504,116 11,330,116 13,215,187 10,820,057 13,856,940 14,084,942 1 Ls, Mounted 6,795,216 8,937,000 10,044,174 10,729,728 7,875,074 7,387,436 10,249,830 12,622,884 1 NA 2,803,784 3,537,589 3,286,672 4,473,720 5,888,024 7,283,286 745,786 289,846 563,766 938,056 927,220 1,312,488 1,280,380 1,818,720 1,795,104 2,974,362 2,713,748 1,305,888 1,149,188 1,478,812 2,047,208 1,837,398 3,810,240 2,089,848 1,919,112 1,418,880 714,216 783,592 2,184,924 1,353,448	ments, Unmounted 12,228,872 1 ments, Mounted 8,785,218 s NA Lenses, Mounted 7,142,502 745,788			•		37,722,470	89,531,170	34,029,910
LS, Mounted 8,785,216 8,837,000 10,044,174 10,729,728 7,875,074 7,367,436 10,219,830 12,622,884 1 NA 2,603,784 3,537,580 3,268,872 4,473,720 5,886,024 7,203,296 NA 2,863,784 3,537,580 4,421,550 5,006,970 5,951,874 6,023,460 745,786 289,848 583,786 939,058 927,220 1,312,488 1,290,380 1,616,720 1,795,104 2,974,382 2,713,748 1,305,888 1,149,188 1,478,812 2,047,208 1,837,398 3,810,240 2,089,848 1,919,112 1,418,880 714,216 783,592 2,184,924 1,353,448	sents, Mounted 8,785,218 NA Lenses, Mounted 7,142,502 745,788	8,255	11,330,118	13,215,197	10,820,057	13,856,940	14,084,942	13,171,427
NA NA 2,803,784 3,537,580 3,288,672 4,473,720 5,888,024 7,203,296 888,734 7,285,328 6,218,018 4,421,550 5,006,870 5,851,874 6,023,460 745,768 289,648 563,768 938,058 827,220 1,312,488 1,290,380 1,818,720 1,795,104 2,874,382 2,713,748 1,305,888 1,149,188 1,478,812 2,047,208 1,837,398 3,810,240 2,089,848 1,919,112 1,418,880 714,218 783,592 2,184,224 1,353,448	NA Lenses, Mounted 7,142,502 745,788	2,000	10,729,728	7,875,074	7,367,438	10,219,830	12,622,884	10,773,042
see, Mounted 7,142,502 7,388,534 7,285,328 6,218,018 4,421,550 5,008,870 5,851,874 6,023,480 745,786 289,648 563,786 938,056 927,220 1,312,488 1,290,380 1,816,720 1,785,104 2,974,382 2,713,748 1,305,888 1,149,188 1,478,612 2,047,208 1,837,398 3,810,240 2,089,848 1,919,112 1,418,680 714,216 783,592 2,184,224 1,353,448	Lenses, Mounted 7,142,502 745,788		3,537,580	3,268,672	4,473,720	5,888,024	7,203,296	8,648,456
745,768 289,646 563,786 938,056 827,220 1,312,486 1,280,380 1,616,720 1,785,104 2,974,362 2,713,748 1,305,888 1,149,188 1,476,612 2,047,206 1,837,398 3,810,240 2,089,848 1,919,112 1,418,680 714,216 783,592 2,184,224 1,353,448	745,788		8,219,018	4,421,550	5,008,970	5,951,874	6,023,460	4,872,062
1,795,104 2,974,362 2,713,746 1,305,888 1,149,188 1,478,612 2,047,206 1,837,398 1, 3,810,240 2,089,848 1,919,112 1,418,680 714,216 783,592 2,184,224 1,353,448	10 G FUF 30C F		938,058	927,220	1,312,488	1,280,380	1,616,720	2,022,188
3,8f0,240 2,088,848 1,919,112 1,418,880 714,218 793,592 2,184,224 1,358,448	/p(u +n:400/4)	4,382	1,305,888	1,149,188	1,478,812	2,047,208	1,837,398	1,849,730
	3,810,240 2,06	9,848	1,418,680	714,218	793,592	2,184,224	1,353,448	538,560

BY END-PRODUCT: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL

End Product	1978	1979	1880					1985	
TOTAL	100.0%	100,0%	100.0%	100.0%	100,0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Still cereses	18,8%	19, 4%	17,5%					38, 0%	
Telescopse	16,4%	15.8%	16.9%					20.4%	
Photographic Lenses, Mounted	18,3%	25,5%	25.2%					13.6%	
Binoculars	17,5%	11,5%	12.8%					14.1%	
Optical Elements, Unmounted	10,5%	10,4%	8					5.0%	
Optical Elements, Mounted	GI CU	7.2%	7.8%					4.5%	
Photocoalere	¥	ž	%0 "0					%9°2	
Projection Lenses, Mounted	8.1%	5,9%	5.7%					2.1%	
Microscopes	28 0	0.2%	0.4%					0.6%	
Projectors	1.5%	9.4X	2.1%					, 7 , 0	
Motion Cameras	3.4%	1.7%	1.5%					20,0	

Sources Department of Commerce

STILL CAMERAS CONTAINED ELEMENTS

74 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 21,830,358 24,080,516 22,448,802 28,760,484 30,055,398 3 17,341,058 18,629,708 19,567,362 22,314,968 20,951,052 2 17,100,772 1,820,158 1,231,044 2,248,748 3,581,804 32,580 450 5,970 216,534 714,390 718,332 136,784 321,364 87,398 41,286 308,582 136,784 321,364 87,398 41,286 308,582 136,582 14,286 306,582 14,286 306,582 14,286 306,582 14,286 306,582 14,81,858 14,181,858 3,055,278 4,834,844 14,88 14,88 14,88 14,88 14,880 14,81,88 14,81,88 14,81,88 14,81,88 14,81,88 14,81,81 18,				u, s,	IMPORTS: QUANTITY	S t Q U A N .	LITY			
21,830,358	Country	1978	1879	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1885	1988
17,341,056 18,629,708 18,567,382 22,314,966 20,951,052 22,560 30,854 123,396 32,560 30,762 17,100,772 1,820,156 1,231,044 2,248,748 3,581,804 123,396 360,762 271,638 215,748 396,450 718,332 1574,494 586,370 216,534 714,390 718,332 400,320 198,564 89,394 601,314 344,064 2,390,894 2,898,798 1,161,858 3,055,278 4,694,844 1978 1979 1980 1981 1981 1982	MORLD	21,830,358	24,080,516	22,448,802	28,760,484	30,055,398	34,788,532	57,948,608	101,151,812	122,259,150
1,100,772 1,620,156 1,231,044 2,248,746 3,561,804 32,580 43,848 56,258 30,854 123,396 380,782 271,838 215,748 396,450 5,970 574,494 596,370 216,534 714,390 718,332 138,764 321,854 87,398 41,286 308,582 400,320 198,584 89,394 601,314 344,084 2,380,894 2,898,798 1,181,858 3,055,278 4,894,844 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982	JAPAN	17,341,058	18,629,708	19,587,382	22,314,968	20,951,052	28,139,588	31,959,930	35,467,844	42,267,480
32,580 43,848 56,258 30,854 123,396 380,782 271,638 215,748 396,450 5,970 574,494 596,370 216,534 714,390 718,332 436,764 321,854 87,386 41,286 308,582 400,320 198,564 89,394 601,314 344,084 2,380,694 2,888,798 1,181,858 3,055,278 4,884,844 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982	TAIMAN	1,100,772	1,620,158	1,231,044	2,248,748	3,581,804	4,945,428	14,214,600	37,887,788	50,581,092
380,782 271,838 215,748 396,450 5,970 574,494 598,370 216,534 714,390 718,332 718,332 400,320 198,564 89,394 601,314 344,084 22,380,894 2,888,788 1,161,858 3,055,278 4,684,844 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1982 20,818,158 23,910,804 22,819,044 23,954,544 34,919,468 1	KOREA	32,580	43,848	56,258	30,654	123,398	111,158	1,387,488	2,119,842	2,842,932
574,494 588,370 216,534 714,390 718,332 138,784 321,854 87,396 41,286 308,582 400,320 198,564 89,394 601,314 344,064 2,380,694 2,888,798 1,181,858 3,055,278 4,684,844 1978 1978 1980 1981 1982 1982 20,818,158 23,810,804 22,819,044 23,854,544 34,819,468 1	SINGAPORE	380,782	271,638	215,748	396,450	5,970	13,152	94,148	35,178	7,452
138,784 321,954 87,396 41,286 308,582 400,320 198,584 89,394 601,314 344,064 2,380,694 2,898,798 1,181,858 3,055,278 4,694,844 1978 1980 1981 1982 20,818,158 23,910,804 22,819,044 23,954,544 34,919,488 1	8	574,494	598,370	216,534	714,390	718,332	1,127,172	1,874,510	2,782,190	6,541,200
400,320 188,584 89,384 601,314 344,084 2,380,694 2,888,798 1,161,858 3,055,278 4,694,844 1978 1980 1981 1982 20,818,158 23,910,804 22,819,044 23,954,544 34,919,488 1	当	138,784	321,954	87,396	41,286	308,582	723,896	1,238,878	1,844,480	5,048,150
2,380,694 2,888,788 1,161,858 3,055,278 4,694,844 1978 1980 1981 1982 20,818,158 23,810,804 22,819,044 23,954,544 34,919,488 1	W.GERMANY	400,320	198,564	89,394	601,314	344,064	265,848	295,926	582,808	779,154
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1982 20,818,158 23,816,804 22,819,044 23,854,544 34,819,468 1	ALL OTHERS	2,380,894	2,888,798	1,181,858	3,055,278	4,694,844	2,480,038	8,637,924	23,078,970	20,018,894
20,818,158 23,910,804 22,819,044 23,954,544 34,919,488 1	o to to	973	9	U. S.	EXPORT:	S: DUAN.	1 I F Y	4084	2. 0. 0. 0. 0.	4- 0 0 0 0
20,818,158 23,910,804 22,819,044 23,954,544 34,919,488 1	000000	20		2001		1001				
1,927,122 2,390,078 1,697,786 1,688,438 4,237,488	WORLD JAPAN	20,818,158	23,910,804 2,390,078	22,819,044 1,697,796	23,954,544 1,688,438	34,919,468 4,237,488	18,748,874	13,928,858 574,404	15,887,316 372,498	19,674,138 373,704

Sources Department of Commerce

6,228

11,321,526 699,906

> 1,309,158 93,102 7,957,848

> > 458,340 7,864,014

7,481,420

5,382,318

1,172,370

8,625,080 3,214,512

12,621,846 3,620,682

7,907,940

1,997,948

2,004,930 10,505,528

ALL OTHERS

W. GERMANY

1,170 142,356 1,428,510

3,186,084

8,385,168

36,078 38,352

7,620 10,356

87,834

4,188

5,864 7,128

102,012

84,716

28,160 12,498 555,414

20,670 4,508 103,602 8,995,920 1,391,790 3,417,318

85,838

12,860 24,858 189,756 9,880,118 2,325,192 1,588,£74 11,680,736

368,300

TAIMAN KOREA

13,658

157,128 7,815,798 1,954,508

SINGAPORE

88

59,766

7,886,480

CARLILL LEDGE INC. ASSET

CHAIN BORGET MAN

TELESCOPES CONTAINED ELEMENTS

25. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25.	82 84 4 81 81 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82	1,430 21,685,190 21,069,750 23, 1,720 17,100,720 15,084,840 14, 1,225,250 3,025,880 4, 1,225,250 3,025,880 4, 1,225,250 3,025,880 4, 1,230 447,470 821,770 2,130 435,850 482,770 1, S, E X P O R T S : 1980 1981 16 1,248,955 2,448,425 2, 1,244 40,840 298,999 1,843 55,777 53,984 2,148,426 2,448,425 2, 1,244 40,840 298,999	21,685,190 21,069,750 23, 24,00,720 15,084,840 14, 22,240 204,520 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
204,520 3,025,880 0 821,770 7,230 482,770 2,112,940 E X P O B T 1981 2,448,425 53,884 53,884 1981,999 109,999 109,944 152,000 100,144	204,520 3,025,880 0 821,770 7,230 482,770 2,112,940 E X P O R T 1981 5,2448,425 5,384 5,384 6,003 152,000 152,000 152,000 152,003	2,240 204,520 1,225,250 3,025,880 0 447,470 821,770 9,720 7,230 435,850 482,770 2,909,510 2,112,940 1, S, E X P 0 R T 1980 1981 4,748,955 2,448,425 1 45,777 53,984 1 40,640 298,999 1 55,777 53,984 2,909,940 298,999 3 56,272 209,344 4,180 850,144 6,003	90,840 2,240 204,520 7,300 0 0 0 335,380 447,470 821,770 15,030 9,720 7,230 283,470 435,850 482,770 3,738,480 2,908,510 2,112,940 1979 1980 1981 7,844,028 4,748,955 2,448,425 65,581 65,777 53,984 1418,943 56,272 208,344 1,480 0 152,000 1,480 0 152,000 1,480 0 0 152,000 1,480 0 0 152,000 1,480 0 0 152,000
	2,240 1,225,250 0 447,470 9,720 495,850 2,909,510 1980 4,748,955 55,777 40,840 55,777 40,840 56,273 910,284	2, 2, 2, 4	19589,710 1,2 90,840 1,2 7,300 4 335,380 4 15,030 6 15,030 6 15,030 6 1979 19 1979 19 1979 4,3 1979 19 1979 1979 19 1979 1979 197

Source: Department of Commerca

PHOTOGRAPHIC LENSES, Mounted CONTAINED ELEMENTS

Country	1978	1979	u, S. 1980	IMPORTS 1981	IMPORTS: QUANTITY 1981 1982 1983	1 I T Y 1983	1984	1985	1986
WORLD	99.384.822	34.733.502	32,368,482	38,976,098	41,144,988	38,308,180	55,935,684	38,211,222	38,517,158
JAPAN	19,530,714		28,538,798	31,447,868	34,891,770	31,726,884	47,877,248	33,538,412	90,107,582
TAIMAN	1,705,802		1,527,308	1,896,942	2,032,830	1,608,770	2,172,972	1,240,350	1,249,446
KOREA	438,720		1,170,450	2,112,630	2,281,236	2,837,118	4,803,808	2,583,752	5,087,588
SINGAPORE	8,180		7,332	4,080	3,210	38,128	36	1,200	1,358
8	537,054	878,444	887,054	883,280	1,572,084	1,811,790	960,528	515,790	922,398
¥	5.928	9,150	4,890	2,288	19,770	33,504	31,986	11,844	4,818
W. GERWANY	518,180	653,460	851,834	453,284	261,842	558,858	241,998	150,348	118,344
ALL OTHERS	171,672	269,010	257,544	651,300	363,658	287,472	321,284	320,718	1,148,808
			æ ≃	2 - a - a - a - a - a - a - a - a - a -	YTITAMIOSS	TITY			
Country	1978	1979	1980	1981	. =	1983	1984	1885	1986
u idua	578.848	735.444	501,222	598,322	712,530	840,728	624,884	1,646,016	184,790
JAPAN	17,408	12,818	18,784	24,782	72,968	27,882	48,126	46,958	34,260
TATMAN	330	1,008	138	1,440	270	732	158		834
KOREA	300	408	4,880	19,752	48,122	83,754	218	5,934	2,480
SINGAPORE	480	150	4	1,182	426	5,582	798	5,748	30
8	281,594	415,500	259,212	402,564	500,862	578,478	401,108	1,548,828	54,482
当	71,454	216,996	89,358	322,242	453,908	553,748	378,212	1,449,782	8,178
W.BERWANY	13,512	151,782	129,390	44,454	24,258	14,250	11,778	38,328	18,684
ALL OTHERS	298,838	305,780	220,386	148,592	91,884	144,318	174,482	48,452	72,714

Sources Department of Connerce

SELECTION OF SELEC

BINOCULARS CONTAINED ELEMENTS

Country	1978	1979	U. S. 1980	IMPORT 8 1981	IMPORTS: QUANTITY 1981 1982 1983	I T Y 1983	1984	1985	1986
WORLD JAPAN TAIWAN KOREA SINGAPORE EC UK W. BERWANY ALL OTHERS	20,380,800 10,340,790 3,148,700 4,024,290 0 208,310 8,070 164,810 2,838,710	14,290,400 6,910,640 2,794,080 2,861,280 0 190,710 20,350 128,020	18,495,270 9,187,110 1,599,760 2,071,480 0 152,780 160 121,250 3,484,180	22,538,710 13,512,250 8,000 1,885,940 0 162,940 450 99,680	21,853,150 16,405,950 448,580 1,539,130 198,770 2,100 130,810	28,725,530 17,808,020 1,085,770 1,443,550 2,313,700 2,313,700 80 213,550	37,722,470 25,825,830 2,808,550 2,471,380 1,567,230 7,880 280,510	39,531,170 28,158,420 2,338,150 7,800 1,595,850 1,330 306,820 8,743,970	34,029,910 3,008,990 2,273,900 0 878,060 400 253,950 9,193,320
Country	1978	1878	U, S.	EXPORT 1981	S: QUANTITY 1982 1983	1983	1984	1985	1988
WORLD JAPAN TAIMAN KOREA SINGAPORE EC UK W. GERMANY ALL OTHERS	434,220 16,020 5,410 54,830 17,670 17,080 40,380	1,019,720 19,930 2,280 18,210 3,280 248,330 30,970 53,880	848,700 20,850 10,390 32,760 2,850 340,970 21,130 55,810	498,540 84,230 3,810 26,770 2,980 157,210 24,790 23,330	660,570 27,310 8,130 35,390 3,780 327,580 18,870 13,300	1,213,360 54,980 43,480 13,800 391,300 110,650	709,510 77,050 12,790 14,680 15,480 325,110 75,020 136,900	84,090 73,210 88,660 12,800 123,370 11,170 54,340	1,191,530 132,750 8,970 81,070 10,530 341,030 102,940 58,540

Sources Department of Commerce

OPTICAL ELEMENTS, Unmounted CONTAINED ELEMENTS

Country	1978	1879	u. S. 1980	1 M P O R T S 1981	S: QUANTITY 1982 1983	1 I T Y 1983	1984	1985	1986
				000	20 04	130 000 07	40 050 040	44 084 049	49 474 497
	12,228,872	12,838,255	10,504,116	11,000,110	1816012681	/minacini		340440044	
JAPAN	7,973,869	10,898,364	7,806,895	7,535,300	10,414,839	7,414,811	10,597,758	8,650,299	8,654,296
TAIMAN	540,194		290,912	309,998	226,481	481,922	857,917	344,418	540,681
KOREA	139,383	-	87,154	167,008	125,325	146,792	105,571	83,077	880,425
SINGAPORE	13,882		91,613	838,858	389,986	322,108	324,421	211,298	285,815
8	857,144	7	990,472	1,050,033	825,508	1,663,617	1,680,125	1,432,241	1,331,805
×	33,173		483,316	275,505	250,103	1,048,547	848,948	1,111,052	702,014
W.GERMANY	442,043	422,445	336,073	543,540	384,825	473,653	821,278	197,604	217,588
ALL OTHERS	2,904,219	968,964	1,257,272	1,587,921	1,223,079	780,807	491,151	3,333,612	1,478,405
			u, s,	EXPORT	S: QUANT	ΙΙΤΥ			
Country	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1988
WORLD	3,345,518	4,323,226	2,991,705	2,719,297	4,282,048	2,184,043	1,683,835	1,835,881	1,680,882
JAPAN	251,121	319,121	244,598	204,068	477,500	235,419	193,781	187,711	102,786
TAIMAN	48,084	10,503	11,770	31,127	16,958	24,991	8,848	19,576	11,147
KOREA	45,278	55,881	10,919	24,776	26,584	75,252	32,388	54,653	19,907
SINGAPORE	22,504	25,333	19,817	25,141	60,471	27,048	40,758	3,045	2,847
8	1,103,698	1,487,735	953,078	968,132	1,517,781	743,523	502,127	559,004	726,728
¥	285,853	354,834	193,616	178,720	423,967	308,092	125,752	155,410	47,789
W.GERMANY	267,072	245,872	334,878	378,577	407,419	204,593	50,484	24,688	12,482
ALL OTHERS	1,874,832	2,444,873	1,751,522	1,488,052	2,182,754	1,077,811	906,076	1,081,871	817,666

Sources Department of Commerce

OPTICAL ELEMENTS, Mounted CONTAINED ELEMENTS

Country	1978	1979	U. S.	IMPORTS: QUANTITY 1981 1982 1983	1982	1 T Y 1983	1984	1985	1986
WORLD JAPAN TAIWAN KOREA SINGAPORE EC UK W.GERMANY	8,795,216 5,686,098 0 1,620 75,558 819,356 68,802 406,830	8,837,000 7,071,788 125,802 50,888 11,538 1,209,128 61,18,	10,044,174 7,424,712 22,488 489,224 32,490 1,530,782 54,664 1,432,074 584,488	10,729,728 7,737,300 110,112 74,154 167,788 2,343,678 50,472 2,265,012	7,875,074 5,925,986 38,244 57,888 295,644 1,288,028 13,440 1,850,538	7,367,436 6,428,256 24,462 43,484 282,848 417,402 10,874 384,392 191,004	10,219,830 8,780,246 112,584 100,998 287,450 560,898 60,270 448,038	12,622,884 9,820,352 82,604 16,350 409,518 818,834 29,442 574,184 1,885,228	10,773,042 9,171,408 201,780 41,970 444,708 528,296 21,144 487,820
Country	1878	1979	u, S. 1980		EXPORTS: QUANTITY 1981 1982 1983	7 I T Y 1983	1984	1985	1986

198,878 39,028 7,538 2,537 92,400 1,996 86,320 684,794 1,026,172 186,672 26,883 4,040 2,868 28,221 257,555 49,299 11,614 25,296 6,123 13,853 52,880 7,474 15,812 644,753 138,985 163,789 11,510 8,480 8,489 130,847 3,940 40,709 709,878 195,954 25,242 3,198 4,790 222,837 5,427 167,809 257,954 544,103 107,459 6,276 5,083 106,017 7,406 86,356 319,057 543,688 104,845 13,320 1,701 1,618 72,052 43,588 350,051 8,124 19,384 11,327 281,017 38,579 8,000 508 11,725 35,104 354,927 ALL OTHERS SINGAPORE W.GERMANY TAIMAN JAPAN KOREA MORE

71,850 85,484 17,276 50,016 5,011

753,882 120,859 13,138 428,418

Source: Department of Commerce

PHOTOCOPIERS CONTAINED ELEMENTS

				ร์ ก	IMPORTS	. QUANTITY	×ΙΙ			
Country	1978	1979	ļ	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1988
WORLD	¥	_	 §	2,603,784	3,537,580	3,288,872	4,473,720	5,898,024	7,203,298	8,648,456
JAPAN	Ā		≨	2,396,144	3,364,200	3,103,328	4,248,872	5,489,248	8,758,738	8,165,000
TAIMAN	¥		¥	3,138	1,544	1,864	98	240	90	200
KOREA	\$		¥	800	2,296	3,272	2,608	1,352	5,192	1,328
SINGAPORE	¥		¥	0	C	35	624	0	0	128
品	¥		¥	160,000	118,592	127,800	161,304	264,352	214,112	253,344
美	¥		¥	180	338	896	13,168	30,632	2,144	7,376
W. GERMANY	¥		¥	129,040	84,672	69,032	78,058	41,072	5,304	10,188
ALL OTHERS	¥		≨	43,704	50,928	32,576	60,218	132,832	227,178	228,458
Country	1978	1979		U. S.	E X P O R T S 1981	S: QUANTITY 1982 1983	. I T Y 1983	1984	1985	1988
WORLD	¥		\$	¥	311,782	339,720	348,304	343,120	274,424	404,128
JAPAN	W		≨	¥	13,178	13,040	15,128	12,178	16,592	22,712
TAIMAN	¥		¥	AN	1,192	889	368	640	344	809
KOREA	¥		≨	NA NA	448	208	1,120	1,888	544	80
SINGAPORE	¥		¥	¥	2,528	3,024	1,472	1,258	1,032	1,472
유	¥		≨	¥	129,184	108,704	167,752	131,120	808*89	33,464
吴	≨		≨	AN	20,712	29,580	34,888	30,192	19,184	9,056
M. GERMANY	≨		ş	≨	17,320	14,800	31,112	28,240	17,832	1,048
ALL OTHERS	¥		¥	NA NA	185,284	218,056	162,464	198,040	186,104	345,792

Source: Department of Commerce

PROJECTION LENSES, Mounted CONTAINED ELEMENTS

Country	1978	1979	u . s. 1980	IMPORTS:	1982 1983	1 T Y 1983	1984	1985	1986
WORLD	7.442.502	7.388.534	7.295.328	6.219.018	4,421,550	5,006,970	5,851,874	6,023,460	4,672,062
JAPAN	6,123,168	5.942.676	6,083,412	4,994,658	4,117,434	4,678,082	5,390,468	5,528,998	4,001,472
TAIMAN	0	0	9,000		0	0	7,878	825	369,114
KOREA	12,000	0	0	0	0	0	4,740	0	0
SINGAPORE	360	0	980	•	30,090	140,364	880	1,200	5,982
8	254,328	221,834	185,154	180,702	135,300	137,448	206,070	191,238	204,882
¥	17,208	14,820	27,248	85,614	86,318	8,336	43,374	43,782	22,482
W. GERMANY	230,640	192,402	110,154	69,354	58,112	10M,772	107,028	106,278	157,758
ALL OTHERS	752,846	1,203,924	1,018,772	1,043,668	138,728	51,098	342,080	303,174	90,612
Country	1878	1978	U. S. 1980	E X P O R T 8	S: QUANT 1982	1 T Y .	1984	1985	1986
WORLD	230,862	487,446	1,481,948	720,270	1,484,984	3,388,544	2,838,868	2,747,748	3,199,314
JAPAN	18,180	30,840	749,418	313,422	204,480	1,110,654	1,928,262	1,710,824	1,210,074
TAIMAN	120	380	2,772	840	1,290	0	11,864	840	18,804
KOREA	1,200	264	0	240	3,354	2,550	2,700	17,528	36,450
SINGAPORE	윱	388	30,908	8,628	3,732	5,928	3,822	8,190	1,350
8	53,784.	69,038	443,490	153,156	853,140	1,472,334	738,632	823,718	1,753,968
š	11,628	23,604	21,120	43,448	28,938	17,544	10,572	16,032	17,084
W. GERMANY	18,024	16,440	395,520	67,644	504,998	951,788	0	0	0
ALL OTHERS	157,388	386,550	255,380	244,014	418,968	777,078	153,788	186,852	178,668

Sources Department of Commerce

PROJECTORS CONTAINED ELEMENTS

Country	1978	1878	u, s. 1980	IMPORTS 1981	1982 1983	1 T Y 1983	1984	1985	1986
WORLD	1,785,104	2,874,382	2,713,748	1,305,888	1,149,198	1,478,812	2,047,208	1,837,388	1,649,730
JAPAN	889,238	597,386	897,484	387,986	540,150	818,658	699,438	579,894	357,078
TAIWAN	0	17,280	52,280	178,694	95,454	35,142	495,084	597,584	245,904
KOREA	8,000	3,444	2,100	60	0	1,824	0	4,178	13,200
SINGAPORE	38,688	83,018	115,500	139,178	218	368	8,454	1,410	120
88	97,512	105,284	62,508	126,906	168,286	277,368	344,004	333,744	383,522
当	15,068	8,052	9,024	4,758	578	5,250	3,690	888	25,368
W. GERMANY	38,184	25,074	24,846	34,014	65,082	137,574	81,134	77,978	78,536
ALL. OTHERS	963,666	2,167,992	1,783,914	465,120	347,112	343,254	500,226	320,610	838,906
			6	ж С С	SECENT	X	·		
Country	1878	1878	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1988

Sources Department of Commerce

ALL OTHERS

W.GERMANY

731,498 39,600 5,340 5,280 11,016 263,588 105,810 43,188

841,188 26,882 10,422 5,328 11,088 316,512 120,098 59,922 440,976

940,422 49,958 7,718 4,812 13,782 285,270 100,452 83,908 578,888

1,059,384 47,034 18,942 9,372 16,932 435,788 188,334 78,768

1,239,398 89,718 52,110 9,804 18,018 406,988 133,224 72,954 862,760

1,707,498 66,138 12,954 10,302 17,688 589,722 193,452 109,692

1,710,234 81,822 5,282 16,858 18,732 636,678 206,172 129,180 951,084

1,989,050 85,404 22,176

2,168,942

WORLD JAPAN TAIWAN

10,692 8,012 883,542 294,888 132,180 958,224

78,254 7,812 11,718 7,802 938,532 312,938 184,724

SINGAPORE

KOREA

MICROSCOPES CONTAINED ELEMENTS

			u. S.	IMPORTS	SIDUANT	ΙΤΥ			
Country	1978	1878	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
WORLD	745,768	289,846	583,786	938,058	927,220	1,312,488	1,290,380	1,618,720	2,022,188
MPAN.	410.682	210.378	481,918	847,896	443,898	573,244	649,446	783,986	1,804,064
TATWAN	112		14	7007	380,072	612,528	483,528	70,728	204,036
KOREA	84	592	4	88	1,050	154	1,470	1,414	7,840
STNGAPORE	•	0	0	252	14	0	28	385	æ
8	324.100	48.438	91,602	55,216	50,882	64,806	89,600	158,354	110,152
¥	4.722	7,742	4,748	4,396	4,648	19,292	22,878	15,554	7,112
W. GFRMANY	324.RB2	37.198	85,750	47,856	39,396	39,662	59,444	115,542	97,300
ALL OTHERS	10,808	32,584	10,192	33,964	51,324	61,754	86,282	601,848	890'96
			r, s,	EXPORTS	EXPORTS: QUANTITY	ΥTI		ļ	
Country	1978	1979	1980	1984	1982	1983	1984	1985	1988
WORLD	283,208	428,818	875,014	1,082,382	841,274	721,980	597,648	599,970	228,592
.IAPAN	5.858	18,058	12,822	4,914	3,738	1,932	8,870	8,174	6,454
TATER	8,552	1,162	980	1,974	9,724	3,332	8,960	1,568	3,220
KOREA	5,278	2,840	6,078	17,304	135,590	65,828	4,328	8,190	8,944
STNGAPORE	11.340	11,748	27,850	2,940	29,282	19,754	9,464	4,858	4,398
6	50,274	77,288	104,580	108,582	57,458	125,552	152,814	122,052	71,022
1 ≝	27.818	30,002	888,88	73,780	24,570	38,558	118,340	12,964	9,268
W. SFRWANY	8,580	10,444	10,360	9,576	6,858	31,360	15,512	100,254	18,998
ALL OTHERS	209,498	317,828	721,812	956,928	617,876	489,954	418,804	455,478	136,556


Source: Department of Commerce


MOTION CAMERAS CONTAINED ELEMENTS

			: ::	IXPORTS	S: QUANTITY	λ Ι Ι .			
Country	1978	1979	1980	1981	22	1983	1984	1985	1986
MORLD	3,910,240	2,089,848	1,919,112	1,418,680	714,216	783,582	2,184,224	1,353,448	538,560
JAPAN	2,873,400	1.841.008	1,682,528	1,247,952	881,980	729,488	424,352	373,888	125,838
TATEAN	104,320	78,720	95,912	67,736	34,152	37,618	1,783,312	939,480	356,160
KOREA	-	096	2,480	0	0	24	8	0	24,000
SINBAPORE	6	0	0	0	808	0	632	60	1,072
8	7,912	6,552	18,928	19,272	88948	21,632	10,138	21,920	24 r 704
 	40	72	24	40	98	168	152	144	844
W. BERMANY	5,528	5,592	16,144	17,248	8,338	18,440	8,768	18,752	18,032
ALL OTHERS	924,608	162,808	141,264	83,720	8,808	4,832	15,760	18,352	889 688
			ů, S.	EXPORTS	S: QUANTITY	TITY			
Country	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1988
WORLD	188,480	189,328	99,248	16,568	15,082	8,180	17,077	12,857	38,482
JAPAN	15,344	20,988	8,624	455	872	549	1,810	389	571
TAIMAN	488	184		88	8	48	0		102
KOREA	808	60		190	180	183	174	113	60
SINGAPORE	1,578	800	18	12	537	40	8	134	110
8	41,824	68,884	3,356	4,758	2,849	2,965	3,842	2,457	24,832
놀	12,978	42,180	888	1,484	775	1,054	3,178	1,180	3,920
W.GEPHANY	7,608	2,088	810	671	315	255	7	181	18,599
ALL OTHERS	129,032	80,704	89,222	11,129	10,524	5,424	11,123	9,780	12,861


Sources Department of Commerce


OPTICAL ELEMENTS 1978-1986





OPTICAL ELEMENTS 1978-1986












FIGURE 5

U.S. TRADE BALANCE: 1978-1986











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